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The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that semantic conventionalism of
a, more or less, Dummettian variety is unjustly neglected in contemporary
philosophy.
The strategy for arguing this is to make a conjecture about why people
ignore it; there seem to be two plausible reasons: 1) there are (what people
take to be) obviously preferable candidates on offer; 2) there are (what people
take to be) knock-down arguments against semantic conventionalism.
In response to 1), I consider intentionalist Gricean semantics, and argue
it is at least no better off than conventionalist theories. Of course, any
number of theories could be used oppose semantic conventionalism. But
the Gricean theory is seen as particularly strong, and showing that it is no
better off makes my case for the viability of semantic conventionalism all the
more compelling. For 2) I consider three possible reasons for thinking that
conventionalism has been refuted.
Chapter Three concerns the objection that semantic conventionalism de-
pends on the existence of “luminous” psychological states, of which there
are none (according to Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument). I agree with
Williamson, and reject luminosity as part of a viable conventionalist theory.
Chapter Four supposes that semantic conventionalist theories depend on
the (untenable) analytic/synthetic distinction to avoid collapse into holism.
However, I also reject the analytic/synthetic distinction for a more favourable
distinction.
In Chapter Five, the objection I consider is that semantic convention-
alism involves an epistemically constrained notion of truth and so collapses
into incoherence because of the knowability paradox. However, my response
to this is that the semantic conventionalist should be happy with such an
epistemic account of truth and that it does not lead to the knowability para-
iii
dox. The paradox can, and is, resolved in this chapter.
So, (1) and (2) are false. The concluding chapter brings together all that
we have learned throughout the dissertation about what a defensible version
of conventionalism might look like.
iv
Acknowledgments
Without the help and encouragement of many people, I most likely would
neither have started nor finished graduate school. My thanks go especially to
Professors David DeVidi, Timothy Kenyon, and Paul Tomassi — all three
contributed to my interest in philosophy of language and logic. Indeed,
without Paul Tomassi, my very first philosophy instructor, I would not have
decided on pursuing philosophy at all.
Tim Kenyon and Dave DeVidi supervised my work at different stages
of my Ph.D. By working with them I have gradually been learning what it
means to be a dedicated academic and what I need to do to reach my career
goals. And, of course, their help, and that of the department in general, in
finding sufficient funding kept me in graduate school.
Also, partial funding for this research was provided by the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada through a Standard Research
Grant to Robert Stainton (University of Western Ontario) for the project
”The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary from the Perspective of Cognitive Sci-
ence and Pragmatic Deficits in Autism.”
Finally, Debbie Dietrich and Linda Daniel have been supportive in many
ways — from finding wayward transcripts to indulging in tangential conver-
sations arising from (the occasional spell of) procrastination.
v
Dedication







2 Intention-Based Semantics 27
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 Plausibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.1 The Third Realm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.2 Behaviourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.3 Further Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 Intention-based Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.1 Natural versus Non-Natural Meaning . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.2 Reductive Definition of Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4 Objections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.1 Timeless Meaning — Humpty Dumpty . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.2 Speaker Meaning — Post hoc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.3 Speaker Meaning — Determining Intentions/Confabulation 48
2.4.4 Occasion meaning — Fine Grained . . . . . . . . . . . 49
vii
2.4.5 Occasion meaning — Coarse Grained . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 Luminosity 59
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Luminosity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Plausibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6 Conditions on the Linguistic Community . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4 Molecularism 78
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2 Holism and Atomism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Plausibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4 Objections to Holism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5 Objections to Atomism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.6 Inferentialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.6.1 Material Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.7 Direct/Indirect Inferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.7.1 Non-logical Inferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.7.2 Logical vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.8 Materially Correct and Other Inferences . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.9 The Linguistic Community and Knowledge of Language . . . 108
4.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5 The Paradox of Knowability 110
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2 The Paradox of Knowability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
viii
5.3 The Paraconsistent Solution: Dialetheism . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4 States of Information Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.5 Explication of S-O-I Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.5.1 Possible World Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.5.2 Kvanvig’s and Percival’s Objections . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.6 Paraconsistent logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.6.1 Minimal — Intuitionistic — Classical Logic . . . . . . 144
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In this dissertation I argue that a particular semantic theory — conven-
tionalism — is given insufficient consideration, particularly in contemporary
philosophy of language. The term ‘conventionalism’ is ubiquitous in philos-
ophy. Several examples are:
(1) David Lewis’s theory of meaning: Lewis’s theory of meaning is related
to the possibility of change in languages — languages are arbitrary and
conventional in that the meaning of lexical items can change.1
(2) Poincaré’s conventionalism about geometry.2
(3) Einstein’s conventionalism concerning the propagation of light.3
1See for instance (Pateman 1982, 135-157).
2Poincaré argued that there are both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, which
can equally well account for the structure of space. In addition, as we shall see, it impossible
to tell whether the universe is Euclidean or not. Whichever we choose is a matter of
convention. See for instance (Sklar 1977, 123-128).
3Einstein’s conventionalism is related to the speed of light. The idea is that, if one were
to bounce a beam of light off an object A to object B, then, bouncing it back from B to
A, the beam would travel at the same speed, under one possible interpretation. However,
it turns out that, using Einsteinean physics, this need not the case. Two options are now
available — either the speed of light is constant in both direction or the speed of light is
reduced from B to A. Whichever interpretation is chosen is a matter of convention. See
1
(4) The Carnapian principle of tolerance.4
So to say that this dissertation concerns conventionalism is not yet to
say much. The sort of conventionalism I have in mind is akin to Dummett’s
view. Dummettian semantic conventionalism is definitely a minority position
in contemporary philosophy of language, but I think that there is much to
be said for it. For various reasons, though, it is more often than not ignored
as a potentially viable semantic theory.
The sort of conventionalism I have in mind is broadly Dummettian in
spirit. At the basis of the semantic conventionalist theory lie the maxims
that ‘meaning is use’ and that to be a competent linguistic agent one must
‘master the rules of the language game’ — both of these are important to
the community-based theory of meaning, which is fundamental to semantic
conventionalism, since it is from the community that meaning arises. The
theory I present is neo-Dummettian for several reasons, as we shall see in a
moment.5
In addition to the maxims that ‘meaning is use’ and that to be a com-
petent linguistic agent one must have mustered the rules of the language
game, Dummett’s semantic conventionalism relies heavily on the notion of
for instance: (Sklar 1977, 297-294), (Maund 1974, 394-407), (Kennedy 2003).
4The conventionalism of the “Principle of Tolerance”: “might perhaps be more exactly
the ‘principle of the conventionality of language forms.” (Carnap 1963, 54-55) In regards
to formal systems Carnap states: “we do not wish to set up prohibitions, but rather to
stipulate conventions.” (Carnap 1934, 51)
5These maxims, of course, do not originate with Dummett, and are perhaps most
famously advocated by Wittgenstein. Moreover, there is a strand in the philosophical lit-
erature dealing with his work that takes his view to be a sort of conventionalism. However,
since there is very little that can be said about Wittgenstein that is not controversial, and
there would be little to gain for the present project in trying to defend the suggestion that
he was a conventionalist — that there was anything so systematic as a semantic theory in
his work for instance — I shall associate conventionalism with authors whose commitment
to the view is not controversial, like Dummett, and seek the indulgence of those who feel
that Wittgenstein is slighted by my doing so.
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‘thoughts’ (in the Fregean sense):
For Frege, thoughts — the contents of acts of thinking — are not
constituents of the stream of consciousness. . . (Dummett 1993, 22-23)
Thoughts, for Frege, are the meanings (i.e., the senses) of sentences. What
Dummett borrows from Frege is an insistence that meaning is not psycholo-
gistic. However, Dummett rejects the notion that meanings of lexical items
are objective, as Frege held them to be. For Frege meaning resides in the
‘third realm’ and is not directly accessible to the linguistic agent. Dummet-
tian conventionalism and my version of neo-Dummettian conventionalism, in
rejecting the third realm and psychologism, makes meaning intersubjective.
(Dummett 1993)
Of course I will not hope, in the space of this dissertation, to show that
conventionalism is the right or the only viable semantic theory, but I do
take it that it is, prima facie, a plausible theory and therefore should not be
ignored by philosophers of language.
One must wonder, then, why semantic conventionalism is supposed to
be so useless.6 I think likely reasons are that:
(1) semantic conventionalism is often thought to be an obviously lesser
candidate for an adequate semantic theory than some others.
(2) semantic conventionalism is regarded by some as unable to respond to
some fundamental, and potentially ruinous, objections.
In response to (1) I consider a particular example of a rival theory that
many think is clearly better — namely Gricean intention-based semantics.
6Some recent papers go as far as to state that semantic conventionalism is ‘obviously’
wrong, despite accepting that there are other types of conventionalism which are worthy
of discussion. See, for instance the examples provided by (Kannetzsky 2003) and (Mundy
1985).
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Intention-based semantics is interesting to investigate because: it is a par-
ticularly popular theory in current philosophy of language; it contrasts with
conventionalism in interesting ways; and intention-based semantics seems in-
tuitively correct to many people. However, I will show that intention-based
semantics is in no better shape than conventionalism — in chapter two, I
raise important objections which will show why intention-based semantics is
problematic.
While this is only one rival theory, the chapter can serve as a type of
exemplar — other rival theories could be shown to be at least equally prob-
lematic to conventionalism in a side-by-side comparison. To take up each
possible rival would be too large an undertaking though.7
In response to (2) I will consider three objections to conventionalism
which are often taken to be knock-down. Each objection turns on a plausible
claim that if conventionalism is true, then a particular (undesirable) feature
must follow: the existence of “luminous” mental states, a commitment to
the analytic/synthetic distinction, and an epistemically constrained notion
of truth. I devote a chapter to each objection, showing in each case that it
is not knock-down.
For the first two, I argue that the claims about the commitments of
conventionalism are false. For the third, I argue that the supposed unde-
sirable feature is not undesirable at all (in fact, it follows from semantic
conventionalism.)
The responses to (1) and (2) frame my argument that conventionalism
is a serious candidate for being the correct semantic theory. A nice fringe
benefit of the approach that I take is that we will learn a lot about what
a more plausible conventionalism would have to look like by the end of the
7It is worth remembering that it is easy to underestimate the difficulties confronting
currently popular theories — so for any other theory, I am assuming that it would be
possible to undertake a similar side-by-side comparison with semantic conventionalism.
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thesis.
Let me now describe what is included in the various chapters in the thesis
in slightly more detail.
In Chapter two I consider a semantic theory which is often thought to
be obviously stronger than semantic conventionalism — intention-based se-
mantics.
First, I will consider why intention-based semantics might seem to be a
preferable theory. But, second, I will show why intention-based semantics is
on no stronger ground than conventionalism.
While our prime interest in intention-based semantics is its role as a rival
to conventionalism, it is interesting to note that some of the key motivations
for intention-based semantics are shared with conventionalism.
One major worry for Grice and Dummett is the third realm. Since we do
not have direct access to the third realm, there must be some other theory
that gives us direct access to the meaning of sentence. Second, Grice and
Dummett object to a particular theory prevalent during the 1950s, namely
behaviourism. In the dissertation, I consider two forms of behaviourism, the
radical behaviourism of Skinner and the milder form proposed by Ryle. 8
The rejection of Frege’s third realm shows a theoretical economy, since
“thoughts” are abstract entities. Thoughts are meant to be fundamental
to meaning, but it is unclear what their nature consist in. For Grice, by
replacing thoughts with intentions we have a different way of explaining
what meaning is and where it comes from, thus avoiding the metaphysical
muddle of abstract objects in inaccessible realms.
Skinnerian behaviourism rejects mental states entirely. The resulting
theory is that semantics should be based on the behaviour of the linguistic
8For the relevant articles, see, (Skinner 1953), (Skinner 1957), (Skinner 1974), (Grice
1957), (Grice 1989c), (Ryle 1949), (Grice 1989b), (Grice 1975), and (Grice 1989a).
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agents entirely; that is, the activities of the agents. Correct language use
means behaving in an appropriate way. However, it is unclear, at least to
me, how one can develop a semantic theory along such radical behaviourist
lines. One might assume that what is actually being proposed is some sort
of code-theory, where an agent encodes what they intend to convey, they
speak, and their interlocutor decodes the utterance.9 However, this cannot
be the case for Skinner as he obviously rejects states and mental content as
contributors to10 a semantic theory.
Ryle’s behaviourism is, I think, a stronger theory, one which intention-
based semanticists and semantic conventionalists were quite right to reject —
but the details of Ryle’s behaviourism show that they were turning away from
what appears to be much more convincing than Skinnerian behaviourism.
Ryle’s milder form of behaviourism rests on dispositions to behave in
a certain way. The problem with other semantic theories, he thought, is
that non-behaviourist accounts of meaning are developed on the basis of a
category mistake. The incorporation of mental states (of a particular kind
— namely internalizing them) in a semantic theory is where the category
mistake lies. Mental states are usually taken to be internal, but according to
Ryle distinguishing between mental states and dispositions is distinguishing
what is actually the same thing. So Ryle did not do away with mental states
entirely. Dispositions were taken to be the mental states.— an extended
discussion of this will be taken up in due course. What is of importance
is that Grice and Dummett, quite rightly I think, found dispositions to be
insufficient to ground a semantic theory or to explain the grasp of meaning
by linguistic agents.
9What carries semantic content would be the mental representations of the agents.
10I am not a philosopher of mind, and so I will not discuss whether mental states and
mental content are identical or not. For Skinner it boils down to the same thing really —
what goes on in the head does not matter, only behaviour does.
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Belief, according to Ryle’s view, then, is a particular sort of dispositional
property. Given that mental states are the dispositions to behave in a certain
way, the “inner life” of the agent is irrelevant to semantics: a semantic theory,
then, is one which can account for the meaning of lexical items in terms of
dispositions.
The rejection of behaviourism further shows a strength of intention-based
semantics, since we obviously have intentions (of one sort or another). But,
mental states in intention-based semantics are dependent on internal mental
states, not to be conflated with dispositions. Without an adequate account
of how, or whether, they play a role in semantics must be considered.
Behaviourism was pervasive in philosophy of language in the 1950s, so it
was an important step in the progression of philosophy of language to move
from behaviour to intentions as the foundation for semantics.
While both conventionalist theories and intention-based theories sought
to distance themselves from the third realm and behaviourism, they went
off in opposing directions in seeking a non-platonic and non-behaviourist
account of meaning. In contrast to semantic conventionalism, Gricean se-
mantics does not rely on intersubjectivity of language, nor does it follow the
aforementioned conditions of a community based theory of meaning.
Now, why should we think that a theory based on intentions is correct? A
natural reason is that speakers do have particular intentions when they make
an utterance. We can clearly do different things with the same utterance —
the literal meaning of ‘nice hat’ is simply ‘nice hat’. But, the utterance can
be made in a sarcastic tone; with a tone which makes it clear that the speaker
means what he says; the utterance can be interpreted as an interrogative; or
the utterance can be an imperative, e.g., to take the hat off during Sunday
mass.
But, is this really so — does the sentence have one meaning with multiple
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applications? Perhaps one could argue that applying different force to the
same utterance actually changes the literal meaning.
I think, however, that intention-based semantics is at least as probleman-
tic as semantic conventionalism. Some problems that will be considered in
chapter two are:
(a) the Humpty Dumpty problem: the Humpty Dumpty problem indicates
why one must have a grasp of a language prior to being able to grasp
the intentions of the speaker. A common example of this problem is
from Caroll’s Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There
(Carroll 1994).
Humpty Dumpty says to Alice “There’s glory for you.” To which Alice
responds with “I don’t know what you mean.” “Of course you don’t” says
Humpty Dumpty “because I have not yet told you what it means. I use
“there’s glory for you” to stand for “there’s a nice knock-down argument.”
The problem here is that Alice cannot understand what Humpty Dumpty
has in mind (what his intentions are) when he says “there’s glory for you,”
because his intentions are not sufficient to make the utterance mean what
he intends it to mean. Only if “there’s glory for you” conventionally means
“there’s a nice knock-down argument” can Alice gauge what Humpty Dumpty
means by his utterance. Humpty Dumpty cannot, simply on the basis of his
intentions, make the first assertion mean the same thing as the second as-
sertion. Of course, it is frequent for a linguistic agent to misspeak and their
interlocutor is still able to grasp what was meant. But, I think that this does
not rely on interpreting intentions — rather the interlocutor understands the
misspoken utterance on the basis of existing conventions and a pragmatic
interpretation of the context of the utterance is what allows one to inter-
pret the utterance properly. But the latter is a matter of interpretation not
meaning.
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The lesson learned here is not just that intentions are insufficient to
provide a basis of meaning: Alice must rely on her preexisting knowledge
of the conventions of English if she has a hope of understanding Humpty
Dumpty’s use of the sentence. Intentions seem to indicate which grammatical
mood is being used, but do not affect the meaning of an utterance.
(b) intention-based semantics is open to the charge that intentions are post
hoc.
It is not unusual for someone to be asked why they did, or said, some par-
ticular thing. What often springs to mind is not the intention at the time of
utterance. Rather, the speaker considers what he may (must or most likely)
have intended in order for those intentions to have conferred a particular
meaning upon their utterance.
But this seems to imply that intentions are frequently or typically post
hoc — they are only considered by a speaker if challenged, and thereafter
are posited to be the intentions of the speaker at the time of utterance —
therefore, it would be the post hoc intentions that determine meaningfulness.
But one cannot have intentions being retroactively meaning conferring. If
intentions are post hoc intentions don’t determine the meaning of an utter-
ance (at the time of utterance), since the intentions simply were not present
at the right time.
(c) intention-based semantics is open to the charge that intentions are
indeterminate and confabulatory.
Determinate intentions may be the exceptional cases, which are not repre-
sentative of the majority of cases where intentions are indeterminate.
Since we cannot be sure that cases where intentions are explicit are mir-
rored by cases where they are implicit, it may be that the explicitly deter-
minate intentions are abnormal, and skew the data: explicit intentions may
9
differ radically in nature from those that are implicit. We simply do not and
cannot draw an analogy between implicit and explicit intentions as there is
no way to acquire empirical data that would determine whether they have
the same qualities — if they are not the same then explicit intentions would
be confabulatory.
(d) intention-based semantics is open to the charge that intentions can
either be too fine or coarse grained. For the former consider:
Grice’s account of occasion meaning in ‘Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions’
(Grice 1989b):
“U meant something by uttering x” is true if and only if, for some audience
A, U uttered x intending:
(1) A to produce a particular response r
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis [or at least in part] of his fulfilment of (2).
(Grice 1989b, 151)
Consider: an American soldier, call him Ted, is captured by Italians
during the Second World War. He wants the Italians to believe that he
is a German officer and so utters the only German phrase that he knows:
“Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühen?” (Lycan 2000, 107). The
utterance is made with the intention that:
(1) The Italian soldiers produce a belief that Ted is German.
(2) The Italian soldiers recognize that Ted intends them to form this belief.
(3) The Italian soldiers come to believe that Ted is a German on the basis
of [or at least in part because] the recognition of Ted’s intention for
them to form this belief.
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Thus, it seems that Ted’s utterance means “I am a German soldier.” But,
this is too fine-grained. Ted’s utterance cannot mean “I am a German sol-
dier” anymore than it may convey to his interlocutors that he thinks that
he is a pink giraffe or that his officious tone of voice means “Release me now
you incompetents” and so forth. His utterance is simply not specific enough.
In other circumstances intentions can also be too coarse-grained to con-
stitute speaker meaning: a parent may say to her young child “It’s ten
thirty!” The broad intention is to get her to go to sleep. The parent knows
that the child knows that ten thirty is considerably past bedtime and that
the child must go to bed. Of course, the child, understanding the intentions,
will most likely draw the correct inference that going to bed would be in her
best interest.
In this case, though, we appear to get a multiplicity of intentions. Initial
intentions which influence the meaning of the utterance would appear to be:
(1) the parent intends the child to think that the parent wants her to go
to bed; (2) the parent further intends for the child to understand that this
is her intention; and (3) the parent intends for her to go to bed because of
understanding the parent’s intention. However, the literal meaning of the
utterance merely reflects the time, not “Go to bed!” Intentions can be even
more coarse-grained than (1) to (3), however.
The parent may have (1’) work to get done, (2’) the parent further intends
for the child to understand that this is her intention; and (3’) the parent
intends for her to go to bed because of understanding the parent’s intention.
Another motivation might be that the parent has (1”) a need for some
relaxation time, (2”) the parent further intends for the child to understand
that this is her intention; and (3”) the parent intends for her to go to bed
because of understanding the parent’s intention.
One could easily expand upon this and provide additional examples, this
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will do for now, though. What then is the speaker meaning?
(1’) to (3’) and (1”) to (3”) may arguably fit the Gricean analysis so the
meaning of the sentence “It’s ten thirty!” would be “Go to bed!” I will
consider in Chapter Two, however, whether such a multiplicity of intentions
actually does fit the analysis. The analysis may very well provide different
meanings for each case.
I will consider whether a reconciliatory move is possible so that (1’)-
(3”) do fit the analysis on different occasions of utterance, but I will hold
off on this discussion until Chapter Two. It seems, prima facie, to be the
case, though, that, given the analysis, several speaker meanings can be at-
tached to the utterance (sometimes at the same time). But having multiple
speaker intentions, and the intentions being unknown by the audience, fails
the Gricean analysis of intention-based semantics. Ultimately, a reconcilia-
tory move is not possible to fit multiple speaker intentions into the Gricean
analysis, and so the problem of coarse grainedness stands.
We turn now to the next three chapters of the dissertation. As previously
mentioned they all concern what are taken to be knock-down arguments
against semantic conventionalism is clearly wrong. They are similar in their
approach. Chapters Three, Four, and Five revolve around claims of the
form: if conventionalism is true, then a particular undesirable feature must
follow. But there are compelling reasons to reject the features in question —
luminosity, the analytic/synthetic distinction (considered in Chapters Three
and Four respectively), and an epistemically constrained notion of truth
(Chapter Five).
I agree and show that luminosity and the analytic/synthetic distinction
must be rejected. But taking semantic conventionalism to imply an epis-
temically constrained notion of truth is actually something that I advocate.
So, the response shall look somewhat different than those of Chapters Three
12
and Four. The reason is that, if I am right that conventionalism implies an
epistemically constrained notion of truth I can show that conventionalism
results in epistemic anti-realism. This is precisely what I think conventional-
ism should imply. And, this is what allows me to get around the potentially
knock-down argument in Chapter Five.
The present discussion of the next three chapters will not be as extensive
as that relating to Chapter Two — the reason being that their similar form
allows us to deal with them quicker. What I will do is give an account of
each objection, my response, and an indication of how this contributes to
the development of the conventionalist semantics I advocate.
In Chapter Three, I consider Williamson’s charge that conventionalism
implies manifestability and hence luminosity of certain mental states. The
basic structure of this objection is that:
(1) If conventionalism is correct, then manifestability follows and if man-
ifestability is accepted, then there are non-trivial luminous mental
states.
(2) But, there are no non-trivial luminous mental states.
(3) So, conventionalism is false.
But, Williamson has an argument that purports to show that there are
no non-trivial luminous mental states, so conventionalism cannot be correct.
Williamson, assuming the truth of the conjunction, takes this to be a
knock-down argument. I agree with Williamson that luminosity must be
rejected, but I think that manifestability must be accepted, so it is the “if
manifestability, then luminosity” conjunct I reject.
Before we can evaluate Williamson’s argument, a bit needs to be said
about what he means when he calls a mental state ‘luminous’.
Luminosity implies that, upon adequate (internal) reflection, the speaker
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can come to know that the meanings are the same. However, it may be the
case that the speaker attaches meanings to words on the basis of conjecture
or speculation that they mean the same, or simple misunderstanding. Does
adequate reflection mean that he can independently come to know the mean-
ings of the terms? Likely not. As a British and Canadian English speaker
I can affirm that the speaker has indeed made an acceptable assertion if by
“The pavement is wet,” he means “The sidewalk is wet,”11 the assertions
are made interchangeably.
The knowledge of the agent is not transparent in the sense that, upon
reflection (of his own mental states), he knows that the term ‘pavement’
means ‘sidewalk’. If he lacked the required knowledge he can come to know
that sidewalk and pavement mean the same thing by asking an “authority,”
consulting a dictionary, and so forth.
Since luminous mental states are ‘trivial’, according to Williamson, I will
briefly indicate what ‘trivial’ and ‘nontrivial’ mean in this context.
A nontrivial state is one in which an agent who is in a condition C can,
at some stage, fail to be in C. However, luminous mental states are shown
to reduce to triviality: if an agent is in condition C then at some point
he is simultaneously in ¬C. Hence luminosity implies (a certain type) of
triviality.12 To be explicit, the distinction is this: if an agent is in condition
C, then at some point he can fail to be in C. But in a trivial state, an agent
eventually finds himself in (C ∧ ¬C).
Why, then, does it seem plausible that a conventionalist must hold that
there are luminous mental states? The suggestion is that knowing a meaning
of a lexical item is a luminous state (granting that knowledge is a mental
11Given, of course, adequate translation of the different dialects.
12Being in C∧¬C does not lead to explosion as triviality is normally taken to imply. The
point is simply that the agent then finds himself in both conditions, which is, of course,
absurd.
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state), given that to be a competent linguistic agent one must ‘master the
rules of the language game’. Now, to master the rules of the game is to
know when a sentence is warrantedly assertable — what follows is that a
speaker needs to know the meanings of the words employed. But, if this is
the case, then the speaker must equally know the assertability conditions of
sentences with words containing the same meaning. For instance, if one were
to assert a sentence such as “The pavement is wet, it must have rained,” or
“The sidewalk is wet, it must have rained,” then to know the meanings of
the terms is to know when they can be asserted; and they can be asserted in
the same contexts, since they must know that pavement is interchangeable
with sidewalk (if one is familiar with both British and Canadian English,
say).
We turn now to Williamson’s ‘anti-luminosity’ argument, the point of
which (that luminous states are trivial) I agree with. But I will then show
that his argument does not ring the death knell for semantic conventionalism.
The argument against luminosity can be paraphrased as:
? First we assume that there is a non-trivial condition C to be luminous.
? Second, since an agent can both be in C and fail to be in ¬C, we
assume that there is a transition for the agent between condition C
and ¬C. The stages of the transition are s1, . . . , sn, with C holding
in s1 and ¬C holding in sn. Since C is luminous, the condition L
applies.
? L : If an agent is in condition C, then he can know that he is in C.
? M : If KC at si, then an agent is in C at si+1.
- Since C (at s1), then KC at sn by applying L — which means that
an agent at s1 knows that they are in C.
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- Apply M 13 — If KC at s1, then the agent is in C at s2.
- By repeated application, for every si, if you are in condition C, then
KC at si+1, and so in C at si+1.
Strictly speaking what Williamson shows is that any luminous mental state
has to be trivial, whereby trivial he means that being in C and ¬C at the
same time is possible — the sorites style argument shows why luminosity
results (in this type of) triviality. A non-trivial mental state would mean
that an agent never finds themselves in conditions C and ¬C at the same
time — there are unquestionably non-trivial mental states, but a condition
of such states is that they are non-luminous.
Note that, rather than objecting to Williamson’s anti-luminosity argu-
ment, I will grant that luminosity results in triviality which means that an
agent can be in C and ¬C at the same time.
So, luminosity is not a condition which can be incorporated into a con-
ventionalist semantic theory. But the rejection of luminosity does not mean
that manifestability should be rejected — the former implies internal reflec-
tion as a sufficient condition for understanding the meanings of lexical items,
the latter is a condition of the externality of language and does not relate
to internal reflection. It is a mistake, then, to think that a conventionalist
must be committed to the luminosity of such states as knowing a meaning
of a term.
One need only consider the example given above concerning pavements/sidewalks
to see why this is.
So, I have accepted Williamson’s ‘anti-luminosity’ argument, in that lu-
minous mental states reduce to triviality. Luminosity does fail. This does
not mean, however, that we must reject of manifestability. Manifestabil-
13I will explain in Chapter Three what, precisely, M is. For the time being it suffices
to note that M is a way of encoding what Williamson calls “margins of error.”
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ity, being part of a community-based theory of meaning, does not rely on
luminosity. Internal reflection of an agent is not necessary or sufficient to ‘ex-
hibit’, as it were, the meanings of terms. This shows that the objection can
be side-stepped because (as mentioned) the second conjunct of Williamson’s
objection doesn’t follow.14 It thus fails to be an objection at all — least of
all knock-down.
This is one way in which I am a neo-Dummettian — luminosity, tradi-
tionally taken to be a feature of semantic conventionalism, does not make it
on to the ‘list’ of what I take to be the defining features of conventionalism.
In Chapter Four I propose a type of molecularist inferential semantics
conventionalism — an inferentialism that allows me to develop molecularism
for semantic conventionalism.
Before indicating precisely what the type of molecularist inferentialism is,
I need to deal with the next supposed knock-down argument — as presented
by, for instance, Fodor and Lepore (Fodor and Lepore 1992).
The argument is:
(1) If conventionalism is true, then there must be a principled analytic/synthetic
distinction.
(2) There is no principled analytic/synthetic distinction.
(3) Therefore conventionalism is false.
(2) is generally accepted for Quinean reasons. I do not propose to tackle
this premise in the argument. Rather, I shall show that the first one is
mistaken.
First, then, I need to show precisely why it might be thought that this
is a knock-down argument — what is it that makes the objection appear to
be plausible?
14Remember that the second conjunct is if manifestability then luminosity.
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Fodor and Lepore argue as follows: either semantic atomism is correct,
or meaning is determined by the role played by a word in relation to other
words. And not both by definition of atomism. Atomism is inconsistent with
the type of conventionalism that I advocate.
But in the absence of atomism, not having an analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion implies holism. For if we wish to avoid holism, we need a principled
way to distinguish which relations confer meaning and which do not if we
are to avoid saying that all relations between lexical items confer meaning
and the analytic/synthetic distinction is the only candidate that seems to
be on offer.
Holism and conventionalism have a feature in common: the meaning of
a word is its role in the sentences in which it occurs. Meaning is not, and
cannot be, determined in isolation from the rest of the language. So, why
not just accept holism? Because it is obviously false: it makes language
unlearnable and if holism is correct then there is no way of cordoning off
sections of the language which confer meaning, for instance.
The assumption built into Fodor and Lepore’s argument is that there
must be some way to determine the meaning of lexical items. This is a
plausible assumption, and is problematic for molecularism: if you don’t have
an analytic/synthetic distinction and the meanings of words are determined
by relationships between them or their relationships to other parts of the
language, then you have to say that all its relationships go to determining
its meaning. Atomism, on the other hand means that words have meaning
in isolation, by individual relationships to things with the world.
So, the rejection of atomism and holism means that there must be an
alternative. Therefore I argue for molecularist inferentialism.
I will: (1) describe a type of inferentialism which is consistent with con-
ventionalism — one which does not fall into holism — as Fodor and Lepore
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argue is inevitable with any theory other than atomism; (2) show that such
an inferentialist picture is molecularist.
On the basis of what I call materially correct and non-materially correct
inferences (but still permissible inferences) we can cordon off sections of the
language. Such an inferentialism picture allows me to maintain that it is cor-
rect to say that it is relations between lexical items that determine meaning,
but only some, not all. This molecularist inferentialism gives conventional-
ists a way to separate off the inferences that count as meaning-constitutive
from the ones that aren’t.
There are two ways which show that the distinction between meaning-
constituting and nonmeaning-constituting inference. The first is that ‘ma-
terially correct’ inferences count as meaning-constitutive and ‘formal infer-
ences’ don’t, although they are still acceptable inferences. The meaning of a
word is determined by materially correct inferences. These give the meanings
of lexical items because they share (some) conceptual content.
The second way to distinguish meaning-constituting from nonmeaning-
constituting inferences is between direct and indirect inferences. A direct
inference is where, say B is inferred from A (with no intermediate steps).
An indirect inference is one where the conclusion of an inference involves
more than one step, e.g., concluding C from A, but by way of a second step
— A to B. So, the inference now is A to B to C.
To distinguish direct and indirect inferences I must establish a hierarchi-
cal account that does not allow one to jump from A to C. This hierarchical
account allows me to show why permissible inferences from A to B are ma-
terially correct, and thus meaning constitutive, while inferences from A to
C (via B) not meaning constitutive.
We are nearly done with the supposed knock-down arguments. The final
one concerns the epistemically constrained notion of truth — to be discussed
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in Chapter Five.
The ‘obvious’ knock-down objection is:
(1) If conventionalism is true, then all truths are known.
(2) All truths are not known.
(3) Therefore, conventionalism fails.
My response to this objection is that the epistemic constraint does not imply
that all truths are known, but that all truths are knowable.
The paradox of knowability seemingly applies in the following way: if
conventionalism is accepted, then so too is the problematic premise that all
truths are known. It is obviously not the case that all truths are known
and so the paradox shows that conventionalism reduces to absurdity. An
immediate response is that conventionalism does not imply that all truths
are known, but that they are knowable. But to some known and knowable
amount to the same thing.
Wherein, then, does the plausibility lie? Why would we think that (1)
is acceptable? (1) might be thought to be plausible given a particular inter-
pretation of knowledge.
The paradox of knowability (also referred to as ‘Fitch’s paradox’ or ‘Fitch
style arguments’), which concerns an argument first presented in ‘A Logical
Analysis of Some Value Concepts’, (Fitch 1963), has generated a great deal
of philosophical discussion. In that paper, Fitch presents an argument that
some believe implies that epistemic anti-realism reduces to absurdity. The
intuition of many anti-realists is that it is, in some sense, correct to say that
for any truth p, it is possible to know that p is true, which one can represent
schematically as (p → ♦Kp). This is often called the verificationist principle,
but is more commonly referred to as the anti-realist principle (Williamson
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1987), (DeVidi and Solomon 2001).15
What Fitch seems to have shown is that if one accepts the epistemic
anti-realist principle,16 then one is forced to accept that for all p, if p is true
then p is known: (p → Kp). Some have taken this to amount to a refutation
of epistemically constrained anti-realism, since it is obviously false that all
truths are known. Others, of course, claim that something is amiss — either
with the proof, e.g., that it rests on unwarranted assumption of classical
logic, or with its interpretation of the modality ♦.
Thus, conventionalism seems to require a way out of this problem. My
approach will be to grant that conventionalism implies knowability, but deny
that Fitch’s argument works. In effect, I shall show that there is at least one
way to save conventionalism from this challenge.
My approach will be what is known as a “logical revisionist” response to
the paradox. In more detail, what I will show is that there are several logical
revisionist proposals that can be used to block the paradox — but that only
one — one which employs a particular interpretation of intuitionistic logic
— is not ad hoc, for the reason that the counterexample to the proof is
developed on the basis of states of information semantics. This provides the
philosophical motivation and prevents the application of intuitionistic logic
from being ad-hoc.
15I prefer the name ‘the anti-realist principle’ as it avoids presupposing that we have
a fixed notion of verification. Many anti-realists would suppose that what counts as a
verification varies across domains of discourse. To maintain the name ‘the verificationist
principle’ would be to invite the assumption that what is under investigation is Verifica-
tionism as presented by Carnap, Ayer, Schlick, Hempel, etc. of the Vienna Circle.
16Naming it ‘epistemic anti-realism’ is important, since it distinguishes other types of
anti-realism, e.g. error theory. The first is important for a semantic theory, the latter is
not. For the most part, unless necessary, I will refer to epistemically constrained anti-
realism simply as anti-realism. This is the only type which we will be concerned with
throughout the chapter.
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It is common to see it argued that a certain sort of anti-realism follows
from conventionalism about meaning. The reasoning usually runs more or
less as follows: manifestability requires that, one way or another, all aspects
of the meaning of all lexical items are learnable, and can be made publicly
available. Thus, for any given declarative sentence S, i.e., for any candidate
for being true, there is nothing about the meaning of S that is hidden.
But in particular, this means, or at least plausibly suggests, that all the
conditions that go into determining the truth or falsity of S are similarly
publicly available, and so in principle it should be determinable whether
those conditions are satisfied or not. Hence, it seems, S must be knowable
— though, of course, for contingent, practical reasons this will often be only
knowability in principle. This bit of reasoning suggests that conventionalism
about meaning leads to a certain sort of anti-realism, often called semantic
anti-realism — the view that truth is epistemically constrained in the sense
that every truth is knowable.
My argument is that if conventionalism is correct then anti-realism fol-
lows (the type that on first glance appears to be susceptible to the paradox
at least). The correct logic for anti-realism is intuitionistic logic, and the
correct semantics is states of information semantics. States of information
semantics is epistemically anti-realist — if an agent accesses a state of in-
formation at which there is sufficient warrant to establish x, he could come
to know that x. But it is not a requirement that any individual agent need
ever reach this state (so, of course, the information would not be accessed
by the community at large).
Before explicating states of information semantic in Chapter Five, I con-
sider a relatively new suggestion for blocking the proof, namely dialetheism
(the view that there are true contradictions) — which blocks the proof by
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rejecting reductio ad absurdum.(Beall 2000)17 The dialetheic strategy, how-
ever, is shown to be wrong, on the basis of several devastating objections.
The major point, as mentioned, is that states of information semantics
provides a philosophical motivation for using intuitionistic logic. However,
I use states of information for a further purpose. Since paraconsistent log-
ics are becoming increasingly favoured by some authors, I will show that
several paraconsistent logics can provide counterexamples to the paradox of
knowability, but they only provide a motivated solution if states of infor-
mation semantics are applied — and hence the counterexamples rely on the
commonalities they share with intuitionistic logic.
I cannot, of course, consider all systems of paraconsistent logics, as there
are simply too many of them. But I do consider three interesting ones: min-
imal logic, a non-adjunctive system, and the Routley-Meyers paraconsistent
logic.18 Paraconsistent logics seem prima facie somewhat odd. But, they are
gaining momentum in the field of formal logic — and hence demand serious
attention.
So, conventionalism leads to anti-realism. Anti-realism is susceptible to
the paradox of knowability. A way of getting around the paradox is to apply
intuitionistic logic, but this appears to be ad hoc. The philosophical motiva-
tion comes from the development and application of states of information. In
addition, whilst some paraconsistent systems can provide counterexamples
to Fitch’s paradox, they also do so only on the basis of states of information
semantics. The latter is taken to be a particularly well-suited semantics for
intuitionistic logic. In the examples I discuss I show that it is not paraconsis-
tency itself that solves the paradox, but the possibility of applying states of
17Explosion is standardly accepted as requirement for any strong system of logic — the
rejection of RAA, on the other hand, prevents this rule of inference.
18As with Grice, considering the fact that there is neither time nor space to consider all
alternatives, I will treat this as a case study.
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information semantics. Hence, these counterexamples rely on commonalities
they share with intuitionistic logic.
Chapter Six will bring all of the above together and give a bird’s-eye
view of the version of conventionalism I am developing. In the introduction
we learned that semantic conventionalism is taken to be refuted on the basis
of two reasons. In the introduction, I suggested two sorts of reasons that
semantic conventionalism might be thought not to deserve the attention
of contemporary philosophers of language. The first reason is that other
theories are thought to be obviously stronger. The second reason is that,
in light of various supposedly knock-down arguments conventionalism is not
only weaker, but wrong.
As just described, one of the main tasks in the main body of the thesis
is to show both reasons to be mistaken. While making this case, though,
we will learn valuable lessons as to what a viable semantic conventionalism
should look like.
Chapter Six shows explicitly that the maxims that meaning is use and
that to be a competent linguistic agent one must master the rules of the
language games that make up the language are the overarching conditions of
the type of conventionalism I advocate. All the other conditions of semantic
conventionalism fit (and are necessary parts of) the theory precisely because
of the way that they dovetail with these maxims.
Concerning the conditions of semantic conventionalism, I will show that
there are some fundamental ones in addition to the two overarching maxims
— thus developing a more robust theory of semantic conventionalism. A key
lesson, for instance, will be the commitment to manifestability. Mantifesta-
bility of meaning is easily misunderstood — it need not entail that individual
speakers have ready access to all aspects of the meanings of words, and is
compatible with the division of linguistic labour. However, it is tempting to
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think otherwise.
Before turning to the main business of the thesis, it will be useful to
have a brief list of a few important features of conventionalism in one place.
One might think of this as the rough version of conventionalism, to which
the refinements described in Chapter Six apply. Note that I am not claim-
ing that I have discovered these conditions of semantic conventionalism —
Dummettian semantic conventionalism, for instance, incorporates the same
conditions, and indeed, anything that qualifies as semantic conventionalism
will at least incorporate most of them in some form. Throughout the dis-
sertation, however, it will become clearer how these conditions should be
understood.19 For now, it should be enough to consider various criteria
in “sound bite” form. All of which grow out of the idea that meaning is
determined by the rules for the use of language in a community.
- meaning is neither platonic nor subjective — rather it is intersubjec-
tive. That is, the semantic conventionalist contends that meanings
have an ontological status other than the mind-independent objective
existence attributed to them by Platonists such as Frege without falling
into crude psychologism about meanings. How exactly this works is,
of course, a philosophically fraught matter.
- meaning is use.
- meaning public. That is, there is no aspect of meaning that is in
19It may be, and probably is, the case that the conditions are explicated somewhat
differently than they would be by other conventionalists. In other respects they may be
very similar. This is not really pertinent to the current dissertation, however. Although I
do identify the semantic conventionalism presented here as neo-Dummettian, what I aim
to do is to draw out the conditions through the consideration of conventionalism faced
with the objections. The conditions, then, come to light in broad strokes. I think that
they are necessary for a viable semantic conventionalism, but I do not claim that they are
representative of any one person’s theory.
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principle private to any individual.
- meaning is manifestable. This is a sort of corollary to the public nature
of knowledge. Since any aspect of meaning is public, there is no aspect
of meaning that cannot be presented to a potential linguistic agent. So,
for instance, there cannot be a distinction in meaning between a pair
of linguistic terms unless a difference in the applicability of the two
terms in a particular case can, at least in principle, be made evident.
- meaning is molecular. That is, the meaning of a given linguistic item
cannot be given in isolation from the role that item plays in a partic-
ular “language game,” but a language game is smaller than an entire
language. Two people can share exactly the same meaning for a word
like “two” even if one can play the game of advanced calculus and the
other cannot, since the meaning of “two” is fixed by the role it plays
in statements about small collections of things, for instance.
- meaning is conventional — that is, it’s arbitrary in some important
sense that we operate with the concepts we in fact do; there are al-
ternative conceptual schemes which would have allowed us to function
in the world, and it is not a matter of correctness that determines the
choice between them.
Other conditions will be discussed in Chapter Six and the explanation of
each will be expanded upon. But for the moment this list is sufficient to get





In Chapter Two I consider, as mentioned in Chapter One, a semantic theory
which is often thought to be obviously stronger than semantic convention-
alism, namely intention-based semantics — and so is taken to be a major
challenge to semantic conventionalism.
One must not underestimate the influence that the Gricean project has
had on present day philosophy of language — leading to a variety of research
projects from psycholinguistics, distinguishing between ‘what is said’ and
‘what is implicated’ in speech (leading to modern day discussions concern-
ing the distinction between pragmatics and semantics), and even projects
concerning language acquisition (both in children of ‘normal’ linguistic abil-
ity and those with language deficits arising from, e.g., autism) and, of course,
semantic theories.
The importance of the Gricean project must therefore not be underes-
timated. Although I will ultimately argue that intention-based semantics
is not as strong as it appears to be, I do not deny that the distinction be-
tween what is said and what is implied should be ignored. Pragmatics is
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important to philosophy of language and Grice’s projects leads to many in-
teresting investigations in this field. What I maintain, however, which is
at odds with many philosophers of language, is that in order to investigate
pragmatics properly, we must distinguish two Gricean projects — that of,
e.g., ‘Meaning’ (Grice 1957, 103-109), which is a semantic project, and that
of, e.g., ‘Logic and Conversation’ (Grice 1975, 121-133), which is a pragmatic
project.
First, I will consider why intention-based semantics might seem to be a
preferable and stronger theory than semantic conventionalism — that is, I
will give reasons to indicate why Grice1 would want to turn to intention-
based semantics in the first place.
The first two reasons why intention-based semantics seems so strong are
that it rejects both the Fregean third realm and behaviourism.
The rejection of the first shows a theoretical economy, since “thoughts”
are supposed to be abstract entities. Thoughts are meant to be fundamental
to meaning, but it is unclear what their nature consists in. By replacing
thoughts with intentions we have a different way of explaining what mean-
ing is and where it comes from, thus avoiding the metaphysical muddle of
abstract objects in inaccessible realms. Since we do not have direct access to
the third realm, there must be some other theory that gives us direct access
to the meaning of sentence — and Gricean semantics is in the position to
do this.
The rejection of behaviourism also shows a strength of intention-based se-
mantics, since we obviously have intentions (of one sort or another), whereas,
1I concern myself with Grice throughout this chapter, since he was the first to develop
intention-based semantics. And, further, although there are other intention-based and
neo-Gricean theories out there, I am working on the assumption that they are all at least
influenced by Grice’s works. Further, as explained, this theory is taken to be an exemplar
and so it is sufficient to consider only this one form of intention-based semantics.
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I will argue, it seems implausible to construct a semantic theory from be-
haviour alone. Behaviourism was pervasive in philosophy of language in
the 1950s, so it was an important step in the progression of philosophy of
language to move from behaviour to intentions as the foundation for seman-
tics. In the dissertation, I consider two forms of behaviourism, the radical
behaviourism of Skinner2 and the milder form proposed by Ryle.3
Several other reasons that intention-based semantics is suitable to use as
an exemplar are that: it is a particularly popular theory in current philoso-
phy of language; it contrasts with conventionalism in interesting ways; and
intention-based semantics seems intuitively correct to many people.4
But note that Dummettian semantic conventionalism equally sought to
reject the third realm and behaviourism. Intention-based semantics and
conventionalism simply took different routes.5
As mentioned in chapter one, while intention-based semantics is only
one rival theory, the chapter can serve as a type of exemplar — other rival
theories could be shown to be at least equally problematic to conventionalism
in a side-by-side comparison, I am suggesting. To take up each possible rival
would be too large an undertaking, but it is worth remembering that it is
easy to underestimate the difficulties confronting currently popular theories.
First, I will give an overview of the rejection of the third realm and
behaviourism, since it signals the most important strengths of intention-
2See (Skinner 1953), (Skinner 1957), (Skinner 1974).
3See (Ryle 1949).
4I will explain later why this latter is the case. To give a brief indication, though, we
know that we have some sort of intentions and we know that we can do different things
with the same utterance (which would indicate distinct speaker meanings for the same
utterance) — it is fair enough, then, to suppose that intentions are (or at least may be)
important to a semantic theory.
5For the relevant articles, see (Grice 1957), (Grice 1989c), (Grice 1989b), (Grice 1975),
and (Grice 1989a), (Dummett 1993), etc.
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based semantics (as mentioned above). The other motivations will also be
considered in due course.
Second, I will provide an exposition of intention-based semantics. The
purpose is to set the scene to show that intention-based semantics is (at a
minimum) in no better shape than the rival theory of conventionalism.
Third, given the objections I discuss, I will show that intention-based
semantics at least as problematic as conventionalism. In light of these ob-
jections, I argue that conventionalism needs to be reconsidered as a viable
semantic theory.
2.2 Plausibility
2.2.1 The Third Realm
‘Third realmers’, as we might call them, were found to be suspicious by many
authors in philosophy of language, mathematics, and logic from the 1950s
on. A goal of intention-based semantics, which it must be noted is shared by
conventionalist theories, is the ‘tidying’ up of Fregean metaphysics. This is in
order to gain direct access to the meaning of sentences. While Grice turned to
intention-based semantics, semantic conventionalism took a different route,
namely accepting that meaning is external, but replacing the objectivity of
thoughts with community-based intersubjectivity.6
The third realm is where abstract objects ‘reside’, as one might put
it. Since Frege maintained that the meanings of sentences have mind-
independent existence they could not be posited as a feature of the psy-
chology or intentions of individual linguistic agents.7 Furthermore, being
abstract and ‘placed’ in a different realm, meanings do not reside in the
6As I will later argue, this makes meaning out to be determined by the community as
a whole, not individual linguistic agents.
7That is, the ‘senses’ of sentences are objective and ‘out there’ in the world, as it were.
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same ‘reality’ as, say, middle-sized objects such as tables and chairs. Ab-
stract objects do not exist in the same way. Concrete objects belong to one
realm, abstract objects to another. Meanings must be somewhere — so,
as mentioned, they are not dependent on psychology nor intersubjectivity,
rather they are objective.
What arises, then, is a somewhat strange metaphysical picture where
different types of objects from distinct realms must interact if one wants
to provide a semantics for sentences. Propositions, which play a role in
providing a semantic theory for sentences, must somehow interact with this
realm, although they reside in the third realm.
The problem, though, with the Platonic realm of abstract objects is that
gaining access to propositions through senses seems mysterious — and does
not explain how the leap from the actual world to the third realm is made.
How senses and propositions contribute to a semantic theory is therefore
unclear.
Natural language philosophers were, quite reasonably, not impressed by
Frege’s metaphysical view and sought to provide a semantics which avoided
it.
There are several ways to respond to the metaphysical stance taken by
Frege. Intention-based semantics brings meaning back into the ‘realm’ in
which we reside (at least it does so presuming that intentions themselves
are to be counted among the furniture of the world). For the Gricean, what
needs to be explained is how meaning can be described in terms of the
intentions of the individual speakers of a linguistic community. This is a
discussion which will be taken up in a later section.
Dummett, as already noted, is equally suspicious of the third realm. The
conclusion he reaches is very different from intention-based semantics. His
response to platonism was not to place intentions at the root of a theory
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of meaning but to make meanings intersubjective and part of the linguistic
community as a whole. Meaning, according to Dummett, is determined not
by the individual speakers, but the use of lexical items.
So much the worse, then, for the third realm.
To conclude, Grice (and Dummett) reject the third realm. One might
say that their semantic theories got off the ground because of the rejection
of this metaphysical stance. However, although they had this, at least, in
common, they went off in very different directions precisely as a result of
rejecting the third realm. Whilst Grice opted for intention-based semantics
— leaving him open to the charge of psychologism8 — Dummett, as we shall
see in a later chapter, remained closer to the Fregean in spirit. Although
the third realm is rejected and the semantic theory is made to hinge on
the intersubjectivity of the linguistic community, he still accepted Fregean
‘thoughts’ as important in explicating meaning.
So, we have seen the benefit of the ‘theoretical economy’ of intention-
based semantics (and indeed conventionalist semantics). We obviously have
some sort of intentions, but “thoughts” (in the Fregean sense) are dubious.
By replacing thoughts with intentions, the intention-based semanticist does
not expand the metaphysical objects (if they may be called such) that must
be incorporated into the theory. The theoretical economy of intention-based
semantics, then, simplifies the matter and provides a more plausible foun-
dation for semantics — thus certain, unclear, considerations are avoided.
2.2.2 Behaviourism
Grice objected to behaviourism as he did to the third realm — both the
radical behaviourism, proposed by Skinner, and the milder version, proposed
8At least, that is how Dummett reads intention-based semantics. Whether this is the
case or not will be discussed later.
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by Ryle.
Skinnerian behaviourism rejects mental states entirely. As mentioned in
the introduction, behaviourism is meant to lead to a semantics based en-
tirely on the behaviour of the linguistic agents; that is, the activities of the
agents. Correct language use relies on behaving in an appropriate way. How-
ever, as mentioned earlier, it is unclear to Grice and other philosophers, how
one can develop a semantic theory on such radical behaviourism. Perhaps
a code-theory could be applied, where an agent encodes what they intend
to convey, they speak, and their interlocutor decodes the utterance.9 How-
ever, this cannot be the case for Skinner as, we have already mentioned,
he sees no room for mental states, so behaviour must carry semantic con-
tent, not mental representations, which come about as a result of particular
behaviour.10
Ryle’s milder form of behaviourism rests on dispositions to behave in
a certain way. The problem with other semantic theories, he thought, is
that non-behaviourist accounts of meaning are developed on the basis of a
category mistake. Incorporation of mental states in a semantic theory is
where the category mistake lies.
Grice, quite rightly I think, found dispositions to be insufficient to ground
a semantic theory or to explain the grasp of meaning by linguistic agents.
Note that Ryle did not do away with mental states entirely, but the dis-
positions were taken to be the mental states. Belief, according to this view
is a dispositional property. The purely subjective inner feeling or experi-
ences are irrelevant to meaning. Further, given that mental states are the
dispositions to behave in a certain way, the inner life of the agent is equally
9What carries semantic content would be the mental representations of the agents.
10A charge against Skinner is that he based his semantic theory on the observation of
animal behaviour — this seems far removed from being able to develop a theory based on
behaviour.
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irrelevant to mental states themselves. In relation to a semantic theory,
the same holds: understanding lexical items may require particular mental
states, but these are still taken to be dispositional; in addition, a semantic
theory is one which can account for the meaning of lexical items in terms of
dispositions.
So, the second motivation for intention-based semantic was to reject
behaviourism — as mentioned when discussing Fregean metaphysics, it is
obvious that we have intentions (of some sort). A strength of intention-
based semantics, then, is similar to the rejection of Fregean thoughts — we
know that we have intentions; linguistic agents obviously intend to convey
something when they make an utterance, so we should try and incorporate
intentions into a theory of communication and a theory of semantics.
2.2.3 Further Motivations
A further appeal of the Gricean project is that it closely knits the theory of
meaning with the theory of communication. His paper ‘Logic and Conver-
sation’ (Grice 1975, 121-133) provides a normative account of conversation,
which relies on his account of the role of intentions. If, for instance, some-
one uses an utterance in a manner which disregards the rules of permissible
language use, such as answering “yes” when asked if he has the time, then
they are breaking the rules of communication by not being relevant.11
11It must be noted, however, is that it is possible to distinguish Grice’s semantic project
from that undertaken in ‘Logic and Conversation’. The latter concerns the pragmatics of
language use. As I am not dealing with pragmatics in this dissertation, I am not going
to discuss the role of intentions in pragmatic determination of what is ‘said’, except when
it is pertinent to the discussion. How much pragmatic interpretation is determined by
pre-existing conventions (e.g. sarcasm seems to have particular conventional qualities, for
instance tone of voice and so on) or on the interpretation by a hearer of their interlocutor’s
intentions is without a doubt an interesting topic, but one which for our purposes is a
digression.
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We can clearly do different things with the same utterance. An utterance
that is spoken as an assertion, e.g. ‘continents drift’, may be uttered with
assertoric, imperatival, or interogative force.12 But, the utterance can be
made in a sarcastic tone, with a tone which makes it clear that the speaker
means what he says, or can be interpreted as an interrogative or as a demand
to take the hat off during, say, Sunday mass. The context of the utterance
helps to determine the occasion meaning.
According to the Gricean analysis, speakers have different intentions on
the occasion of utterance and therefore they mean different things on those
occasions. Since, as we shall see, literal meaning is made up of a disjunction
of occasion meanings, it seems that each occasion of utterance does signal a
distinct meaning: ‘nice hat’ means ‘nice hat (really)’ or ‘what an awful hat’
(utterance:‘(pfffft,) nice hat! (sarcastic)’) or ‘take that hat off’ (utterance:
‘nice hat (through gritted teeth)’).
I do not have much more to say in regards to whether the semantic
content changes on occasions of utterance. I do not think that it does, but
in a way this goes beyond the bounds of the chapter, which is to show that
intention-based semantics (of the Gricean variety) is problematic and that
allows me to conclude that conventionalism needs to be reconsidered.
One final point must be made, though. I mentioned that intention-based
semantics seems to square nicely with many peoples’ intuitions about where
meaning comes from. “Of course it’s up to the speaker,” they may say “it
12Speaking of ‘literal meaning’ of an utterance is, however, somewhat problematic, since
it is not clear what this means for an intention-based theory of the Gricean sort. This is
because, I shall argue, it leads to an inherent inconsistency — that of timeless meaning
being constructed by a disjunctive account of occasion meaning (in turn dependent of
speaker meaning), whilst accounting for the timeless meaning of certain sentences (and
subsentential lexical items) by using the notion of the ‘conventions’ of the use of such
sentences. This is an issue we will turn to in due course.
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is, after all, the speaker who intends to communicate something.” Although
this is contrary to my own intuitions, I can see why it is appealing.13
2.3 Intention-based Semantics
Thus far we have seen several reasons that got intention-based semantics
off the ground: the rejection of the third realm and the rejection of be-
haviourism being the most important. But, we also considered whether
occasion meaning is actually semantically relevant and why intention-based
semantics seems to square with the intuitions of others. Now we need to
consider how incorporating intentions into a theory of meaning leads to an
account of timeless meanings of sentences — thus making it clearer why
intention-based semantics is often thought to be a viable theory, whereas
conventionalism falls by the wayside.
The reason that intentions are ineliminable for Grice is that, without
them, we cease to have a way of developing a semantics for natural lan-
guages. Having intentions provide the foundation of linguistic meaning has
the benefit that the agent can decide what an utterance means on a partic-
ular occasion— indeed, the agents determine what an utterance means —
in a particular context or what they meant to convey to their interlocutors
in a particular context. So, from individual intentions we can broaden out
the meaning of an utterance, creating multiple occasion meanings.
I agree that the utterance of an individual speaker does affect the pur-
pose of the utterance. However, I do not think that it changes the literal
meaning. Moreover, timeless meaning of lexical items being dependent on
the speaker meaning of individual agents seems problematic. Some of the
13Of course, this is not the whole story — for that we must consider the two-part
reduction, which more fully explains how timeless meaning can be derived. We shall turn
to that in due course.
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problems encountered (discussed in section 2.4, following my interpretation
of Grice’s theory) with intention-based semantics are:
(a) the Humpty Dumpty problem: the Humpty Dumpty problem indi-
cates why one must have a grasp of a language prior to grasping the
intentions of the speaker.
(b) that intention-based semantics is open to the charge that intentions
are post hoc.
(c) that intention-based semantics is open to the charge that intentions
are indeterminate and confabulatory.
(d) that intention-based semantics is open to the charge that intentions
can either be too fine or coarse grained.
Before turning to the objections, however, it is necessary to gain a decent
understanding of Grice’s theory.
2.3.1 Natural versus Non-Natural Meaning
Before turning to the discussion which concerns only meaningnn and thus
intention-based semantics, I think it is important to note Grice’s distinction
between natural and non-natural meaning, since Grice starts his discussion
(Grice 1957) with this distinction. We don’t need to spend too much time
on this distinction — but it is useful for seeing why meaningnn is that which
concerns semantic content of lexical items. Grice mostly illustrates the dis-
tinction by giving examples and so shall we.
The basic idea is that there are some cases where we use the term ‘mean’
to indicate that one sort of phenomenon is a reliable indicator of another.
“Spots mean measles,” or “Tree rings indicate the age of the tree,” are not se-
mantically relevant, since such sentences merely indicate reliable indicators,
37
e.g., spots indicating the presence of measles. Consider a further example:
“the smoke means fire.” What ‘means’ indicates, as in the previous exam-
ples, is that there is a law-like relationship between smoke and fire (ceteris
paribus).
Grice distinguishes such examples of natural meaning from sentences and
words, which have what he calls non-natural meaning (meaningnn). If we
say “‘Robin’ means a species of bird indigenous to North America,” Grice
contends, we use ‘mean’ in a quite different sense, since this claim does not
involve the same sort of law-like regularity. The idea in the background
is that non-natural meanings are semantically important and involve com-
municative intentions of agents, whereas natural meaning does not involve
communicative intentions.
But it is important to note that meaning nn doesn’t only attach to lin-
guistic items. Let us consider one more example to illustrate that commu-
nicative intentions, and so the class of utterances, according to Grice, can
be conceived of as broader than we might initially think (Grice 1957, 106).
Grice asks us to consider this case:
(1) I show Mr X a photograph of Mr Y displaying undue familiarity with
Mrs X.
(2) I draw a picture of Mr Y behaving in this manner and show it to Mr
X.
I find that I want to deny that in (1) the photograph (or my showing
it to Mr X) meantnn anything at all; while I want to assert in (2) the
picture (or the drawing) and showing it meantnn something (that Mr
Y had been unduly familiar). . . [this case shows that] I do not want to
maintain that all our uses of “mean” fall easily, obviously, and tidily
into one of the two groups I have distinguished; but I think that in
most cases we should be at least fairly strongly inclined to assimilate
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a use of “mean” to one group rather than to the other. (Grice 1989a,
218)
The photograph, then, carries natural meaning, whereas the drawing
carries meaningnn, because (2) is a particular sort of product of Grice’s
communicative intention directed at Mr X. The photo, on the other hand,
is, as in the case of the previous examples, merely a reliable indicator (of
what happened in front of the camera).
To conclude, typically the things with natural meaning will be non-
linguistic, but indicate a law-like relationship. Non-natural meaning typ-
ically attaches to linguistic utterances, but his example of the drawing is
meant to show that non-natural meaning can attach to non-linguistic cases
also, in which case they are taken to be a different type of utterance.
2.3.2 Reductive Definition of Meaning
The entire project that Grice pursues relies on the two-part reduction —
the two part reduction concerns, as mentioned, meaningnn. In later papers,
(Grice 1989c) and (Grice 1989b), this reduction is expanded upon, but it
still retains the fundamental features of the original reduction. Therefore,
the 1957 version will be focussed upon unless otherwise indicated.
Now, let us look at the reduction of linguistic meaning (that is, mean-
ing which has become fixed, i.e., standard meanings) to intentions. The
reduction begins with a (partial) definition of timeless meaning. The sec-
ond section of the reduction is vital to the development of timeless meaning.
For intention-based semantics, timeless meaning must reduce to intentions.
What one might say is that a sentence x means y, z, and w (given the
context of utterance) and always will (disregarding for convience the possi-
bility of language evolution). This is not to say that there are no constraints
on timeless meaning. Indeed, the relevant constraints will become vital to
the discussion in due course. First, though, let us get the reduction Grice
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advocates into a clear form:
“x meansnn [(timeless)] that so-and-so” might at first shot be equated
with some disjunction of what “people” (vague) intend (with qualifica-
tions about “recognition”) to effect by x. (Grice 1957, 108)
Part one of the reduction, then, reduces timeless meaning to the utterer’s
occasion meaning — considering that timeless meaning is a construction
of all the occasions that an agent meant (non-natural) something by his
utterance. Second:
“x meant something” is (roughly) equivalent to “Somebody meantnn
something by x.” Here again there will be cases where this will not
quite work. I feel inclined to say that (as regards traffic lights) the
change to red meantnn that the traffic was to stop; but it would be
very unnatural to say “Somebody. . .meantnn by the red-light change
that the traffic was to stop.” Nevertheless, there seems to be some sort
of reference to somebody’s intentions. (Grice 1957, 108)
And, this in turn reduces to the intentions of the speakers — part two of the
reduction:
“A meantnn something by “x” is (roughly) equivalent to “A intended
the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of
the recognition of this intention”; and we may add that to ask what
A meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect (though,
of course, it may not be possible to get a straight answer involving a
“that” clause, for example, “a belief that. . . ”). (Grice 1957, 108)
The reduction takes one from timeless meaning to utterer’s occasion
meaning and from utterer’s occasion meaning to intentions. If, e.g., “He’s
green” is uttered by persons a and b, a may mean by the utterance that
he is a newbie. And person b might mean by the utterance that he is lit-
erally green. So, taken disjunctively, “He’s green” means “He’s a newbie”
or “His skin has a green tinge” or . . . (whatever else the utterance is used to
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convey).14 Thus the utterer’s occasion meaning and timeless meaning are
inextricably bound up with intentions. Both concern the utterer’s intentions
which determine the meanings of sentences.
The reason why intentions become central is because they concern the
result in an explanation of occasion meaning, which shows what the speaker
is doing with the utterance — how he intends to be understood — these
occasions of use taken disjunctively to be the timeless meanings of lexical
items means that everything must reduce to intentions (in one way or an-
other). Note that in later works ((Grice 1989c), Grice (1989b)) the audience
becomes more of a vital element of the theory of meaning. These later defini-
tions incorporate the audience’s recognition of the intentions of the speaker
in a similar fashion as the 1957 distinction. But, in addition, the proposi-
tional attitudes of the utterer and their interlocutor towards utterance x as
well as the speaker’s desire for the audience to share the same propositional
attitude towards x and so on are built into the extended analysis.
To conclude this section, the two part reduction presented in ‘Meaning’
(Grice 1957) is of vital importance to the Gricean project, as it is the only
clear indication of how timeless meaning can be based on intentions.
2.4 Objections
There have been many attempts to undermine intention-based semantics.
In all three papers discussed here — 1957, 1968, 1969 — Grice anticipates
several objections and proceeds to provide what, at first glance, appear to be
adequate responses. However, there are several objections which I think are
(at least potentially) devastating for intention-based semantics, regardless of
14To explicate timeless meaning one must say something like: if the timeless meaning
of a statement is x ∨ y, then in order to determine if a meantnn x or meantnn y we need
to know the intentions of the speaker.
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the Gricean responses. The potential of providing serious objections shows
that semantic conventionalism is not “obviously” in a worse position than
intention-based semantics.
Even though several individual objections are aimed at the first part of
the reduction (timeless meaning→ utterer’s occasion meaning) and some
against the second part (utterer’s occasion meaning→ speaker meaning)
there is a recurring theme applicable to all. The important objections fo-
cus on the fact that, surprisingly, Gricean theory of meaning depends on
conventions, and this in turn implies a circularity.
2.4.1 Timeless Meaning — Humpty Dumpty
If it is truly intentions that determine speaker meanings, which in turn de-
termine the disjunctive account of timeless meaning, then we are left with
a problem of how to constrain the items included in the disjunction. One
must wonder how many uses of sentences (or words) can be included in the
disjunction.
As we shall see with the ‘Humpty Dumpty’ problem, a speaker cannot
take an utterance to mean anything they like on pain of ruling out such a
thing as timeless meaning — in short, a disjunctive account would cease to
be a possibility.
The famous ‘Humpty Dumpty’ problem is that Humpty Dumpty says to
Alice “There’s glory for you.” To which Alice responds with “I don’t know
what you mean.” “Of course you don’t” says Humpty Dumpty “because I
have not yet told you what it means. I use “there’s glory for you” to stand
for “there’s a nice knock-down argument.”” (Carroll 1994) But if Humpty
Dumpty can do this, then his alternative way of expressing “there’s a nice
knock-down argument,” i.e., “there’s glory for you,” should be added to the
disjunction of timeless meaning.
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But Humpty Dumpty’s speaker meaning of “there’s glory for you” cannot
be included in the disjunctive timeless meaning. If it were possible to add
Humpty Dumpty’s intended meaning to the disjunction, then any number
of equally spurious occasion meanings would need to be added to timeless
meaning.15
Moreover, Humpty Dumpty’s utterance (if added to the disjunction)
would imply that even possible occasion meanings would need to be in-
corporated into the disjunction, not just actual occasion meanings. If this is
so, disaster looms for Gricean semantics. There would not, in short, be any
way of constraining timeless meaning (Searle 1969).16
Grice does have a response to this problem: the disjunction which makes
up timeless meaning(s) relies not only on (1) what the speaker intends by
the utterance, but also (2) what the audience expects the utterance to mean,
and (3) the fact that there are conventions of use which determine whether
utterances are correct or incorrect.
But, we immediately see a circularity, given (3). Intentions are meant to
explain conventional meaning. However, the Humpty Dumpty case shows
that we must be aware of the conventions of the linguistic community in order
to communicate successfully. In this case, at least, it is necessary to grasp
the conventions prior to the intentions in order to explain or understand the
utterance.
15See for instance Searle’s objection from Speech Acts (Searle 1969) which we will turn
to later.
16Note that it is not only possible occasion meanings that need to be considered, but
possible intentions. There is an example later in the discussion (concerning the possibility
of (unaccessible) intentions which a school teacher may or may not have) of what one might
mean by an utterance. Which is to say, since meaning hinges on intentions and possible
intentions become important to timeless meaning, then Gricean semantics becomes far
more complex than it appears in the first case, and, as with incorporating possible occasion
meanings, may lead to serious consequences for constraining disjunctive meaning.
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To be fair, Grice’s position aims to be somewhat more sophisticated than
this. In (Grice 1989b) he goes to great lengths in order to describe how one
might constrain the expressions permissible in the disjunction. Consider, for
instance, an incomplete utterance type (which is the term he uses to refer
to words) such as “grass.” This can stand (roughly) for “lawn material” or
“marijuana”.
The fact that incomplete utterance types can have multiple meanings is
similarly the case for complete utterance types, that is, sentences. Consider:
“I shall be pushing up the daisies when the sun goes supernova” is used
to mean “I shall be dead when the sun goes supernova.” “Pushing up the
daisies” means being dead. This is because language contains this particular
idiom and it is conventionally taken to imply being dead.
Sentences uttered that, on the other hand, do not have an ‘usual’ mean-
ing,17 such as “My clock will have stopped when the sun goes supernova,”
do not mean “I shall be dead when the sun goes supernova,” since they
are not usual expressions of English — for “my clock will have stopped” to
mean “I shall be dead” depends, I think, not on an idiomatic reading of the
words, but on pragmatics. That is “my clock will have stopped,” can be
interpreted by the interlocutor as “I shall be pushing up the daisies.” But
the interlocutor would have to make the interpretative leap. The hearer will
be able to understand the speaker on the basis of conversational implicature,
rather than idiomatic usage.18
The speaker who utters the latter may make himself understood to his
17I would say that we must even go so far as to avoid the ambiguous ‘usual’ tag, but can
rightly assume ‘usual’ meanings to be conventional and are those which are sanctioned by
the community.
18Remember that I distinguish between Grice’s semantic and pragmatic projects. If I
am right, then the meaning of “I will be pushing up the daisies. . . ” is relevant to the
semantic theory and “My clock will have stopped. . . ” is part of the pragmatic theory.
44
interlocutor by explaining what he means, or indeed by the context in which
the speaker and interlocutor find themselves. But the latter utterance is a
deviant case, as is the case of Humpty Dumpty’s expression and so suffers
from the same problem.
The point in the 1969 article is this: both words and sentences have
a usual/common usage. If they are used in a way that is not idiomatic
then that use, or rather the occasion meaning , is not incorporated into
the disjunction. That is why Humpty Dumpty cannot mean “there’s a nice
knock-down argument,” by “there’s glory for you.”
But, even in light of Grice’s response the circularity is clear. How can he
justify resorting to standard usage to account for intentions and then, in turn,
use intentions to account for the common use? If he does so then intentions
are not primary. Circularity, then, becomes not merely a possibility, but an
inevitability.
2.4.2 Speaker Meaning — Post hoc
We shall now turn from speaker intentions to their application to timeless
meaning, discussed above.
It is not unusual for an agent to be asked why he did, or said, some
particular thing. What often springs to mind is not the intention at the
time of utterance. Rather, the speaker considers what he may (must or
most likely) have intended in order for those intentions to have conferred a
particular meaning upon their utterance.
But this picture seems to imply that intentions are post hoc — there-
fore, it would be the case that the post hoc intentions are what determine
meaningfulness. But one cannot have intentions being retroactively mean-
ing conferring. If intentions are post hoc, then it cannot be consistent with
Grice’s theory that intentions form the basis of the meaning of an utterance
45
(at the time of utterance), since the intentions simply were not present at
the right time.
Consider: I may pat down my jacket, look confused, and utter “we have
to go back to get my keys.” If questioned about my intention (at the time
of utterance) I may answer “well, I suddenly realized that I left my keys
in the office, and we have to go back and get them if we want to get into
the apartment.” The conscious sequence of events from the patting down to
utterance, however, may simply have been the conscious component “keys!”
accompanied by a mental image of a bunch of keys lying on my desk. Or
perhaps “keys” need not be a part of this picture at all and the mental
image suffices for the utterance. The utterance would not, therefore, carry
the intentions (at least at the time of utterance) that would allow it to fit
into Grice’s analysis of meaning. (Dummett 1991)
An immediate reply would be that the intentions are not (usually) part
of conscious thought processes, but a rapid and subconscious process from
which we later form a rational reconstruction — the importance of intentions
is that they account for what we probably would have intended had we
reflected upon them at the time of utterance. The lack of the necessity of
conscious reflection at the time of utterance calls into question the derivation
of occasion meaning from intentions. If that step of the reduction fails, then
it follows that the reduction from lexical meaning to intentions would fail
too.
But if one allows intentions to be part of a hypothesized subconscious
process, then the Gricean is left with the fact that intentions can be at-
tributed to the utterance after the utterance is made, and so, as previously
noted, are post hoc.19 If certain intentions are not present at the time of
19Grice admits (Grice 1957) that often intentions are unconscious and posited post
hoc. Shortly we shall consider whether intentions may actually be present at the time of
utterance, but that they are processed so quickly that no conscious reflection at the time
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utterance then they could not have been that which is meaningful. They do
not, in short, make the utterance mean what it does. To this there is no
Gricean answer it seems. Intentions must be present at the time of utterance
or else something other than intentions must be meaning conferring. And,
thus, intentions fail to contribute to occasion meaning or timeless meaning.
To restate the point somewhat more succinctly: if there are no intentions
(of the right sort) attached to individual utterances at the time of utterance,
then at least in, e.g, the case of the lost keys, we have a counterexample to
speaker intentions imparting meaning.20
Further, there is no indication that cases such as the lost keys are isolated
and rare. To the contrary, it is much easier to think of examples where
intentions are post hoc than examples where intentions are clearly present.
This further makes it impossible to characterize the disjunction of timeless
meaning as a disjunction of the intentions of the linguistic agents.
But let us, for the time being, grant Grice that intentions may be post
hoc, and that this does not negatively affect his theory. In 1957 Grice states
that we perform a rational reconstruction of our intentions and attribute
the most likely intentional candidates to the utterance. If this is so, then
occasion meaning (derived from intentions) still constitute the basis on which
linguistic meaning is founded. Grice states that:
Explicitly formulated linguistic (or quasilinguistic) intentions are no
doubt comparatively rare. In their absence we would seem to rely on
very much the same kinds of criteria as we do in the case of nonlin-
guistic intentions where there is a general usage. An utterer is held
of utterance is necessary or possible. But, I shall argue that this means that either (1)
intentions are confabulatory or (2) explicit intentions of speakers as representative of what
probably motivated an utterance provides skewed data, since explicit intentions are so
rare. What they might signal is not the usual intentions behind an utterance, but unusual
intentions. This is because the recognition of implicit intentions are so rare.
20Or at least of underlying an occasion of utterance and hence not making it into the
disjunctive timeless meaning.
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to intend to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally intended
to be conveyed), and we require a good reason for accepting that a
particular usage diverges from general usage. . . (Grice 1957, 222)
The problem is that there is no reason to believe that any particular
intentions were present at the time of utterance, except on rare occasions.
How, then, can they be meaningful, or convey the timeless meaning of lexical
items? How can one build a theory of meaning when the intentions which
are supposed to form the basis of the theory are missing? To these questions
there seem to be no answers for the intentionalist apart from, once again,
appealing to conventional usage.
2.4.3 Speaker Meaning — Determining Intentions/Confabulation
The problem here is two-part in nature: (1) the determination of intentions
on occasions of utterance may (as we have seen) not be determinate, and
so (2) the speakers and their interlocutor may not be able to grasp the
intentions. If intentions are indeterminate then the timeless meaning of an
utterance equally becomes unclear.
Consider in contrast cases where intentions are determinate.21 Even
in these cases22 the data may be skewed. The problem is this: if explicit
intentions are so rare, then it is not clear how we can rely on them as
representative of internal (implicit) ones. Determinate intentions may in
fact be the exceptional cases, which are not representative of the majority
of cases where intentions are indeterminate, even to the speaker.
Since we cannot be sure that cases where intentions are explicit are mir-
21An example could be: “I would like a coffee.” Unless the context indicates otherwise,
it can be assumed that the intention of the utterer is merely to convey that they want a
coffee.
22That is, that both the speaker and hearer can grasp the intention(s) behind the ut-
terance.
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rored by cases where they are implicit, it may be the case that the explicitly
determinate intentions are abnormal, and skew the data: the cases where
intentions are explicit may differ radically in nature from those that are im-
plicit. We simply do not and cannot draw an analogy between the two as
there is no way to acquire empirical data.
The implication is that when the intentions of an utterer are explicit
they may not have the same characteristics of implicit intentions. It follows
that explicit intentions may confound the conclusions that one might want
to draw on the basis thereof in regards to the status of intention-based se-
mantics. Explicit intentions may be different enough in nature from internal
ones that no connection can be made.
2.4.4 Occasion meaning — Fine Grained
The next problem to be considered involves giving two counterexamples to
the part of the Gricean analysis which concerns occasion meanings. These
counterexamples have been dubbed the problem of “grainedness” (Dummett
1993, 299-300). The counterexamples will show that, in some contexts, occa-
sion meanings are too fine-grained. The next section will deal with occasion
meanings being too coarse-grained.
In regards to fine-grainedness, the framework for an example is provided
by Grice’s account of occasion meaning in ‘Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions’
(Grice 1989b):
“U meant something by uttering x” is true if and only if, for some audience
A, U uttered x intending:
(1) A to produce a particular response r
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis [or at least in part] of his fulfilment of (2).
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(Grice 1989b, 151)
Consider the example, briefly discussed in Chapter One: an American
soldier, call him Ted, is captured by Italians during the Second World War.
He wants the Italians to believe that he is a German officer and so utters the
only German phrase that he knows: “Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen
blühen?” (Lycan 2000, 107)23
Now, Ted utters “Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühen?” intend-
ing:
(1) The Italian soldiers to produce a belief that Ted is German.
(2) The Italian soldiers to recognize that Ted intends them to form this
belief.
(3) The Italian soldiers to come to believe that Ted is a German on the
basis of [or at least in part because of] the recognition of Ted’s intention
for them to form this belief.
Thus, it seems that Ted’s utterance, due to the occasion meaning of the
utterance, means “I am a German soldier.” But, this is too fine-grained.
Ted’s utterance cannot mean “I am a German soldier” anymore than it may
convey to his interlocutors that he thinks that he is a pink giraffe, a unicorn,
and invisible elephant, or that his officious tone of voice means “Release
me now you incompetents” and so forth, since his interlocutors also do not
understand German. His interlocutors simply cannot pick out what Ted
means — his utterance is too fine-grained for it to mean what Ted wants it
to.24
23This is a well known example. It originates in Searle’s book Speech Acts (Searle 1969).
24The analysis of meaning offered by Grice expands between 1957 and 1969. The later
amendments, however, essentially result in the same analysis: that it is by grasping the
speaker’s intentions on the occasions of utterance that the speaker’s interlocutor grasps
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One important addition to later Gricean analyses of meaning is the idea
of ‘modes of correlation’. As far as I can tell, these modes of correlation relate
to conventional meaning. The possibility of intending x relies to a degree on
the ‘conventional’ usage of x. Grice is explicit that Ted can justifiably means
“I am a German officer” by “Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühen”
(Grice 1989b) — and so “I am a German officer” should be one of the usual
usages of the sentence “Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühen.” This
is a conclusion that most Griceans reject, since the intentional meaning (that
which Ted is trying to convey) would deviate too much from the standard
linguistic meaning of the utterance.
Although most Griceans refuse to accept that “Kennst du das Land wo
die Zitronen blühen?” means “I am a German officer,” Grice himself does not
think that it is so ridiculous. As Grice says concerning this exact situation:
[T]o point out that the German line means not “I am a German officer”
but “Knowest thou the land where. . . ” is not relevant. If the American
could be said to have meant that he was a German officer, he would
have meant that by saying the line, or by saying the line in a particular
way. . . (Grice 1989b, 162)
It is possible, and quite right I think, to view Ted’s utterance as another
Humpty-Dumptyism. Part of the earlier discussion concerned Grice’s own
attempt at curtailing the possible meanings conveyed by the intentions of the
utterers by appealing to the usual usage of sentences. This seems consistent
with rejecting what he says in the above quotation. If this is correct, and
in addition, if most Griceans would not be willing to admit that Ted (or
Humpty Dumpty) can use any words or sentences to mean anything they
the meaning of the utterance. Features added to Grice’s analysis of meaning between 1957
and 1969 are, e.g., the role of propositional attitudes of utterers and the grasping thereof
by their interlocutors, etc. But, the expanded elements of the analysis still rely on the
utterer’s intention, which create appropriate thoughts in the audience so that they can
grasp the intentions.
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wish, then there must be some way to limit which speaker meanings can
count as part of the disjunctive timeless meaning.
One way to draw a boundary to speaker meaning is, as mentioned, to
require that the utterance is used in such a way as to conform to the conven-
tional usage of it. But, again, we are left with the Humpty Dumpty problem
of circularity. In the case of timeless meaning, it cannot be that anyone can
mean absolutely anything by their utterance. This is especially clear when
Grice himself appeals to the ‘usual’ meanings of words and sentences.
2.4.5 Occasion meaning — Coarse Grained
In addition to intentions being too fine-grained to constitute speaker mean-
ing, they can also be too coarse-grained. Take the following example: a
parent says to her young child “It’s ten thirty!” The broad intention is to
get the child to go to sleep. The parent knows that the child knows that ten
thirty is considerably past bedtime and that she must go to bed. Of course,
the child, understanding the intentions, will most likely draw the correct
inference that going to bed would be in her best interest.
In this case, though, we appear to get a multiplicity of intentions. Initial
intentions which influence the meaning of the utterance would appear to be:
(1) the parent intends for the child to go to bed; (2) the parent further intends
for the child to understand this intention; and (3) the parent intends for her
to go to bed because of understanding the parent’s intention. However, the
literal meaning of the utterance merely reflects the time, not “Go to bed!” I
admit that it does seems that, in combination (1)-(3) fit the Gricean analysis
given above and so “It’s ten thirty” would (questionably) mean “Go to bed!”.
But, the multiplicity does not cease here.
The parent may have (1’) work to get done (and so intends for the child
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to from the belief that the mother has work to do);25 (2’) the parent further
intends for the child to understand that this is her intention; and (3’) the
parent intends for her to go to bed because of understanding the parent’s
intention.
Another motivation might be that the parent has (1”) a need for some
relaxation time, and wants the child to form a belief to this effect; (2”) the
parent further intends for the child to understand that this is her intention;
and (3”) the parent intends for her form the belief because of understanding
the parent’s intention.
Or (1”’) a babysitter might be arriving who will expect the child to be
asleep when he turns up and so the parent intends the child to think that
the parent intends her to go to bed because of the sitter’s looming arrival;
(2”’) the parent further intends for the child to understand that this is
her intention; and (3”’) the parent intends for her to go to bed because of
understanding the parent’s intention.
What then is the speaker meaning?
(1’) to (3”’) may (again, arguably) give the expression “It’s ten thirty,”
the meaning “Go to bed.” But all the intentions from (1’) to (3”’) may be in
place at once, so the meaning of “It’s 10:30” on a single occasion means all
these things (and more): “It’s 10:30 and I have work to do and the sitter is
coming and I need some time alone.” The meanings are all bundled together
and undifferentiated. So there is no one speaker meaning.
Having multiple speaker intentions, in addition to them being unknown
by the audience, fails the Gricean analysis of intention-based meaning. If
25Notice that sometimes having intentions being determinate is undesirable. It may be
the case, for instance, that the child is not sympathetic to her parent’s need to work and
sees that as taking attention away from her. Grasping the belief that the mother has work
to do may have the opposite effect than desired and make it more difficult to get the child
to bed.
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a multiplicity of intentions are present, then, given the two part reduction,
there are multiple occasion meanings. The single utterance would not have
a meaning at the time of utterance, but multiple meanings at the same time.
The question that arises is how the audience would be able to determine the
meaning of the utterance — does it mean that “the parent is busy,” “the
parent needs some time off,” etc? If there are intentions x, y, z (at the same
time, then the audience cannot figure out the meaning of the utterance (not
the timeless meaning, but the occasion meaning).26 This is because there
is more than one intention present at the same time and so there is no one
occasion meaning (or at a minimum, not one that can be identified).
Apart from failing to conform to the Gricean analysis, it is not clear that
multiplicities of intention are of any explanatory use. In this case, if all goes
well, the child will comprehend the parent’s intention through contextual
information (and so would actually be part of a pragmatic theory rather than
semantics) that they should hurry off to bed, but with insufficient knowledge
of the intentions of speaker to gather the multiplicity of meanings of the
utterance. In this case, being unable to grasp the distinction between (1)-
(3) and (1’)-(3”’), the meaning of the utterance surpasses the comprehension
of the speaker’s interlocutor.
Grice does have a response to the possibility of having a bundle of inten-
tions: in cases where there are multiple intentions one is (or should be) the
primary intention which determines the occasion meaning. But this cannot
be so. If speakers have multiple intentions on the occasion of an utterance
then it follows that there is more than one communicative intention. But,
26There may, of course, be exceptions to the rule. Consider, for instance puns and double
entendres. It is precisely the multiplicity of meanings that make these work. But they
certainly do not represent standard usage. Further, one might argue that it is pragmatic
interpretation, not semantics, that determines whether an interlocutor can interpret the
multiplicity of these cases.
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consider again the analysis which was given in the example of Ted uttering
a German phrase to an audience intending them to take it to mean “I am
a German soldier.” What would happen on an occasion with multiple in-
tentions? Let us run the analysis again to check: A mother utters “It’s ten
thirty” intending:
(1) her daughter to produce a belief that the mother has work to do and
that the mother needs some relaxation time and that a babysitter is
arriving.
(2) her daughter to recognize that the mother intends the daughter to
produce a belief that the mother has work to do and that the mother
needs some relaxation time and that a babysitter is arriving.
(3) her daughter comes to believe that she should go to bed on the basis of
[or at least in part because of] the recognition of the mother’s intention
for the daughter to produce a belief that the mother has work to do
and that the mother needs some relaxation time and that a babysitter
is arriving.
At this point the Gricean analysis is not clear and seems to go against the
example where it is an intention not intentions that a hearer must grasp
to understand the speaker meaning. The only way for the analysis to work
is by saying that there was not one speaker meaning on the occasion of
utterance. It cannot be said, then, that there is a speaker meaning at all,
but that there are multiple speaker meanings on the occasion of utterance.
What this seems to result in is not a single occasion meaning on the basis of
the Gricean analysis, but multiple meanings. Consider the analysis again:
“U meant something by uttering x” is true if and only if, for some audience
A, U uttered x intending:
(1) A to produce a particular response r
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(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis [or at least in part] of his fulfilment of (2).
(Grice 1989b, 151)
If the above example does not convince the reader consider the following
example. Bob utters “nice hat” to Bill as a colleague walks by. Intending
to sound as if he were being sarcastic and that thinks the hat is ghastly, the
analysis should be:
Bob utters “nice hat” intending:
(1) Bill to produce a belief that the hat is ghastly.
(2) Bill to recognize that Bob intends [for] Bill to form this belief.
(3) Bill comes to believe that the hat is ghastly on the basis of [or at least
in part because] the recognition of Bob’s intention for them to form
this belief.
But, suppose that Bob’s sarcasm hides a desire to cover up the fact that
he has romantic feelings for the hat-wearer. Whilst uttering “nice hat” he
intends for Bill to think that he is being sarcastic, but really he thinks the
hat looks rather dashing on the object of his desire. The analysis now goes
as follows:
Bob utters “nice hat” intending:
(1) Bill to produce a belief that the hat is dashing.
(2) Bill to recognize that Bob intends him to form this belief.
(3) Bill comes to believe that the hat is dashing on the basis of [or at least
in part because] the recognition of Ted’s intention for them to form
this belief.
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But, Bob patently does not want Bill to think that the hat is dashing. To
make this more explicit, let us suppose that Bill recognizes that sarcasm
is often taken to be a hidden form of flirting or an indication of romantic
feelings: this recognition makes it even clearer that Bob not only has multiple
intentions and thus multiple speaker meanings on occasions of use, but that
they must have different analyses — and so different meanings.
However, intention-based semantics does not seem consistent with having
concurrent multiplicity of meanings. Grice’s stance is that, even if the utterer
has a multiplicity of intentions, one of them is the primary intention. And
it is the primary intention that must be grasped by the audience in order
for (1) the utterance to be meaningful and (2) the audience to grasp the
meaning of the utterance. But this supposes that the primary intention is
that which makes the utterance meaningful, not that the utterance can have
multiple meanings at the same time. In the case of Bob especially, there
does not seem to be one intention which can be picked as the primary one
in a non ad-hoc fashion.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter several important objectives have been achieved.
First, we must remember, as was discussed, that Grice’s theory was his-
torically very important in rejecting the third realm and behaviourism (but
so too does conventionalism) and that the other motivations are important to
take into consideration. I have also explained why intention-based semantics
seems to square well with the intuitions of many people.
Second, intention-based semantics is important for contemporary philos-
ophy of language. Many projects focus on Gricean (or neo-Gricean) theories
of meaning27
27I myself have an active interest in such projects, for instance it is interesting to inves-
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Indeed, I think that Grice’s theory is a strong one and must not be
rejected from the canon. However, the point of this chapter was to show
that conventionalism is overlooked in favour of alleged relative strengths of
intention-based semantics. And, this has been achieved. By using this one
exemplar — and a particularly strong one at that — I have shown that
there are objections which can be raised against it. Whether or not they
are insurmountable has not been considered in too much detail. The main
purpose of considering the objections was to show that this strong theory is
not an indication that conventionalism must be rejected out of hand.
Moreover, as we repeatedly saw in considering responses to objections,
there is a seeming need to appeal to conventional usage to salvage the inten-
tionalist’s intuitions about “literal meaning.” While I do not want to make
too much out of it here, this does at least hint that it is worth considering a
semantic theory that builds directly on these conventions — especially since,
as noted, conventionalism shares the anti-platonist and anti-behaviourist
virtues of intention-based semantics.
tigate what intention-based semantics can tell us about what is said, as opposed to what
is implied (remember the link between Grice’s theory of communicative practice and his
semantic theory). And intention-based semantics has also been applied to trying to come





In this chapter I consider the first supposed knock-down argument to con-
ventionalism noted in the introduction. Here, I consider Williamson’s charge
that conventionalism implies manifestability and hence luminosity. The ba-
sic structure of this objection is that:
(1) If conventionalism is correct, then manifestability follows and if man-
ifestability is accepted, then there are non-trivial luminous mental
states.
(2) But, there are no non-trivial luminous mental states.
(3) So, conventionalism is false.
I agree that luminosity must be rejected, whilst manifestability (of the
sort I have in mind) must be accepted.
However, Williamson thinks that any semantic conventionalist is com-
mitted to luminosity. To show why conventionalism is wrong, he constructs
what is known as the ‘anti-luminosity’ argument — so he does provide what
is, prima facie, a knock-down argument. In agreeing with Williamson’s anti-
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luminosity argument, but retaining manifestability, I show that his argument
is not knock-down — in effect by denying the second conjunct of (1).
So, my overall goal is to show that while luminosity is inconsistent with
a strong semantic conventionalism, manifestability must be incorporated in
semantic conventionalism.
To say that a mental state is luminous is to say that, whenever an agent is
in it, the agent is in a position to know that he is in it. Consider specifically
linguistic knowledge, luminosity (according to Williamson) translates to the
transparency of meaning — if an agent grasps the meaning of a word, then
reflection should enable the agent to know in detail all aspects of the meaning
of the word.
Manifestability, as I present it, however, explicitly rejects the necessity
of such knowledge being available to an agent. It needn’t be the case that
an agent knows all the aspects of the meaning of a lexical item of a word.
If an agent can use the lexical item correctly, then he has sufficient, but not
necessarily exhaustive, knowledge of the meaning of the term.
Since language is externalized, I argue that manifestability means that
by appealing to (some subset) of the community we can gain knowledge of
lexical items. So, this is in effect internalism versus externalism. The latter
I accept, the former I reject.
However, any luminous mental states reduce to triviality as we shall see
when discussing the anti-luminosity argument.1 The ‘anti-luminosity argu-
1This is assuming that luminosity implies that knowledge of the meanings of terms
would be a type of mental state — I do not take up the discussion as to whether or not
knowledge is internal or external as it would take us too far afield, but note that it is not a
settled matter as to which holds. It is sufficient here to note that Williamson’s argument
against luminosity is part of a broader project — that of rejecting the KK principle.
That is to say, he rejects the idea that if one knows (that they are in a condition) x,
then one need also know that one knows that (they are in condition) x. This broader
project need not concern us, however, since we are only concerned with how it affects
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ment’ is presented in Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits. (Williamson
2000) The exposition of which will follow shortly.
The sections of the chapter are:
1 Specifying what luminosity is.
2 Considering why it seems plausible that a conventionalist should be
committed to luminosity.
3 An exposition of Williamson’s ‘anti-luminosity argument’. Using this
argument, he shows that there are nontrivial luminous states — that
is, at no (non arbitrary) place in the transition between a condition C
and a condition ¬C can the agent come to know that they have failed
to be in C and are thereafter in ¬C.
4 My response to the objection.
Essentially my response, if one wants to call it that, is to accept Williamson’s
argument that luminosity is an undesirable feature of conventionalism. But,
the knock-down objection fails in light of the fact that a conventionalist need
not, and cannot, be committed to it — luminosity must be rejected.
I will show that the rejection of luminosity actually helps to clarify the
conditions of a community-based semantic theory. Giving up luminosity
means that the mental states of the linguistic agents fall out of the semantic
theory, and quite rightly so. The way that I draw out an expanded picture
of anti-luminous conventionalism is by providing a series of examples where
a linguistic agent attaches particular meanings to words, but in such a way
that they depend on the community in order to tell if they understand the
meanings of the terms and under what conditions sentences containing those
terms are warrantedly assertible.
the conventionalist semantics. The broader project concerns many metaphysical questions
which are not pertinent to this discussion.
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(5) So, after providing a series of examples, it will become apparent that
certain criteria should be incorporated into a semantic conventionalist
theory.
The conditions which come to light and which will be incorporated into
semantic conventionalism are: manifestability, externality of language, and
the fact that it is the community which determines ‘the rules of the game’,
not the individual agents. Meaning is still ‘use-based’, but appropriate use
is determined by the community — a linguistic agent may actually be blind,
e.g., to the appropriateness of an assertion, but can in principle be put right
by being exposed to appropriate conventions. It follows, as I will show, that
there must be some sort of division of linguistic labour incorporated into the
theory.
3.2 Luminosity
Luminosity is, prima facie, a likely condition upon linguistic agents in that,
if an agent attaches meanings to lexical items, then he needs to know (upon
sufficient reflection, as mentioned), whether the meanings are the same or if
they diverge.2
There is, unfortunately, only a small literature concerning luminosity,
especially concerning semantic theories, so my exposition will be a bit rough
and ready — but I think that Williamson’s is also. This chapter, however,
provides sufficient information to deal both with the objection and make it
clear why I respond in the way that I do.
Before we can consider why a conventionalist might feasibly be com-
mitted to luminous mental states in regards to lexical items and evaluate
Williamson’s argument, a bit needs to be said about what he means when
he calls a mental state ‘luminous’.
2How would he, e.g., know when he is able to make correct assertions?
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A luminous mental state is one where, if an agent is in it, he is always
able to tell that he is experiencing that mental state (or at least, he can
come to know that they are experiencing it). Consider, for instance, pain,
which is often taken to be luminous (how easy is it, e.g., to avoid noticing a
migraine?).
To introduce a further piece of Williamson’s jargon, a mental state is
non-trivial if an agent can be in it or not. Again, pain is a useful example.
The usual assumption is that an agent can always know whether they are
in condition C or ¬C (migraine or no) — not that the agent always does
know, since he might, e.g., not be paying attention, but if an agent did pay
attention he would be able to tell. This, however, turns out not to be the
case, as proven by the anti-luminosity argument, as we shall see in a moment.
3.3 Plausibility
Why, then, does it seem plausible that a conventionalist must hold that
there are luminous mental states in regards to knowledge of meanings, as
Williamson suggests a conventionalist is?
The suggestion is that knowing a meaning of a lexical items is a luminous
state.3 To be a competent linguistic agent the agent must ‘master the rules
of the language game’. One might say that for every term employed in a
sentence, the agent must know the meaning of the term if he is warranted
in asserting it.
It does seem plausible, as mentioned, that given the maxim that agents
must know the rules of the language game that they must individually know
the assertability conditions of sentences, and hence the meanings of the terms
3Note, though, that this is granting that knowledge is a mental state — Williamson is
an externalist about knowledge, so it should come as no surprise that he finds luminosity
so implausible.
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employed. But, if this is the case, then the speaker must equally know when
the meaning of two terms is the same or divergent. For instance, if an agent
were to assert a sentence such as “The pavement is wet, it must have rained,”
or “The sidewalk is wet, it must have rained,” then to know that either can
be asserted under the same conditions, he must understand that the terms
are synonymous — since he must know that pavement is interchangeable
with sidewalk (if one is familiar with both British and Canadian English,
say). Alternatively, if lexical items with divergent meanings are used in a
sentence, then the agent must also know that the assertability conditions
change. Knowledge of assertability conditions and meanings then does seem
to be required of the individual agents.
We turn now to Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, in part to show
that he is right that knowledge of lexical items cannot be luminous. But I
will then show that his argument does not ring the death knell for semantic
conventionalism.
3.4 Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument
In order for conventionalism to work, the argument goes, access to the ‘rules
of the language game’ must imply luminosity of the meanings of lexical items
for individual speakers. But, according to Williamson, language users do not
have such access to the language. In order to show this, he constructs what
I shall call the ‘anti-luminosity’ argument (Williamson 2000).
In regards to the charge of luminosity, bear in mind Williamson only
concerns himself with one conventionalist, namely Dummett, not all conven-
tionalists. Dummett does seem to be committed to luminosity. There is no
reason to suppose that other conventionalists agree to luminosity — indeed,
I do not, and shall explain why in a moment.
Therefore, I shall not concern myself with (what Williamson perceives
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to be) Dummettian luminosity. Perhaps the reason that Williamson takes
Dummett as, what we might call, the ‘luminosity role-model’ is that, given
his perceived dominant position in regards to conventionalism, all other con-
ventionalists fall into line. This, I will show, is unwarranted.
The basic structure of Williamson’s argument is fairly straightforward:
he assumes that there is a non-trivial luminous state — a state C, which
a person can be in or fail to be in, but not both at once. He reduces the
assumption to absurdity by showing that for any such condition it is possible
for a person both to be in it (C) and fail to be in it (¬C).
Before sketching the argument in slightly more detail, we need to note one
further epistemological claim Williamson relies on. While not committing
himself to reliabilism, he does insist that knowledge of P implies a sort of
reliability for the belief that P . In particular, if an agent knows P under
certain conditions, then P must be true under closely related conditions
(though in some of these related conditions P might not be known). He
sometimes refers to this as a requirement for margins of error, something
that gets encoded in principle M below.
The argument against luminosity can be paraphrased as:
? First we assume that there is a non-trivial condition C to be luminous.
? Second, since an agent can both be in C and fail to be in ¬C, we
assume that there is a transition for the agent between condition C
and ¬C. The stages of the transition are s1, . . . , sn, with C holding
in s1 and ¬C holding in sn. Since C is luminous, the condition L
applies.
? L : If an agent is in condition C, then he can know that he is in C.
? M : If KC at si, then an agent is in C at si+1.
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- Since C (at s1), then KC at sn by applying L — which means that
an agent at s1 knows that they are in C.
- Apply M — If KC at s1, then the agent is in C at s2.
- By repeated application, for every si, if you are in condition C, then
KC at si+1, and so in C at si+1.
- Strictly speaking what Williamson shows is that any luminous mental
state has to be trivial, where by trivial he means that being in C and
¬C at the same time is possible — the sorites style argument shows
why luminosity results (in this type of) triviality. A non-trivial mental
state would mean that an agent never finds themselves in conditions
C and ¬C at the same time — there are unquestionably non-trivial
mental states, but a condition of such states is that they are non-
luminous.
Rather than responding to Williamson’s argument, I grant that luminos-
ity results in triviality. So, any semantic theory that requires the existence
of non-trivial luminous states is in trouble. This, given what I said above,
means that conventionalism can plausibly be thought to be in trouble.
Semantic theories aside, for the moment, note that, if Williamson is
right, then we cannot even help ourselves to the idea that no physical or
mental states are states that, when we are in them, we always have knowl-
edge of being in them,4 nor even that when we are in them we could know
it. Consider, for instance, having a headache — there may be more pressing
things to do than lying down with a cold compress, such as making dinner
for the family. Being engaged in such an activity may very well lead some-
one to cease to be aware that they are in pain — other considerations, in
4This means that anti-luminosity implies just what the argument above showed: that
we cannot always have knowledge of the conditions we find ourselves in.
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other words, override the knowledge that one is in pain. This does not, yet,
however, show that pain is non-luminous — you could still be in a position
to know (even whilst making dinner) that you have a headache. To show
that pain is non-luminous, then, we cannot merely appeal to distraction by
alternative activities. Having a headache is plausibly a non-trivial state.
Williamson’s argument, if sound, implies that there are possible cases where
an agent has a headache, but is not in a position to know that this is so.
The anti-luminosity argument is therefore one with important and contro-
versial consequences, and so deserves careful attention from philosophers. I
set these issues aside here because they are beside my present point, not
because I think his argument settles the matter.
To sum up: whilst the conventionalist is seemingly committed to luminosity,
it must be rejected. Since I reject the ‘undesirable’ feature myself, luminosity
does fail in the sense that there can be gaps in the knowledge of individual
agents in regards to the knowledge of the meanings of lexical items. This
shows that the objection can be side-stepped. It thus fails to be an objection
at all — least of all knock-down. This is one way in which I am, at most, a
neo-Dummettian — luminosity, something Dummett takes to be a criterion
of semantic conventionalism, does not make it onto the ‘list’ of what I take
to be the defining features of conventionalism.
However, I do insist that meaning is public and manifestable. This means
that anything which deserves to be called conventionalism no aspect of mean-
ing is “hidden.” This suggests “knowability in principle” for all aspects of
the meaning of any particular term. What I suggest is that this needn’t be
“knowability” for the particular agent, but knowability for the community.
But what, exactly is meant by the community knowing the meanings of
lexical terms?5 Without an answer to this our argument is incomplete. A
5As we will see in a later section (and in Chapter Five) knowing in relation to a commu-
nity may, at first glance, appear to be odd. However, given the fact that I advocate division
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community is a conglomerate of individuals but neither the understanding of
lexical items nor assertability conditions are fixed by the individuals. Knowl-
edge is distributed across the community. First we must consider what the
community looks like in general before moving on to specifics.
Conventionalism, then, is not threatened by Williamson’s argument,
given the manifestability of meaning. As long as knowledge of the mean-
ings of lexical items are (externalized and) manifestable by the community,
then the condition is merely that an agent not in possession of the knowl-
edge of the meaning of a term could come to possess the knowledge, say, by
asking the right person.
3.5 Examples
What the examples to come show is that the meanings of lexical items need
not be transparent. In externalizing accessibility of the meanings of lexical
items I show that the knowledge of individual agents is not primary, the
“knowledge” of the community is. The externality is based on the notion of
manifestability.
Returning to the sketch of the supposed “knock-down” argument against
conventionalism with which we began, I will show that the conjunction ((con-
ventionalism → manifestability) ∧ (manifestability → luminosity)) fails,
since the latter conjunct is false.
These examples show that the community is central in determining how
one comes to know the meaning of lexical items. All three involve mani-
festability in one form or another (but not luminosity). After the examples,
further discussion will highlight several criteria of semantic conventionalism.
Notice that when I talk about the ‘community’, I do not simply mean the
of linguistic labour (spelled out in terms of manifestability in due course), and develop a
type of states of information semantics (in Chapter Five), this oddness disappears.
68
(individual) linguistic agents of the community, but other resources, e.g.,
books, the internet, observation on the part of the agent, subsets of the
linguistic community (e.g., groups of experts), etc.
(1) The first example concerns what seems to be one word of which I
possess knowledge of the meaning. It just so happens that there is a
divergence of meaning when the word is applied under different cir-
cumstances. So, I know the meanings of two terms and I count them
as two lexical items because they carry distinct meanings — w1 and
w2 and I further know that they do not have the same meaning.
Consider the robin, which is a different species in North America, Europe,
and Australia. I did not know that there was a different species of robin
in Australia — my ornithological knowledge is distinctly lacking. I stum-
bled upon the Australian distinction by trying to determine the (precise)
difference between the North American definition and the European defini-
tion of robins. I do not, or at least did not, know what the distinguishing
features are of the Australian robin, but I can either ask an ornithologist
(who, by being a member of the ornithological community can be taken to
be an authority on the matter), by consulting a book, or even (heaven forbid)
Wikipedia. All three would be able to provide me with sufficient information
concerning different species globally. So, I can come to know that w1 6= w2
and that neither is identical to w3.
But, in the case I have in mind, I was a competent user of the word before
discovering this further distinction. I was “in a position to know” that there
are distinct meanings, but not merely by reflection.
(2) The second example is one in which I, or some other linguistic agent,
have deficient knowledge of two objects to be able to tell them apart.
However, they should be identified by different words — but I do not
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know this until after an authority has been consulted. The linguistic
agent, in this case, is incompetent.
Consider the terms w1, take this to be ‘dalmation toadflax’, and w2, take
this to be ‘yellow toadflax’. I cannot tell the difference between the two, not
being a specialist in regards to flowers. Assume, looking at some flowers that
I take w1 to be identical with w2 (given my lack of knowledge in regards to
flowers). In fact they are different species of the snapdragon family. The
only distinguishing feature, apparently, is that they have different types of
leaves. I had no idea about these flowers at all until I consulted the internet.
However, my mother and grandmother, having a large number of books on
botany would be able to look the flowers up in the books.
There would be two types of authority in this example. The first is
that it can be pointed out by my mother and grandmother that dalmation
and yellow toadflax are the different species (or they may witness incorrect
usages of the term(s) and correct me). They might not know immediately
the difference between dalmation and yellow toadflax, but they do know
that they are (somehow) different and so they can look up the facts. I am
no authority at all; my mother and grandmother could be said to be partial
authorities, in the sense that they know that there is a difference and they
know how to acquire the requisite knowledge; the second authority, which
ultimately determines between dalmation and yellow toadflax, then, are the
books which are consulted.
In this situation, I am not a competent linguistic speaker at all, but can
appeal to the other authorities to update my linguistic competence — so
that I can grasp the meanings of the terms involved.
There is thus, as in the robin case, information available to me which
would allow me to distinguish w1 and w2. But this requires externality of
language — it must be manifestable in principle, i.e., it must be manifestable
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that the words carry different meanings and apply to distinct objects.
Notice, though, that this example is somewhat different from the robin
example — a limited knowledge of the distinction between species of robin
was in my stock of lexical items. Although I did not know about the Aus-
tralian robin, I knew the difference between the North American and Euro-
pean species sufficiently to know under what circumstances the words could
be used. So, in this case, I was a competent linguistic agent in regards to
two types of robin, but not at all about the two different species of flower.
In the second example, I am an incompetent linguistic agent (since I did not
even know that dalmation and yellow toadflax existed). My grandmother,
on the other hand, is in a position similar to mine with respect to the two
sorts of robins.
- Note that examples (1) and (2) are very similar in nature. One can
extrapolate from them and come up with any number of alternative
examples. Although there is some divergence between (1) and (2), we
see a greater difference when we consider (3).
(3) The third example is one in which I have an approximate knowledge
of a lexical item.
Suppose that someone has been raised by a geophysicist and, on various
family holidays, attendance of public lectures, and so forth, gathers some
information concerning what a geophysicist is and does. Suppose it is me.
There are two ways in which I have some knowledge of what the lexical
item means. As in philosophy, there are distinct disciplines in geophysics.
Some geophysicists pursue fields that are very close in nature to geological
ones. Others concentrate on, e.g., four-dimensional seismic surveys. Can
I be said to be a competent linguistic agent in this case? Most likely not
entirely. However, by consulting textbooks, geologists themselves, etc., I
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can come to know what the general definition of ‘geophysicist’ is (call this
w1). But, moreover, I can come to know that a geophysicist in discipline1
and discipline2 are actually different types of scientists, in the same way
that there are philosophers in different fields (which may be as opaque to an
outsider as someone outside the field of geophysics).
The differences in meanings of the lexical items in question are mani-
festable in all three examples, because in all three, one can appeal to outside
sources to gain knowledge of the meanings of lexical items. Internal reflection
is obviously not sufficient in any of the cases, so manifestability does not im-
ply luminosity (thus showing the falsehood of the conjunction which is used
in the construction of the ‘knock-down’ argument — the second conjunct is
shown to be false).
By discussing the conditions of conventionalism which result from the
examples, it will become apparent not just that I do not think that knowledge
of lexical items is external, but that the meanings must be external.
3.6 Conditions on the Linguistic Community
How, exactly, then do the examples relate to the linguistic community and
the conditions of semantic conventionalism? Of course providing examples
is not the only way to draw out these conditions, but they are useful.
The examples above show that ‘mastering the rules of the game’ and
accepting that ‘meaning is use’ can taken to be very broad notions — on the
basis of the community, and the ‘authorities’ that it contains, we can tell
whether an assertion is warranted or not (once the conventions are under-
stood). The only thing an agent need know is under what circumstances an
assertion is deemed to be warranted or not. And on the basis of the rules
of the community, the linguistic agent can either stick to their assertion or
must take it back.
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So, a competent linguistic agent need not (immediately) possess the
knowledge of the meaning of lexical items, but can make assertions on the
basis of ‘approximate’ knowledge.
What, then, have we learned from the examples?
It is reasonable to draw the following lessons from the examples:
(1) the community determines what the rules of the game are and whether
they are being followed correctly.
(2) meaning must be externalized.
(3) meaning is manifestable.
(4) there are different types of authority
(5) these conditions make it clear that there must be some sort of division
of linguistic labour to make semantic conventionalism acceptable.
(1)-(5) are importantly related to each other, as shown in the examples.
The examples provided show that one cannot achieve a grasp of the conven-
tions of a language unless the rules of the game are employed. If a rule is
flouted and an unwarranted assertion is made, then an agent can (or at least
should be able to) be put right. That is, the authorities — members of (or
objects of) the linguistic community — determine the rules (conventions) for
using lexical items. Thus, knowing the conditions under which an assertion
could be correctly made is precisely understanding and following the exter-
nalized rules. The rules then require abiding by conventions. Otherwise,
what the ‘language game’ consists in is unclear, if one could make sense of
what this means in the first place.
In order for a conventionalist to survive Williamson’s attack, he must
revise his understanding of what “grasping” the rules of the game or the
meanings of lexical items actually implies. The rules of the game are not
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determined by the individual, but by the community. We’ve known that
all along — this is simply part of what it is to be a conventionalist. So, in
order for an agent to be a competent speaker, the rules of the game do not
need to be entirely transparent to him, as the examples have shown. As the
examples have further shown, grasping the meaning of lexical items or the
rules is displayed by the agent’s basic competence with the rules — even if,
as noted, he does not know all aspects of the rules.
Having accepted Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, I have accepted
that having knowledge of the meanings of lexical items must mean that an
agent is in a non-luminous state. I have also accepted that manifestability
implies “being in a position to know” all aspects of the meaning of a word in
some sense. But since grasp of meaning must be non-luminous, something
other than internal reflection must provide access to knowledge of the mean-
ings of lexical items, this, as mentioned previously relies on the acceptance of
conventions. Meaning is constituted by these conventions, which are plainly
external and community-based — otherwise no agent would be competent,
no preexisting meanings would be available to grant the agent access to the
language, and no authorities could exist. The examples show that meaning
must be not only manifestable, but also intersubjective, and that there must
be a division of linguistic labour.
Knowing the difference between the European and North American robin,
shows that I am a competent linguistic agent, since I know what assertions
are warranted on the basis of the knowledge that I have. But in order to gain
knowledge of the Australian species I would have to consult an appropriate
authority or authorities — be they sublinguistic groups, books on a partic-
ular subject, internet sites, or whatnot — the meaning of the terms must,
therefore, be manifestable; the meanings of the terms are determined by
the community (intersubjective). The division of linguistic labour is made
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clear when we considered the different types of authorities contained in the
linguistic community. Similarly, these conditions hold if I am an incompe-
tent linguistic agent in regards to toadflax, and a colloquial user of the term
‘geophysicist’. The three conditions discussed, then, hold whether I am an
incompetent, partially competent, or competent language user.
Manifestability, intersubjectivity, and division of linguistic labour raise
an important point — the examples clearly show that, e.g., manifestability
does not relate to the psychology of the linguistic agents.6
Other cases of deficient knowledge and ways of appealing to some author-
ity to gain access to the conventions of the linguistic cases are easy to come
by, but the principles are the same. One need not have full knowledge, nor
implicit knowledge, of a language to be a member of a linguistic community
— but they must have access (in some way or another) to the conventions
of that linguistic community.
3.7 Conclusion
To conclude, we have learned that Williamson is quite right — luminosity
would indeed be problematic, if not devastating, to a semantic conventional-
ism that required it. However, having accepted Williamson’s anti-luminosity
argument, we have also shown several conditions of a community-based se-
mantic theory — when considering what a conventionalist ought to say to
take the sting out of Williamson’s argument, we have uncovered a version
6Perhaps a further example would be the ever occurring red lines under words when
I am writing quickly. Who determines the correct spelling? Perhaps a dictionary: but a
dictionary relies equally on language use of the community — a standard is generally set
such that a certain amount of occurrences of a word must appear in print before accepted
as a standard/conventional meaning. But, I am assuming that if an author of a dictionary
discovers that all the 500,000, or whatnot, applications originate from the same author
they will not accept the use as conventional.
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of conventionalism that has the appealing features of manifestability, inter-
subjectivity, and division of linguistic labour.
The argument presented by Williamson shows that by anti-luminosity,
luminosity of the meanings of lexical items is incoherent. That is, triviality
follows if the linguistic agents must be aware of the meanings of lexical
items in the way Williamson assumes other authors take such knowledge to
be (i.e., luminous). But then by sufficient (internal) reflection an agent can
come to know the meanings of the lexical items he employs. Williamson has
quite rightly shown that internal reflection is insufficient.
In this chapter, then, we have learned several important lessons in regards
to semantic conventionalism: community-based language is not threatened
by the anti-luminosity argument. By placing the conditions of externality,
manifestability and the division of linguistic labour on the community7 —
made clear by the examples and the subsequent discussion of community-
based semantics — I have shown luminosity does not follow.
Hence we have shown that the objection we began with is not knock-
down. And in fact, by accepting Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, we
have shown that it ceases to be an objection at all.
The conditions which have become apparent by considering Williamson’s
argument, and the examples given above, help in establishing several criteria
that are necessary for a workable semantic conventionalist theory. So, in
fact, by considering this ‘objection’ we are well on our way to making more
explicit what I take to be a viable semantic conventionalism.
To sum up: the basic structure of the argument does have an effect on
conventionalism. The first premise of the argument:
If conventionalism is correct, then manifestability follows and if man-
ifestability is accepted, then there are non-trivial luminous mental
7Note that I take all three as contributors to the condition of intersubjectivity.
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states.
is rejected, since we have shown the second conjunct to be false. So, as I
have shown, semantic conventionalism should not (and cannot) be a viable





A popular view in the philosophy of language literature, advocated notably
by Fodor and Lepore,1 is that there are only two viable sorts of semantic
theories, namely holism2 or atomism.3 It is thought that there is no seman-
tic “third way” because of the Quinean rejection of the analytic/synthetic
distinction. Fodor and Lepore further argue that holism is “crazy” (or at
least that no tenable arguments have been put forward in favour of it), and
so it seems that the only acceptable semantic theory is atomism. To be
explicit, the argument presented by Fodor and Lepore is a disjunctive syllo-
gism. They maintain that either holism is correct or that atomism is. Since
holism is crazy, it must be the case that atomism is correct.
It is on the basis of reasoning of this sort that one might think a second
knock-down argument against conventionalism can be constructed.
The supposed knock-down argument goes as follows:
1See the introduction of Holism: A Shopper’s Guide (Fodor and Lepore 1992).
2Holism is the view that the meaning of all lexical items in a language are related to,
and affected by, all other lexical items.
3The view that each lexical item in a language has meaning independently of every
other lexical item.
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(1) If conventionalism is correct, then there must be a principled ana-
lytic/synthetic distinction.
(2) There is no principled analytic/synthetic distinction.
(3) Therefore conventionalism is not true.
The reason for (2) is that it is accepted, for Quinean reasons, that there
is no principled analytic/synthetic distinction. I will not concern myself with
(2). My focus is on premise (1), the rejection of which will show that the
objection is mistaken.
First I need to show precisely why it might be thought that the above is a
knock-down argument — what makes the objection appear to be plausible?
Fodor and Lepore argue as follows: either semantic atomism is correct
or meaning is determined by the role played by a word in relation to other
words. And not both by definition of atomism.
Atomism is inconsistent with the type of conventionalism that I advocate.
Consider language games — if we are going to accept that there are such
things, then it cannot be the case that lexical items have meaning in isolation,
which is what atomism means. So, we know that atomism cannot be the
right view for conventionalism.
Now, once one has accepted that meaning is determined by relations to
other parts of the language, some might ask “which parts?” In order to
avoid holism (i.e., to avoid saying “all of them”), one needs a principled way
to distinguish which relations confer meaning and which do not.
The analytic/synthetic distinction is the only candidate that seems to be
on offer as a principled distinction to determine which relations are meaning
conferring (the analytic ones) and which are not (the ‘others’). But, by
(2), that is not a principled distinction. So, why not just accept holism?
Because it is obviously false: it makes language unlearnable. In essence, the
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conventionalist should reject holism for the same reasons Fodor and Lepore
do.
Summing up: if you don’t have a principled analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion and the meaning of words is determined by relationships between its
occurrences of other parts of the language, then you have to say that all its
relationships go to determining its meaning. Atomism, on the other hand,
means that words have meaning in isolation, perhaps by their relations to
things in the world. So, holism and conventionalism have a feature in com-
mon: the meaning of a word is its role in the sentences in which it occurs.
Meaning is not, and cannot be, determined in isolation from the rest of the
language. But, as mentioned, if holism is correct, there is no way of cordon-
ing off sections of the language which are meaning-constituting. Since the
analytic/synthetic distinction is the only candidate for doing this cordoning,
conventionalism needs the analytic/synthetic distinction.
To put this point another way, conventionalism cannot be either atom-
istic or holistic. If conventionalism were atomistic, then it would seem that
‘meaning is use’ fails — and this maxim, in combination with the maxim
that to be a competent linguistic agent is to know the rules of the game, is
essentially what it means to be a conventionalist theory of meaning, since
the community decides what appropriate use is. Atomism, relying on the
acquisition of individual lexical items rather than learning pre-existing con-
ventions, from which we grasp the meaning of words, is the wrong way round
for a semantic conventionalist.
I argue that the supposed objection and its explication by Fodor and
Lepore presents a false dichotomy — a semantic ‘third way’, molecularism,
is possible, and plausible. What I have in mind is the development of a
‘weaker’ distinction than the analytic/synthetic distinction but one which
is principled, which the analytic/synthetic distinction, at least if Quine is
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right, is not — namely one which distinguishes meaning-constituting and
nonmeaning-constituting inferences. This avoids both holism and atomism,
but it does so in a way such that the conventionalist is not committed to the
analytic/synthetic distinction.
In order to provide a principled distinction I: (1) establish a type of in-
ferentialism which is consistent with conventionalism — one which does not
fall into holism — as Fodor and Lepore argue is inevitable with any theory
other than atomism; (2) show that such an inferentialist picture is molecu-
larist. On the basis of a distinction between what I call materially correct
and non-materially correct (but still permissible) inferences we can cordon
off sections of the language. On the basis of such a type of inferentialism I
show that it is correct to say that it is relations between lexical items that
determine meaning, but only some, not all such relations. This molecularist
inferentialism gives conventionalism a way of separating off the inferences
that count as meaningful from the ones that aren’t. Roughly, what I shall
argue is that the inferences that count for meaning are what we shall call
materially correct, but not logically correct.
There is a principled distinction to be made by using molecularist inferen-
tialism: that is, between meaning-constituting and nonmeaning-constituting
inference. What I call ‘materially correct inferences’ count as meaning-
constituting and ‘other inferences’ are nonmeaning-constituting. The dis-
tinction is drawn on the basis of a notion of particular types of inferential
relations which shall be developed — materially correct inferences deter-
mine meaning, and thus words gain content only on the basis of these, since
these are the inferences licensed and determined by the community to be
constitutive of the meanings of particular terms. The distinction rests on
the differences between direct and indirect inferences. A direct inference is
where, e.g., B is inferred from A (with no intermediate steps). An indirect
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inference is one where the conclusion of an inference essentially involves more
than one step, e.g., concluding C from A, but by way of a second step — A
to B. So, the inference now is A to B to C.
To distinguish direct and indirect inferences I must establish a hierarchi-
cal account that does not allow one to jump immediately from A to C. This
hierarchical account allows me to show why permissible inferences from A
to B are materially correct, and thus meaning constitutive, while inferences
from A to C (via B) are not meaning constitutive. To do this, I must pro-
vide a hierarchical account of inferences that does not allow transitivity of
the relation of material correctness, i.e., in such a way that the inference be-
tween A and C is not materially correct. As a sort of corollary I will further
show that there is an ‘asymmetry’ built into such a hierarchical account of
permissible inferences.
It is also important to distinguish material from formally correct infer-
ences. In formal inferences there is no content, so, whilst some are direct
inferences they are not meaning constitutive. That is, in addition to the di-
rect/indirect distinction, I will make clear that there is a second subset of in-
ferences which, whilst permissible and (sometimes) direct , are not meaning-
constituting — namely formally correct inferences. In contrast to holistic
inferentialists, I argue that since logical vocabulary is contentless, logical
inferences, even if inferentially direct, do not count as materially correct.
On the basis of licensed, meaning constitutive, inferences, the meaning
of words (and so the existence of ‘concepts’)4 is determined by the licensed
inferences endorsed by the intersubjective practices of the linguistic commu-
nity — contrary to the traditional views that concepts are either platonic or
psychological states of individual agents, both those theories have previously
4Note that, according to my view, contra other theories of semantic inferentialism,
conceptual content falls out of the picture.
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been rejected as unsuitable for semantic conventionalism. Concepts, on this
view, are derivative from the meanings of words and sentences and so, being
embedded in a semantic conventionalist theory, have to be determined by
the community and are thus (at a minimum) shown to be intersubjective.
But, the way that the community determines the meaning of words is by the
licensing of materially correct inferences.
What this amounts to is the idea that language games are hierarchically
arranged, and the relation of inferences being meaning-constituting infer-
ences is not transitive. So, only once an agent has mastered inferences at
one level is it possible to acquire concepts of a higher level. ‘Lower’ level
inferences, whilst still meaning constitutive in relation to other lower level
inferences, do not count as meaning constitutive in relation to higher level
materially correct inferences, as we shall see.
The distinction that I draw is, as mentioned, weaker than the ana-
lytic/synthetic distinction — but I think this is not a problem. If it does
the job of establishing that molecularism is viable, then it does not need to
be as clear cut as the analytic/synthetic distinction was meant to be, which,
after all, is rejected by many philosophers.
My story, then, is this: materially correct inferences determine mean-
ing. Formally correct inferences are not materially correct, and so are not
meaning-constituting inferences. The upshot of the discussion in this chap-
ter is that conventionalism which is based on molecularist inferentialism is
at least in no worse a position than other theories. To establish this much
all I need to do is to establish the possibility that molecularist inferentialism
can distinguish between meaning-constituting and nonmeaning-constituting
inferences. This is not to say that I am presenting the only possible theory,
nor that it is even the right theory — only that it is one way to make the
distinction, i.e., a weaker distinction than the analytic/synthetic distinction
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is not detrimental to semantic conventionalism and is principled in a way
that the analytic/synthetic distinction is not. So, semantic conventionalism
based on molecularist inferentialism will be shown to be a stronger position
to take for conventionalism than the analytic/synthetic distinction, previ-
ously thought to be the only road to molecularism.
In what follows I borrow heavily from the inferential role semantics de-
veloped by Robert Brandom in Making it Explicit (Brandom 1994). The key
feature of Brandom’s view is that some of the inferential roles of an expres-
sion constitutes its meaning. But, since Brandom is an inferential holist, he
accepts the argument from Fodor and Lepore that if some inferential roles
constitute the meaning of a lexical item, then all of the inferential roles of
an expression constitute its meaning.
I shall modify Brandom’s view, showing that his work is a natural starting
point for an inferentialism of a different character.
4.2 Holism and Atomism
For starters, let us get some definitions on the table — this will assist in
establishing the need for a semantic middle ground.
The definition that I use for holism is that it is a view which implies that
every lexical item of the language is relevant to determining the meaning of
any individual term in the language. If inquiring into the meaning of a term
or sentence, the entire language must be taken into account.
It must be noted that some authors suggest that there are different types
of holism. There is the ‘out and out’ holistic account of meaning where, as
mentioned, every lexical item is relevant to the meaning of other lexical
items. If the meaning of one sentence (or ‘node’ in the language ‘web’)
changes, then the meaning of all other lexical items are revised also. A
somewhat different account of holism is that, if relevant, then a change in
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meaning of a lexical item will only affect the meanings of others in the
vicinity. For instance, if numbers are defined as abstract, platonic, entities
and one shifts to a fictionalist account thereof, then the definition of all
numbers would need to be altered. This does not imply that the meaning of
other sentences changes, only those relevant to talk of number theory.
Talk of numbers is, what one might term, a language game. Being an
independent language game from, e.g., talk of middle size objects (chairs,
desks, people, etc.), means that one language game may not affect all lan-
guage games at once. It could be argued that what changes is merely the
language game in question — the others are left intact unless changes are
made to these other language games. This latter form of holism strikes me
as not really holistic at all. By distinguishing language games and the fact
that changes in those games does not bleed through to others strikes me as
molecularist. Indeed, it strikes me as close kin to the view I am defend-
ing. The challenge of avoiding collapse into ‘out and out’ holism by giving
a principled account of relevance of the relations between parts of language
is essentially the same project as I am tackling.
The definition for atomism is that the semantic atoms, namely words (or
those items in the language which are concatenated, such as “dog-paddle,
”underhand,” “prehistoric,” etc.) are taken to have a meaning, and have
their meaning in isolation from the rest of the language. Atomism is usually
taken to be bound up with a causal theory of meaning. It follows that words
are learnable and can, at least in principle, be added to a speaker’s linguistic
competence, individually. Sentences, therefore, only have meaning in virtue
of the meanings of the individual terms involved.
Notice that this turns the context principle on its head. The context
principle is that the meaning of a word is determined by the roles it plays
in sentences. The atomistic view, however, would have it that the meaning
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of words are prior to sentential meaning. The latter is derived from word
meaning.
4.3 Plausibility
As briefly suggested at the start of this chapter, the knock-down argument
is closely related to one found in various forms in the philosophy of language
literature. It will be worth our while to start with that argument, which gets
a clear statement from Fodor and Lepore. Their argument is, using what I
hope are sufficiently obvious abbreviations:
(1) Atomism ∨ ¬Atomism5
(2) ¬ Atomism → Holism
(3) ¬ Holism
(4) Therefore, Atomism.
This argument is obviously classically valid, so its plausibility depends on
the plausibility of the premises. Since premise (1) looks pretty safe (even
considering my advocacy of intuitionistic logic in Chapter Five), it is (2) and
(3) that are of most concern. We will consider (3) in the next section. Let
us now consider (2).
Fodor has been arguing for something like (2) for some time. Consider
what he (Fodor 1987) and Devitt (Devitt 1993) call the “basic argument.”
(A) Some of an expression’s inferential properties constitute its meaning.
(B) If some of an expression’s inferential properties constitute its meaning
then they all do.
5Fodor and Lepore call any theory that is not atomism anatomism.
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(C) So, all of the inferential properties of an expression constitute its mean-
ing. (Devitt 1993, 17)
If we accept that all non-atomistic semantic theories account for the
meaning in terms of inferential properties, the basic argument becomes an
argument for (2).
I have suggested that it is the lack of a principled analytic/synthetic
distinction that grounds (B). Fodor and Lepore are quite explicit about
this:
Premise 1 [Semantic properties of sentences] of a language are molecular.6
Lemma: If Smith has the belief that P, he must have other beliefs not
identical to P.
Premise 2: There is no principled distinction between the propositions
that Smith has to believe to believe that P and the propositions that
Smith doesn’t have to believe to believe that P.
Conclusion: The property of being-some-belief-or-other-of Smith’s [and
presumably being-some-formula-or-other] is holistic. (Fodor and Lep-
ore 1992, 23-25)
Fodor and Lepore use examples to make premise (2) plausible. Consider:
- Theory1: S1: The trees are losing their blossoms.
- This is partially confirmed by S2: There are high winds.
- The fact that there are high winds is partially confirmed by the obser-
vation report that S3: The branches on the trees are all moving.
- S4. . .Sn. Take Sn to be, e.g., High winds signal a coming storm.
6This is a paraphrase of the first premise of Fodor’s argument. There is no need to
provide the entire premise since, for our purposes, they amount to the same thing.
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But, Fodor and Lepore assume that it is outlandish to suppose that one
needs to believe that high winds signal a coming storm in order to believe
that the trees are losing their blossoms. Moreover, we could come up with
any number of examples: S1: the trees are losing their blossoms. S2: there
is an elementary school in the area. S3: some children are vandals. . .Sn: if
parents instructed their children in appropriate behaviour the trees would
be left alone.
Extrapolate from these two examples and we see that Fodor and Lepore
are right, to this extent — big problems ensue if meaning is determined by
relations to other sections of the language and there is no way to cordon
off sections of the language. Indeed, that holism follows from the denial
of atomism if one rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction, as Fodor and
Lepore do, is not implausible. The hidden premise, of course, is that the
only candidate for blocking, in a non-arbitrary way, chains of inferences such
as the above, is by allowing only analytically correct inferences.
4.4 Objections to Holism
Let us turn next to premise (3) of Fodor and Lepore’s argument — that
holism is false (indeed crazy). This, of course, is a claim with which the
conventionalist can happily agree, if I am right.
The first reason to question holism is its sheer implausibility. It seems
highly improbable that there are inferential relations between such concepts
as ducks, bathtubs and, say, the number 2, such that the concepts are de-
pendent on one another for their meaning.
What is the reason, one might wonder, to suppose that the semantic
content of a sentence depends on the entirety of the language? It seems
intuitive that there is, or at least should be, a way of demarcating sections
of the language so that the meaning of a sentence is related to, gained by,
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or changed by, only a small subset of the language, not the whole language.
Even if one were to argue that all concepts can be inferentially related to
each other, it is a leap from that, to the view that the meaning of a sentence
is determined by the entire language.
Further, demarcating the boundaries of English is an important theo-
retical question for holism. This is because, if the language is constantly
revisable, as English of course is, then every piece of the language must be
revisable at the same time. But it seems doubtful that adding a new concept
to a language, or having one that gradually changes over time, affects the
rest of English all in one go. Such a change might affect the semantic value
of some sentences that are in the semantic or conceptual neighbourhood, but
it is highly doubtful that all sentences or concepts are, or even are possibly,
affected.
Second, it is often thought that holism should be conceived as fundamen-
tally related to beliefs. This means that the semantic contents of sentences
depend on the psychology and individual understanding of linguistic agents.
But this is highly questionable. If belief and semantic content are thus con-
nected, then, for anything that changes in a person’s web of beliefs, there
is some corresponding change in the semantic content of everything in the
web. Further, this would make language private, and would mean that there
would never be the exact same content of a sentence for different members of
a language community. Each change in the beliefs of an agent would signal
changes in the meanings of sentences in that agent’s idiolect — making a
shared language highly unlikely.
4.5 Objections to Atomism
We have briefly considered Fodor and Lepore’s case for atomism. Unfortu-
nately for them, atomism faces equally serious problems which make it, like
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holism, an untenable position.
There are broad theoretical problems with atomism. One example is that
there is, as yet, no plausible account of the causal theory of meaning, which
is proposed by many atomists as the theory needed to explain the semantic
content of atomic expressions.
The causal theory, in a very crude form, is the view that a token of “cow”
in ‘the head’ means COW because the tokening is caused by cows. It is the
fact of having a type of token that is differentially sensitive to the presence
of cows that constitutes the tokening of the concept “cow.” Semantic atoms
supposedly gain their content from such causal relations.7
But, consider the disjunction problem. For instance, suppose that you
are in your backyard at twilight, you see a shadowy object at the end of the
yard which causes the tokening of “dog” in your head. However, it was not
a dog, but a large cat, which caused the tokening. So tokenings of “dog”
are caused by dogs and, sometimes, cats. But we can broaden this out:
perhaps it was a huge rabbit at the end of the yard. So tokenings of “dog”
are caused by dogs or cats or rabbits. Perhaps the sensible thing to say is
that “dog” is caused by the presence of a a suitably sized shadowy shape at
the end of the yard. But then, by the causal theory, a suitably sized shadowy
object should be (part of) the meaning of “dog”. One readily sees how such
considerations are particularly problematic. One might ask: how then is it
possible ever to misrepresent anything or for a concept to have a particular
content? The atomist is neither able to account for causation as a suitably
discriminating determinant for semantic content nor solve the problem of
7There is a multitude of issues that could be raised in context of atomistic language
acquisition, such as the question of whether children acquire single words by ostensive
definition, by some eye gaze detection mechanism, or some other cognitive ability. This
question is an important one in the philosophy of language, but one which we are not able
to pursue here.
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misrepresentation. It is fair to say that most (non-causal) atomists (and even
some causal atomists) agree that no satisfactory solution to the disjunction
problem is yet on offer.
Dretske is perhaps the most famous advocate of the causal theory of
meaning. His account variously (as his work progresses) relies on reliable in-
dicators grasped during associative learning; the behaviour an agent exhibits
in light of certain stimuli; functions from stimuli to behaviour; dispositions
to behave in a certain way; and compositionality. However, Sturdee (Sturdee
1997) argues persuasively that none of the progress in Dretske’s account of
misrepresentation can adequately account for misrepresentation. In all cases
the disjunction problem still looms large.8
Fodor’s solution in Psychosemantics (Fodor 1987) is to reject what he
calls the ‘Crude Causal Theory’ (see Chapter Four of Psychosemantics),
which he attributes to Dretske’s account of informational semantics in Knowl-
edge and the Flow of Information (Dretske 1981). The way to deal with
causally constrained semantic content is to provide a ‘Slightly Less Crude
Causal Theory of Content’ (SLCCTC) (Fodor 1987, 126):
The Slightly Less Crude Causal Theory of Content offers the following
two friendly amendments: for (2) [that is in the CCTC: “only instances
of A cause tokens of ‘A.’] read: ‘If non-A’s cause ‘A’s’, then their
doing so is asymmetrically dependent upon A’s causing ‘A’s’. For (1)
[which for the CCTC is: “every instance of A causes tokens of ‘A’.]
read: ‘All instances of A’s cause ‘A’s’ when (i) the A’s are causally
responsible for psychological traces to which (ii) the organism stands
in a psychologically optimal relation. (Fodor 1987, 126)
For an account of why the SLCCTC also fails to account for misrepresen-
tation see Maloney’s ‘Mental Misrepresentation’ (Maloney 1990). Fodor’s
8Literature surveyed by Sturdee to make his case is: Knowledge and the Flow of Infor-
mation (Dretske 1981), ‘Misrepresentation’ (Dretske 1986), Explaining Behaviour (Dretske
1988), and ‘Conscious Experience’ (Dretske 1993).
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notion of asymmetrical dependence rests on counterfactual conditionals:
‘horse’ tokens HORSE if there is a nearby possible world where HORSE
is not caused by a cow or a horse or a muddy zebra or . . .Maloney states
that appealing to possible worlds where the token of horse is only caused by
actual horses also does not work. He says:
Since cows form a natural kind and natural kinds essentially have their
(intrinsic) causal powers (that is, the causal powers partially definitive
of the kinds) cows in #’s worlds [the counterfactual worlds] have their
characteristic causal powers [which I assume to mean that they have the
same causal powers as they have in the actual world]. Yet in #’s worlds
cows fail to cause ‘horse’ tokens. Why?. . . What prevents the cows in
the wolds of # from causing ‘horse’ tokens in cognitive agents is that
the relations that the cows bear to the agents in those worlds happen
to preclude cows from exerting their powers to cause ‘horse’ tokens in
the agents. But these are just the circumstances that are also germane
to the causal connections between horses and ‘horse’ tokens. (Maloney
1990, 449)
Thus, on Maloney’s account, appealing to counterfactuals does not sup-
ply the ‘slightly less crude causal theory’ with any way which accounts for
misrepresentation. Other objects must bear their usual causal powers in the
counterfactual worlds, and the correct tokenings are still not immune to the
disjunction problem. If horses have the same causal powers as they do in
the actual world, then presumably, Maloney’s point is that it is ad hoc for
other objects to be discounted as having the same causal powers.
4.6 Inferentialism
Consider again Fodor and Lepore’s argument. If I am right that atomism
is not an acceptable semantic theory, something is clearly amiss. Of course,
the present project is an investigation of the plausibility of conventional-
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ism, which is incompatible with atomism anyway, but the preceding section
suggests that conventionalists should have plenty of company in rejecting
atomism.
What, then, of the prospect of rejecting (3), i.e., accepting holism? This
too is incompatible with conventionalism, as well as being highly implausible
on independent grounds.
Thus the conventionalist, and anyone else who agrees that both holism
and atomism are deeply problematic, must turn to the job of explaining
what is wrong with (2). As advertised, I propose to do so by offering an
alternative to the analytic/synthetic distinction as a way to mark off those
linguistic relations that are meaning-constituting from those that are not. I
do so on the basis of inferentialism.
Robert Brandom, probably the most well-known contemporary advocate
of inferentialism, presents a holistic inferentialist theory (Brandom 2000). I
show that inferentialism needn’t be holistic. The brand of inferentialism I
offer is thus quite different from Brandom’s. Nevertheless, it will be much
more efficient to describe my view as a modification of Brandom’s than to
try to explain it from scratch.
The molecularist inferentialism rests on the distinction between meaning-
constituting and nonmeaning-constituting inferences. I shall borrow, in mod-
ified form, a useful bit of jargon from Bradom’s version of inferentialism —
meaning-constituting inferences are ‘materially correct’ inferences — but
more on this later.
We began the first half of this discussion with a schematic presentation of
Fodor and Lepore’s argument. Let us begin this half with a schematic presen-
tation of my understanding of the conventionalist’s argumentative predica-
ment.
(1) Holism is incompatible with conventionalism, because it would make
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language unlearnable.
(2) Atomism is incompatible with conventionalism, because the commu-
nity drops out of the picture — if the meaning of a lexical items is due
to some suitable causal theory, then it is facts about the world that
determine meaning, not conventions.
(3) So, Fodor and Lepore have presented a false dichotomy.
(4) And so, conventionalism is not shown to be unacceptable on the basis
of a lack of a principled analytic/synthetic distinction.
(5) Therefore, there must be a semantic third way.
One way (perhaps not the only one, but a viable one at least) of establishing
a semantic third way is to develop molecularist inferentialism. Before going
much further, let’s set out characteristics of a couple of sorts of molecularism.
Note that not an awful lot of details have, as yet, been given in regards
to a definition of molecularism. This does not matter for present purposes.
However, others conceive of molecularism, the main point is that it can and
will be developed further using inferentialism. We shall see how this is done
later. But, note that the basic condition of molecularism remains the same:
meaning is to be explicated in terms of (some) connections between distinct
concepts seems to be the consensus:
Molecularism is a view of our contentful conceptual states in which the
content or meaning of a concept is constituted, at least in part, by a
small selection of its connections to other concepts. . .
Or:
Semantic molecularism, like semantic holism, holds that the meaning
of a representation in a language L is determined by its relationships
to the meanings of other expressions in L , but, unlike holism, not by
its relationships to every other expression in L . (Audi 1995)
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So, molecularist inferentialism is our way out, as it were, for convention-
alism — meaning, determined on the basis of material correctness and the
corresponding distinction between meaning-constituting and nonmeaning-
constituting inferences, allows the conventionalist to avoid the highly prob-
lematic atomistic and holistic theories. And further, such a distinction is
principled and can take the place of the analytic/synthetic distinction.
4.6.1 Material Correctness
What can be said about materially correct inferences is not an easy matter.
They are treated by Brandom as primitives in that they are “unexplained
explainers” (Brandom 1994, 133). In this I agree with Brandom — until I
get to the section regarding direct and indirect inferences I will have very
little to say about the nature of materially correct inferences. Even at that
stage, though, a complete account of what a materially correct inference
actually is will not be forthcoming (because I think it cannot). However,
my characterization is more robust than Brandom’s, since I can appeal to
language games and the competency of linguistic speakers to cash out in
more detail what materially correct inferences are.
Brandom advocates inferential holism: for example, he is and must be a
logical expressivist (we shall expand on this in later discussion). He sees the
role of logical vocabulary as being important in cashing out the ‘commit-
ments’ of linguistic agents. So, any formally correct inference is meaningful
because of the role it plays in the ‘scorekeeping’ practices of agents engaged
in drawing materially correct inferences. Formal correctness, then, is not
meaningful in the sense that formal assertions have semantic content, but
only in virtue of the expressive nature which allow us to understand, or
unpack if you will, the commitments of the speakers of a language.
This is just one example in which Brandom and I diverge in our views
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— I do not think that logical inferences are materially correct because there
is no content to the logical vocabulary.
But, since both Brandom and I do think that meaning is determined by
materially correct inferences, and since my notion of materially correct can
profitably be considered a modification, let us look at some examples to get
some indication of what this means.
Consider:
(1) It is raining.
(2) Therefore, (ceteris paribus) the streets will be wet.
Of course, there could be counterexamples to such cases. Suppose that the
street an agent lives on is lined with leafy trees. Then, perhaps, the canopy of
the trees causes the streets to stay dry — hence the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause.
The materially correct inference above is not, Brandom insists, correct
because of the employment of any ‘hidden’ logical rule, such as modus po-
nens. The contrast he has in mind with an argument with an embedded
logical rule, such as(1) If it is raining, then the streets will be wet, (2) it is
raining, (3) therefore the streets will be wet. It is important to Brandom
that not all materially correct inferences are logically correct
Another example is:
(1) Bob is a bachelor.
(2) Therefore Bob is unmarried.
This is an interesting example — being, as it is, a stock example of an
analytic inference — because while it, like the first is not logically valid (i.e.,
is not valid in virtue of form), it is unlike the first in not being ampliative.
It is not possible that the first claim be true and the second not, so there is
no need for a ceteris paribus clause.
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Brandom’s view, to reiterate, is that meaning has to be determined by
materially correct inferences. Further, which inferences are materially cor-
rect is determined by their acceptance or rejection of the inference by the
agents of a linguistic community. The ‘scorekeepers’ — that is, the deon-
tic agents of a linguistic community — track the inferences and determine
whether they are permissible or not.
In some ways this is similar to semantic conventionalism, since accept-
ability of an inference is determined by the community, and the competency
of an agent is determined by their ability to assess and use sentences (or in
this case, inferences) correctly on the basis of the conventions of the language
game.
To turn this into an account useful for conventionalists, we accept that
materially correct inferences are meaning conferring. But, we also distin-
guish distinct classes of correct inferences, and thus I avoid holism — some
classes of inferences, i.e., the materially correct inferences are meaning con-
ferring. Such inferences but must be direct in a sense to be clarified in a
later section. And, further, logically permissible inferences, whether direct
or not, do not count as materially correct. As we see from the above, if
the two previous examples are taken to be materially correct, then some are
ampliative — that is, one can draw conclusions which contain information
that is contained in the premises. This is not permitted in my account of
logical vocabulary. As I will show, logically permissible inferences fail to
be ampliative, precisely because logical vocabulary has no content. But as
the second example makes clear, some materially correct inferences are not
ampliative, which is why I describe an alternative criterion for determining
which vocabulary is logical.
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4.7 Direct/Indirect Inferences
It is time for me to try to make somewhat clearer how I think the distinction
between meaning-constituting inferences and other correct inferences can be
drawn. I will use several examples to approach what is quite a complex
matter, and I do not pretend that I will be able to give an airtight charac-
terization here. The gist of this section is that: (1) meaning is determined by
some special sort of correct inferential relation. A is typical of conventional-
ist views, whether an inference is correct or not is ultimately determined by
the linguistic practices of the community. However, (2) failing to accept a
direct inference shows an agent to be incompetent in a particular language
game, and is grounds for judging that the agent has failed to understand the
meanings of the lexical items which are at play in direct inferences.
Obviously, calling inferences ‘direct’ means that there must be a tight
relation between the premise and conclusion. Now we see more clearly the
nature of this tight relationship — the relation of the premise(s) and con-
clusion of an inference is said to be direct when the lexical items employed
in the former are related to the latter in such a way that failure to recognize
the correctness of the inferences is no mere error, but betrays a failure to
comprehend the subject under discussion.
4.7.1 Non-logical Inferences
Consider the following examples, both of which are plausibly direct in the
relevant sense, since someone who fails to accept them plausibly can be
charged with failing to know what ‘two’ means, for instance:
There are two items on the table
——————————————–
There is more than one thing on the table
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There are two items on the table
——————————————–
The number of things on the table is less than three.
When teaching a child how to count, it is common to use middle-size
objects (e.g., oranges) to show the number of things in front of the child.
Of course, they cannot immediately extrapolate from the number two to
any particular number — perhaps the child only knows the numbers up to
three. At that stage, we probably would not yet say the child has mastered
‘two’, and the class of meaning-constituting inferences for ‘two’ might not
have sharp boundaries is facilitated with small numbers up to, say, one-
hundred required, or is fifty enough? But it is clear that a grasp of the
transfinite hierarchy is not required. Potential vagueness of the notion of
direct inference doesn’t indicate that it is unprincipled, and there are clear
cases on both sides of the direct/indirect divide.
If for example the child were to infer ‘there are two oranges on the ta-
ble’, ‘therefore one of the oranges is mine’ — the inference might be correct,
because of some feature of the context. But, if another child does not accept
that inference, the second is not thereby shown to be linguistically incom-
petent with regards to ‘two’. That inference, if correct ‘mixes games’, and
so is indirect.
Let’s now turn to a couple of further characteristics of this notion of
directness that will enable us to show that it’s actually quite a powerful tool
for explaining why holism needn’t follow from inferentialism. First, while
correctness of inference is presumably transitive, directness is not. Perhaps
Brandom’s example “It is raining, therefore the streets will be wet” is direct
in the present sense, and so too, plausibly, is “If the streets are wet, slipping is
likely.”; it is a good deal less reasonable to think we should convict someone
99
who fails to accept “slipping is likely” from “It is raining” of conceptual
incompetence. Longer chains of inference could make the matter plainer, of
course.
It is also clear that mastery of some language games is possible only
after some others are acquired, and obviously this relation is asymmetric.
One cannot master the complex numbers before one has mastered the small
natural numbers, for instance. But most of humanity count as evidence that
the other way around is quite possible. Thus language games will be partially
ordered.
Finally, what counts as mastery of a concept is going to have a lot to do
with what we use a language game for, and so the “hierarchy” of language
games will reflect the concerns and interests of the linguistic community in
important ways. For instance, membership in the community (of persons)
plays a fundamental role in the functioning of our society. Thus whether or
not an individual falls into some other class is a person or not is often part
of the content of the word that attaches to that class. Someone who doubts
that it follows from “That’s a dog.” that “It is not a person.” betrays either
linguistic incompetence or careless reading of Peter Singer. The content
of ‘dog’ in English on this account is not specified (atomistically) by the
biological species.
Let’s look at an example that puts these ideas to work. It is correct to
infer:
There is a duck in the bathtub
There is a bachelor in the bathtub
————————————–
There are two things in the bathtub
The argument, though, is not logically correct, as the conclusion only
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follows because ducks are not bachelors. One might think examples such as
this will push us back towards holism — do we need to understand what a
duck is to master the concept bachelor? I think not, and the hierarchy of
language helps us see why
It is clear that we need to understand “unmarried” in order to under-
stand “bachelor”. Knowing that being unmarried is something to do with
people this links to the concept “person.” Further, to employ the concept
“duck” properly we must know that it is not a person leading to the concept
“person” (via “non-person”). Now the concept “duck” reaches “person,” as
does “bachelor.” The various links explain how we know that a duck is not a
bachelor, and so how we see the correctness of the inference. But the asym-
metry of the meaning dependencies also allows us to see why this doesn’t
create a link of meaning between ‘duck’ and ‘bachelor’.
Bachelor ⇐ Unmarried ⇐ Person/Non-person ⇒ Duck
One never acquires a concept in isolation to be sure. But, this does not
mean that learning concepts in relation to others means that the indirect
inferences are bound up in such a way that the inferences are materially cor-
rect. Simply having one concept being ‘reachable’ from another on the basis
of inferential relations is not sufficient to establish a link of meaning. Multi-
step links meaning-constituting inferences can be, and often are, indirect.
This is just what it means to say that ‘directness’ is non-transitive. Indirect
inferences are not materially correct and so are not meaning constitutive.
To be explicit, notice the necessary steps for linking bachelors and ducks.
Bachelor goes to unmarried and then to person, while duck goes to non-
person and person. So these concepts both depend on the concept person.
But there is no immediate justification present that such an inferential re-
lation means that “bachelor” and “duck” share meaning — the inference,
in short, is not materially correct. This follows from the fact the ‘direct
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inference’ relation is not transitive.
Let’s consider another example. Suppose, for instance, that a young child
is taken to the park to watch the llamas — she, one would hope, would be
aware that llamas are different in kind to people. But that does not require
her to understand bachelorhood or being unmarried.
So, conceptual linkage is not sufficient for material correctness. The
mere possibility of a link between disparate concepts, then does not show
that the meaning of each depends on the other. So, conceptual linkage, in
short, does not mean that the content of the concepts bachelor and duck are
in any way connected semantically. If there is any shared content at all it
conceivably stops at person. To understand and employ the concept “duck”,
in other words, we do not need to understand the concepts “unmarried” or
“bachelor”. Rather, they share a more basic concept, that of personhood,
but one can master either concepts while having no acquaintance with the
other.
The hierarchical account, under which some lexical items can only be
mastered when you are in possession of other concepts, is both plausible and
useful. Plausible because you can only acquire the concept “bachelor” if you
have mastered the notion of “unmarried,” and this will be exhibited in the
correct usage of the words. Similarly, perhaps you cannot master a notion of
a duck if “non-person” is not mastered. But, the ability to grasp the notion
of “duck” is independent of grasping the notion of “bachelor.” You might
learn what bachelor means, and hence be able to make the indirect inferences
to ducks, but this is only in principle.9 It is not necessary to know or employ
the word bachelor appropriately to know how to do the same with the word
duck. The usefulness of the hierarchical view is that the asymmetry allows
us to explain why.
9As the llama case shows.
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This phenomenon is persuasive, and it is a significant defect of holism
that it cannot account for it. Once one begins to look, it is easy to produce
more examples of this asymmetric dependence. Consider again the natural
numbers, but in a different fashion than the first example. An agent might
need to be able to understand the concept “natural number” to understand
“fraction,” but it seems unlikely that he would have to have mastered frac-
tions to understand natural numbers. Children, for instance, understand
what numbers are very much earlier than they understand what fractions
are.
So, it is not the case that every concept is connected in a meaning-
constituting manner, even if there is an intermediate concept that is required
for mastery of each of two words — the point is that knowing the meaning
of an intermediate lexical item by knowing the licensed inferences in relation
to one word, does not mean that the licensed inferences going from the other
word need be understood.
Hierarchy of Concepts
Consider again the case of the child gaining access to the language game
of numbers. Let us assume that he is competent in using the numbers one
through ten. The inferences that he can draw on the basis of this knowledge
can only concern those numbers. The language game which would extend his
knowledge is not accessible to him yet (and so we might call him a partially
competent language user in regards to the number game).
Similarly, one can understand what a natural number is, without under-
standing fractions, or without understanding (or even conceptualizing) the
infinitude of the natural numbers.
Clearly, there is some sort of hierarchy of concepts on the go, such that
one can only acquire one if an agent is a competent user of another language
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game. Not only does this highlight the hierarchy, but it brings it together
with the asymmetry and nontransitivity mentioned previously. Consider:
Natural numbers→the infinity of natural numbers (ℵ0)→ the powerset
of the natural numbers (if the continuum hypothesis is true).
There is no reason, and it would be highly unreasonable, to think that
a competent speaker of the number game would also have to understand
what the powerset of the natural numbers is, let alone that he understands
why it cannot be counted. So, ℵ1 might be thought, in this case, to be the
highest concept, then ℵ0 would be a lower concept, and the series of natural
numbers lower still.
Similarly as the bachelor example showed, one might need to know some-
thing about personhood to understand what ‘duck’ means and similarly for
‘bachelor’. But, although the two ‘meet in the middle’, the intermediate
steps do not allow us to assume that both words have to be understood for
someone to be a competent linguistic user of either lexical item.
4.7.2 Logical vocabulary
Earlier I mentioned that logical inferences are not, on the present view,
materially correct, and so are not meaning-constituting (except, perhaps, in
the attenuated sense of constituting the meaning of the logical vocabulary).
I also noted, both that some logical inferences are direct, and that simple
non-ampliativeness is not sufficient to pick out logical inferences. I therefore
owe the reader an account of what distinguishes logical inferences from other
sorts.
Although certain features of logical inferences are shared with materially
correct inferences, the vocabulary is content free. So, while the rules of
the logical language game are still determined by the community,10 logical
10In fact, with all the logical systems available these days ranging from classical to,
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inferences do not count as materially correct.
Let us briefly consider again the Brandomian account of logicality. As
mentioned, Brandom is a logical expressivist. So, the point of logical infer-
ences is ‘making explicit’ the commitments of the members of a linguistic
community — such inferences allow us to explicitly ‘keep score’ as deon-
tic agents.(Brandom 2000). All the logical inferences do, then, is encode
materially correct inferences in order to describe the behaviour of linguistic
agents.
One reason that logical vocabulary and material correctness come apart
is that logical inferences are non-ampliative in a way that materially correct
inferences need not be — this simply means that one cannot derive from
the premises anything that was not previously ‘contained’ in the premises.
Notice that this is immediately different from the explication of the inference
‘It is raining,’ ‘Therefore, the streets will be wet’. While this is a materi-
ally correct inference, it is not logically correct. It is ampliative because it
contains information in the conclusion, which it did not in the premises.
But this doesn’t yet distinguish logical inference from our second exam-
ple: “Bob is a bachelor, therefore Bob is unmarried.” To do this one needs
to consider again the ‘two-aspects of meaning’ in conventionalism, for what
distinguishes logical vocabulary is that these aspects are in perfect harmony.
Two-aspect Theory
Since conventionalism is committed to a two-aspect theory of meaning, so
too must be this sort of inferentialism. Thus the two-aspect theory is appli-
cable to materially correct inferences. There must be correct circumstances
and consequences of use for any particular linguistic item — i.e., materially
e.g., paraconsistent and all the divergences between their rules of inference, say, one might
make the case that they are determined by the community to a higher degree than other
inferences. A justification of that claim will not be attempted in this dissertation.
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correct inferences in which the item serves as a key term in a premise and
where it features in the conclusion.
Much of our standard logical vocabulary has easily specified assertion
conditions and consequences of use, i.e., easily specific classes of direct (or,
as logicians prefer, canonical) inferences. These are given by the introduction
and elimination rules for the bit of vocabulary in question. For instance, the
meaning of ‘and’ is given completely by the rule that ‘A ∧ B’ is assertible
precisely when both A and B are assertible. While from the assertion of
A ∧B commitment to the assertability of A and B follows.
But it is not easy specifiability that makes such concepts logical. Rather
it is that the two aspect of meaning are in perfect harmony — what can
be extracted from A ∧ B via the elimination rules is all and only what is
required to warrant an assertion of A ∧B.
With this criterion of logicality, it becomes an open question whether,
for instance, some of the concepts that play a starring role in so-called “In-
troduction to Logic” courses are really logical ones. Dummett, for instance,
suggests in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Dummett 1993) that classical
negation is not a logical concept on the grounds that its introduction and
elimination rules are not in harmony.
For present purposes, though, notice the precise sense harmony provides
for the claim that logical vocabulary is “content free.” Starting from a class
of premises and manipulating them using jointly harmonious rules cannot
add anything “new” to the premises with which we began.11
That ampliative inferences are not logical is thus immediate. But does
bachelor become a logical concept? Do we infer ‘x is a bachelor’ from ‘x is
unmarried, adult, male’, and from the former can we get only the latter? I
11Why it is so useful nevertheless is a fascinating question, but beside the present point.
The Logical Basis of Metaphysics is a good place to start investigation of that question.
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think not. The entanglements of the concept of bachelor are more complex.
It may be stereotype alone that suggests that we can infer Bob’s loneliness
from his bachelorhood, but it is less clear that inferring that he’s either young
or a sad-sack or is not gay is correct. At least, arguably, the word does not
apply indifferently to all unmarried adult men, but rather it involves some
sort of derogatory context of ‘spinster’ as well.
Bringing this together with the two-aspect theory as discussed in connec-
tion to materially correct inferences, we have learned that all aspects of lan-
guage have something akin to introduction and elimination rules — namely
assertability conditions and warranted inferential assertions. So, the two-
aspect theory applies in both cases of materially correct and non-materially
correct inferences.
4.8 Materially Correct and Other Inferences
We have seen several important features of molecularist inferentialism during
the discussion. However, before wrapping up, it is worth being explicit about
what we have shown when taking these features together.
By discussing ‘materially correct’ inferences in different terms than ‘logi-
cally correct’ inferences, we have cordoned off those inferences from (at least
two)12 other sorts of correct inference.
What this shows is (at least the beginnings) of a molecularist inferential-
ism. We now have ‘materially correct’ inferences and ‘other’ inferences —
the former are direct and meaning-constituting; the latter are either indirect
or essentially content-free and so are not meaning-constituting.
The immediate point of producing such a theory is as a counterexample
12I say ‘at least two’ because it may be possible to cordon off other parts of a language.
For our purposes, only showing how one might do this, by invoking materially correct and
logically correct inferences is sufficient.
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to Fodor and Lepore’s argument — we have established a position which is
neither holistic nor atomistic.
4.9 The Linguistic Community and Knowledge of
Language
Consider briefly conventionalism once again in order to show how it relates
inferentialism: conventions indicate correct usage of (both materially correct
and ‘other’) inferences. Using a concept competently in direct inferences
(knowing when such inferences are licensed) means that a language user
understands the meaning of a concept.
Moreover, we are able to use concepts even if we are not able to explicitly
define them (so, again we avoid the analytic/synthetic distinction) — as long
as we use a concept correctly.13 Notice, though, that we needn’t consider
which conventions are particular to warranting an inference, be it meaning-
constituting or nonmeaning-constituting. All that matters for the moment is
the recognition that for a community-based theory of meaning conventions
(in regards to the correctness of inferences) exist.
The notion of ‘directness’, which largely determines material correctness,
likewise rests on community practice. Direct inferences are the ones such
that anyone who fails to countenance such an inference (given opportunity
for reflection) is not linguistically competent in that respect — they do not
follow the rules of the language game being played in the community.
13And hence maxim that meaning is use, and the conventionalist criterion that correct
use is determined by the community are shown to be key.
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4.10 Conclusion
The argument presented by Fodor and Lepore is that without the ana-
lytic/synthetic distinction molecularism is in trouble — indeed it is un-
sustainable, and so conventionalism is also in hot water. However, as we
have seen, there is a way of drawing a molecularist, non-analytic/synthetic,
distinction on inferentialist grounds, that can underpin molecularism.
By using inferentialism we can provide a distinction that is a weaker one
than the analytic/synthetic distinction, but one which is sufficient to pre-
vent a slide into holism. Meaning now depends on the inferential roles an
expression has, but only some of them. Therefore, we do not need to follow
Fodor and Lepore in rejecting the first premise of the “basic argument” made
explicit by Devitt: ‘some of an expression’s inferential properties do consti-
tute its meaning.” Instead, we do reject the second premise of the “basic
argument”: “if some of an expression’s inferential properties constitute its
meaning then they all do.” And so, holism is avoided.
“Material correctness,” then, determines meaning-constituting inferences,
but there is still a class of ‘other’ (permissible) inferences, not related to
meaning — however, they are still governed by the conventions of the com-
munity. Now we can see why it is not simply desirable for the conventionalist
to establish inferential molecularism. Rather, if one is to abide by, e.g., the
two-aspect theory, then it seems that there must be a distinction between
meaning constitutive and nonmeaning constitutive inferences. Thus, the
supposedly knock-down argument by Fodor and Lepore is refuted.
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Chapter 5
The Paradox of Knowability
5.1 Introduction
The ‘obvious’ knock-down objection considered in this chapter runs as fol-
lows:
(1) If conventionalism is correct, then all truths are known.
(2) Not all truths are known.
(3) Therefore, conventionalism fails.
Why would we think that (1) is acceptable? Because it is plausible to
think that a conventionalist is committed to an epistemically constrained
notion of truth. An epistemically contrained notion of truth is that:
anything which is true is something which could be known to be true.
(DeVidi and Solomon 2001, 319)
A constraint of this sort indicates acceptance of the anti-realist principle
p → ♦Kp. Such notions of truth are thought by many to give rise to the
paradox of knowability, though — that is, for reasons to be described below,
it is thought to follow from the knowability of all truths that all truths are
known.
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Now, why suppose that conventionalists are committed to knowability?
Knowability in principle relates to the maxim of ‘meaning is use’ —
this relates to manifestability of meanings. Manifestability, put simply, is
the requirement that one way or another, all aspects of the meanings of all
lexical items are learnable. While the reasoning here may not be airtight,
it is plausible to think as follows: consider some declarative sentence S.
There is nothing about the meaning of S that is not, at least in principle,
available to would-be learners of the language in question, which means that,
at least in principle, all factors that determine the truth or falsity of S are
similarly publicly available. Hence, it seems, S must be knowable, at least in
principle — though of course for contingent, practical reasons this will often
be knowability only in principle.
This bit of reasoning suggests that conventionalism about reasoning leads
to (or at least tends towards) a certain sort of anti-realism. The intuition of
many anti-realists is that it is in some sense correct to say that for any truth
p, it is possible to know that p is true, which one can represent schematically
as (p → ♦Kp), but they do not accept (p → Kp) for every p. (p → ♦Kp) is
often called the verificationist principle, but is more commonly referred to
as the anti-realist principle (Williamson 1987), (DeVidi and Solomon 2001).
I shall refer to this as epistemic anti-realism.1
The paradox of knowability (also referred to as ‘Fitch’s paradox’), which
concerns an argument first presented in ‘A Logical Analysis of Some Value
Concepts’ (Fitch 1963), has generated a great deal of philosophical discus-
sion. In that paper Fitch presents an argument that some believe implies
1Naming it ‘epistemic anti-realism’ is important, since it distinguishes other types of
anti-realism, e.g. error theory. The first is important for a semantic theory, the latter is
not. For the most part, unless necessary, I will refer to epistemically constrained anti-
realism simply as anti-realsm. This is the only type which we will be concerned with
throughout the chapter.
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that epistemic anti-realism reduces to absurdity.
What Fitch seems to have shown is that if one accepts the epistemic
anti-realist principle, then one is forced to accept that for all p, if p is true
then p is known: (p → Kp). Some have taken this to amount to a refutation
of epistemically constrained anti-realism notions of truth, such as those that
are central to what I have called epistemic anti-realism, since it is obviously
false that all truths are known. Others, of course, claim that something is
amiss — either with the proof, e.g., that it rests on unwarranted assumption
of classical logic, or with its interpretation of the modality ♦. The potential
for multiple diagnoses for why this is not really a refutation of anti-realism,
and responses to them, has given rise to a large literature concerning the
paradox of knowability.
Thus, conventionalism seems to require a way out of this problem. My
approach will be to grant, for present purposes, that conventionalism implies
knowability, but deny that Fitch’s argument works. In effect, I shall show
that there is at least one way to save conventionalism from this challenge.
I argue that we should consider so-called “logical revisionist” approaches
to the paradox. In more detail, what I will show is that there are several
logical revisionist proposals that can be used to block the paradox — but
that only one — i.e., the application of intuitionistic logic — is the correct
revision. The philosophical motivation which prevents the application of
intuitionistic logic from being an ad-hoc logical revision is the development
of states of information semantics.
While the argument sketched above deriving epistemically constrained
truth from conventionalism can be questioned, I am quite happy to conclude
that if conventionalism is correct then anti-realism follows (the type that
on first glance appears to be susceptible to the paradox at least — that is
epistemic anti-realism). Throughout the dissertation we have appealed time
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and again to knowability ‘in principle’. The only real and motivated way to
make sense of this notion is by appealing to states of information semantics
(so a condition of semantic conventionalism is made more specific). This
type of semantics leads to an epistemically constrained notion of truth — a
state of information at which there is sufficient warrant to establish x is one
where an agent could come to know that x. But it is not a requirement that
any individual agent need reach this state (so, of course, the information
can equally be inaccessible to the entire community).
Before explicating states of information semantics, I consider a relatively
new logical revisionist suggestion for blocking the proof, namely dialetheism
(the view that there are true contradictions — hence reductio ad absurdum
is blocked). The dialetheic approach is essentially that, on the basis of the
knower paradox, it becomes clear that knowledge contains true epistemic
contradictions.2 (Beall 2000), 3 I will argue, however, that the dialethic
strategy is wrong. With the dialethic approach disposed of, I shall turn to
what is in some ways the constructive core of this chapter (if the reader
will forgive my pun). My first, uncontroversial, claim is that if intuitionistic
logic is correct, then the paradox is blocked, so a conventionalist who ar-
gues that the correct logic is intuitionistic logic avoids the paradox. Such a
“solution” to a paradox is, of course, open to the charge that it is ad hoc.
My second claim is that a logically revisionist solution that advocates intu-
itionistic logic has a suitable philosophical motivation. In making the case
for this, I consider several objections found in the literature to suggest that
the knowability paradox can be blocked by advocating intuitionist logic, and
show that they turn on a confusion of intuitionistic logic and intuitionism.
2This is not the same as the paradox of knowability. The knower paradox is meant to
show that it is possible to know p and ¬p at the same time.
3Explosion is standardly accepted as requirement for any strong system of logic — the
rejection of RAA, on the other hand, prevents this rule of inference.
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I then show that there are grounds other than intuitionism for think-
ing intuitionistic logic to be correct, in particular acceptance of states of
information semantics. It is these semantics that allow one to provide a
philosophical motivation, consonant with conventionalism, for the claim that
intuitionistic logic is correct, and so correct for blocking the paradox.
Of course, this doesn’t yet rule out there being any number of other log-
ical revisions that might block the paradox and be motivated in some other
way. I will try to show that my favoured logical revision is successful and
correct, unlike others, by considering some rivals. Since paraconsistent logics
are becoming increasingly favoured by some authors, I will show that several
paraconsistent logic can provide counterexamples to the paradox of knowa-
bility, but they only provide a motivated solution if states of information are
applied.
Naturally I cannot consider all systems of paraconsistent logics, as there
are simply too many of them. But I do consider three interesting ones: min-
imal logic, a non-adjunctive system, and the Routley-Meyers paraconsistent
logic.4 Paraconsistent logics seem prima facie somewhat odd. But, they are
gaining momentum in the field of philosophical logic — and hence demand
serious attention. The hand-waving of philosophers who are ingrained with
the notion that contradictions necessarily lead to explosion must, at this
time in philosophy of logic, be questioned. This is not a discussion that I
will be able to take up in the dissertation. However, it does indicate why I
picked paraconsistent systems for my investigation in the first place.
In regards to the three systems of paraconsistent logics I consider, I show
that they can provide counterexamples to the paradox of knowability — and
in interesting ways.
4As with Grice, considering the fact that there is neither time nor space to consider all
alternatives, I will treat this as a case study.
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Since Fitch’s argument, as we shall see, is essentially a formal proof,
one can “solve” the paradox by advocating a logic that rules any particular
step in it invalid. As mentioned, my preferred version of this is to advocate
intuitionistic logic, but logical revisionism has been used on numerous occa-
sions. A fairly new suggestion in the literature on the paradox is to apply
dialetheism or paraconsistent logics — that is, systems which reject the rule
of explosion.
The first argument which shall be presented, then, is that there are other
systems of logic that, on the face of it, also seem to solve the puzzle of Fitch’s
paradox. But, the application of these systems of logic are ad-hoc unless
states of information semantic are applied — thus it is intuitionistic logic
(and corresponding states of information semantics) are those things that
provide a principled solution to the paradox. The point of discussing the
other systems of logic is, not only to show that they are important supple-
ments to the literature, but also the discussion shows that a conventionalist
is required to accept my logical revisionism, since the others are ad-hoc, if a
logical revisionist solution is to be accepted.
What we shall see, then, is a recurring pattern. If the paraconsistent
systems block Fitch’s argument they can be massaged into providing “solu-
tions” to the paradox. But they will be seen to do so not in virtue of some
feature naturally associated with the logic in question, but because of an
extra feature that is, so to speak, bolted on to the system. The solutions
are thus ad hoc. The extra feature that is needed is, as mentioned, that
in each case the solutions have a natural home in the states of information
semantics of intuitionistic logic.
This, I think, provides evidence for the idea that the states of information
semantics applied to intuitionistic logic is not just a solution to the paradox
for the conventionalist, but the solution. Of course, I do not pretend that
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this is a conclusive argument. For one thing, I do not intend to survey all
possible alternative solutions. Nevertheless, I think that the argument has
quite a bit of force.
Of course, that the states of information interpretation of intuitionistic
logic provides an avenue of escape for the epistemic anti-realist5 is important
to my project as — at least if my argument is correct — conventionalism is
naturally viewed as involving commitment to anti-realism.
What follows in this chapter, then, is an exposition of the paradox of
knowability; considerations of alternative logical revisionistic solutions; fur-
ther, I shall make clear the case that there is a great amount of philosophical
value to states of information semantics; on the basis of the latter, I reject
several objections which arise in the work of Philip Percival. Thereafter, I
will consider several paraconsistent systems of logic. On the basis of these
I will show that (1) dialetheism has no force, and is unable to provide a
suitable solution and (2) more importantly, those systems of logic which I
consider only provide a principled solution precisely because the counterex-
amples rely on the ‘bolted on’ machinery of states of information semantics.
To sum up: conventionalism seems to imply an epistemically constrained
notion of truth (the epistemic anti-realist principle). The knowability para-
dox seems to show such notions of truth to be aburd. The solution to
the paradox is to apply intuitionistic logic, the philosophical motivations of
which is the application of states of information.
5.2 The Paradox of Knowability
Fitch’s proof is really quite simple. The argument shows that from the
anti-realist principle:
5From here on in, I shall use ‘anti-realist’, or ‘anti-realism’ without noting that it is
epistemic — that is a notion attached to anti-realism throughout the chapter.
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(1) p → ♦Kp
which means that for any p, if p is true, it is possible to know that p, it
follows that:
(2) p → Kp,
i.e that for any p, if p is true, p is known. (2) seems to be “obviously silly”,
as Williamson (Williamson 1987, 256) puts it, and most would agree. Fitch’s
argument uses a number of seemingly innocuous assumptions:
a) The distributivity of knowledge over conjunction: K(p∧ q) ` Kp∧Kq
b) Factivity: ` Kp → p
c) The necessitation rule: ` p, then ` p
d) The following relationship between  and ♦: ¬p → ¬♦p. In the
literature it is often assumed that the correct logic for these modalities
is either S4 or S5. But no such strong interpretation is required for
Fitch’s proof to go through.6.
e) Classical propositional logic.
One formulation of the proof is:
6Any modal logic which accepts the interchange rule ¬p → ¬♦p is sufficient for Fitch’s
proof. And any basic modal logic satisfies this condition.
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(1) K(p ∧ ¬Kp) (Assumption for reductio)
(2) Kp ∧K¬Kp (1 dist.)
(3) Kp (2∧ elim.)
(4) K¬Kp (2∧ elim.)
(5) ¬Kp (4 factivity)
(6) ¬K(p ∧ ¬Kp) (1-5 RAA)
(7) ¬K(p ∧ ¬Kp) (6 necessitation)
(8) ¬♦K(p ∧ ¬Kp) (from (d))
(9) p ∧ ¬Kp → ♦K(p ∧ ¬Kp) (instance of principle 1)
(10) ¬(p ∧ ¬Kp) (8, 9 MT)
(11) ¬p ∨ ¬¬Kp (de Morgan’s negation law)
(12) p → ¬¬Kp (11≡12 given classical arrow)
(13) ¬¬Kp → Kp (Instance of DNE)
(14) p → Kp (Hypothetical Syllogism/ Tran-
sitivity)
5.3 The Paraconsistent Solution: Dialetheism
In ‘Fitchs Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox’ (Beall 2000)
J.C. Beall’s solution is to use paraconsistent logic to challenge Fitch’s proof.
A logic is paraconsistent if and only if it is non-explosive (i.e., rejects the
rule that from a contradiction anything follows). Beall is also a dialetheist,
which is to say that he thinks that there are true contradictions. It his
contention that, if he can show that there is good evidence for true epistemic
contradictions, then it is open to him to block Fitch’s proof at the step
from line (5) to (6) — the application of reductio ad absurdum.7 So the
initial dialetheic solution is to block the inference from a contradiction to
7However, it should be mentioned that Beall never actually recommends this solution,
but just indicates that it is at least open to the anti-realist.
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the negation of the assumption used to derive the contradiction, and so the
general validity of reductio ad absurdum is denied.8
In Beall’s words the motivation is as follows:
It is important to note, however, that appeal to a paraconsistent logic
is not mere ad hoccery. Fortunately, for the verificationist, there is
independent reason for thinking that knowledge is inconsistent — that
is, that a full description of human knowledge includes both Kp and
¬Kp, for some p. Such independent evidence of inconsistent knowledge
is provided by the famous knower paradox. (Beall 2000, 243) [9]
Before discussing the details of Beall’s suggested solution, it is worthwhile
spending some time discussing what the motivation is for accepting dialethe-
ism for this block to Fitch’s proof, as opposed to using a non-dialetheic
paraconsistent logic.
Advocates of paraconsistent logics, who are not dialetheists, can accept
that contradictions do sometimes arise, for instance in the case of the legal
domain, without accepting them as true. The paraconsistent point is merely
that the domain is not trivialized, i.e. that everything follows, should a
contradiction arise; and hence one is still able to make decisions and rea-
son within the domain in question. This is not to say, however, that the
inconsistency is, or can be, accepted as a true contradiction.
To use one of Priest’s (Priest 1987, 153) examples to illustrate this point:
suppose that the constitution of a country contains the following clauses (a)
women do not have the right to vote and (b) all property holders have
the right to vote. Suppose that at some time both (a) and (b) were the
8The question of whether it has some, more limited validity remains open.
9Note that the knower paradox is not the same as the paradox of knowability. The
knower paradox allows one to derive Kp and ¬Kp from the ‘knower sentence’: (k) k is not
known, and so, like the liar sentence results in a contradiction. The paradox of knowability,
on the other hand, allows one to conclude p → Kp from p → ♦Kp, as we have already
seen.
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case. The law at this point is consistent. But suppose further that the
country emancipates women to some degree and allows them to be property
holders without granting the right to vote. Now the law is contradictory, i.e.
inconsistent.10 Cases of this sort surely could, and presumably, do arise and
yet legal reasoning continues nevertheless without everything being legal.
This is supposed to be a case where we have a discourse which is incon-
sistent, but not trivial. But the ‘friend of consistency’ (Priest 1987) will say
that eventually the best thing to do would be to resolve the contradiction,
i.e. determine which claim is true, since they cannot both be.
Of course, there is a degree of idealization involved here. It may be that
the way to resolve a contradiction will not become apparent for quite some
time. And it is at least a possibility that resolution will never be achieved.
But just because a contradiction is never in fact resolved, does not imply
that a contradiction is in principle unresolvable. Even if a contradiction
remains unresolved it does not follow that the contradiction is true, but
merely that no solution has (as yet) been found.
We can see why an advocate of Beall’s solution needs to be a dialetheist
10It is important here to point out that it is sometimes not clear what we mean when we
talk about inconsistency/contradictions. Are they coextensive? (Restall 2000, 343) says:
Before continuing, we need to make clear that when we say “incon-
sistent state of affairs” we do not mean a state of affairs which has
contradictory properties. . . [I]nconsistent states of affairs may exist (in
the same sense as any non-actualised state of affairs might be said
to exist). Their inconsistency means simply that they could not be
actualised. (Restall 2000, 343)
All but the dialetheist will grant that the presence of a contradiction implies inconsis-
tency in that sense. Even “consistentists” will often deny the converse, i.e. allow that
there can be unactualizable states of affairs which do not contain contradictory pairs, i.e.
both p and ¬p for some p
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and not merely a paraconsistentist. An advocate of paraconsistent logic who
does not accept true contradictions would have little or no ground for reject-
ing the reductio in Fitch’s proof. After all, the solution to the contradiction
is obvious in the case of a reductio, namely rejecting the assumption from
which it was derived.
Let’s return to the assertion that the knower paradox provides indepen-
dent evidence for the truth of epistemic contradictions. The knower paradox
is in the family of self-referential semantic paradoxes. Consider the state-
ment ‘(k) k is unknown’.
1 If K(k) (where K means ‘is known by someone at some time’), then k
is unknown since the claim must be true to be known.
2 If ¬K(k is unknown), then it follows that Kk, since if k is unknown
then (k) is known.
3 Hence Kk ↔ ¬Kk, which in most logics yields Kk ∧ ¬Kk.
Rather than saying that something is wrong with the knower paradox, i.e.
that it is in need of clarification and/or resolution, the dialetheist claims
that knowledge is fundamentally inconsistent, and the knower paradox is
independent evidence for its inconsistency. It is not a paradox after all, the
dialetheist will claim, rather it is an accurate representation of a person’s
knowledge.
The strength of this argument depends, in part, on the assumed lack of
sufficient solutions to the knower and other semantic paradoxes (the liar,
the believer,11 etc.). It is beyond the bounds of the chapter to discuss or
11The believer paradox is that an agent can believe two contradictory statements. On
of Da Costa’s examples is a wife who places an extra setting at the dinner table for a
deceased family member. A contradictory statement might be: “I know that he is dead,
but I just don’t believe it.” This is supposed to be an example of self-deception. The more
likely explanation is not that the agent does not believe it to be the case that x, but that
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evaluate all the possible solutions that have been offered, but it is worth
pointing out that the burden of proof lies firmly with the dialetheist. As
Greg Restall has pointed out, arguments of the following sort are obviously
insufficient:
As there is no acceptable solution to the liar and like paradoxes, we
ought to accept the argument to the paradoxical conclusion as not only
valid, but sound. The liar is both true and not true. (Restall 2000,
342)
Admittedly, Restall is not a dialetheist, and so perhaps he is presenting an
unsympathetic reading of the motivation for dialetheism. Consider an alter-
native explanation: Priest is the arch-advocate of dialetheism, concerning
modern motivations for accepting dialethias he says:
Probably the major argument used by modern dialetheists invokes the
paradoxes of self-reference, such as the liar paradox. . . and Russell’s
paradox[12]. . . In the case of each paradox, there appears to be a per-
fectly sound argument ending in a contradiction; and if the arguments
are sound, then dialetheism is true... There is, at any rate, no generally
agreed upon solution to many of the paradoxes, particularly those of
a semantic... nature. It is these facts that give dialetheism about the
paradoxes of self-reference one of its major appeals. (Priest 1998)
But admitting inconsistent states of knowledge, belief, or whatnot, be-
cause there is, as yet, no solution is too hasty. The argument for dialetheism
needs more than just saying that those hung up on consistency have not yet
provided a good answer. What the positive thesis is that supports incon-
sistent knowledge is not clear, or at least not to me. But perhaps I am, as
Priest and Beall would believe, too indoctrinated: perhaps I believe in con-
sistency, not because it is an essential feature of logical systems, but because
they wish it weren’t so. (Costa 1990)
12Russell’s paradox is that a set which is not a member of itself is not a member of itself
if and only if it is a member of itself.
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I have been taught that it is such.
However, this view ignores several potential solutions which, although
not, as yet, successful, at least suggest a way out of the paradoxes with less
cost than dialetheism. Some views which can be found in the literature are
(1) appealing to groundedness,13 or (2) adapting the hierarchical approach
13This is Kripke’s solution. He says: “Given a sentence A of L , let us define A to be
grounded if it has a truth value in the smallest fixed point L a; otherwise ungrounded.”
(Kripke 1975, 71) Andreas Beck explains groundedness (in his Ph.D. thesis — ‘The Liar
Lies and Snow is White’) as:
In Kripke’s theory (Kripke 1975), the Liar sentence is neither true nor
false because it is ungrounded . This solution is based on the idea that,
before it is possible to assign a truth value to sentences of the form “S
‘is true’ or “S ‘is false’,” one has to assign a truth value to the sentence
‘S’.
Kripke motivates this as follows. Suppose we have to explain the word
‘true’ to someone who does not yet understand it. According to Kripke,
we would start with an object sentence like ‘Snow is white’ and explain
that we are entitled to assert “Snow is white’ is true’ (or “Snow is white’
is false’) precisely under the circumstances when we can assert (or deny)
the sentence ‘Snow is white’ itself. By understanding this rule, the per-
son learns inductively to assign truth (or falsehood) to sentences which
themselves contain a truth predicate. If a sentence can receive a truth
value in this inductive process, then it is a grounded sentence. Other-
wise it is an ungrounded sentence. The following example illustrates
the difference between grounded and ungrounded sentences.
An example of an ungrounded sentence would be the liar sentence since:
One can assert L whenever one can deny L does not allow the truth
value of L to be deduced from the truth value of any object sentence.




Beall claims that such solutions appear to be ad hoc.14 But, even if these
alternatives face objections, that is not to say that they are insurmountable.
The burden of proof, then, lies with Beall to show that the responses to
the objections against Kripkean groundedness or hierarchical approaches are
insufficient.
However, there are bigger problems for Beall’s proposal. The following
objection is probably the nail in the coffin for dialetheism as a solution to
the paradox of knowability. For even if dialetheism is correct, accepting
self-referential paradoxes as dialetheas does not prevent Fitch’s argument.
First, remember that the dialetheist does not necessarily advocate many
cases of true contradictions. Most dialetheists only admit dialetheas (true
contradictions) in special cases: candidates are (1) vague predicates which
can lead to contradictions, e.g., this canvas is red and not red. It is possible
to generate this contradiction because the colour continuum is not ‘sliced
up’ into sections in such a way that there is a clear and distinct difference
(at some point on the continuum) where ‘red’/‘not red’ become obvious.15;
(2) the liar sentence; (3) and the knower sentence. But these are supposed
to be special cases, and in general inconsistency should be restricted to such
cases.16 Even if one were to accept that the knower sentence is a genuine case
of a true contradiction, and that it blocks Fitch’s argument, the consequences
The charge of ungroundedness applies equally to (k), since it is effectively the same
(type of) self-referential paradox.
14But, this is precisely a charge that many may want to accuse the dialetheist of in light
of the above quotations.
15Of course, depending on one’s view concerning vague predicates there can be more or
fewer of them. However, the cases of interest here are the borderline ones, even for the
paraconsistentist.
16For a more comprehensive account of theories that are inconsistent but not trivial see
(Priest 1987, 151-153).
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of applying dialetheism to the problem are too strong to make the dialetheic
solution desirable, as we shall see.
Recall that the anti-realist principle is supposed to be general, i.e. for
any p that is true, it is possible to know p. But Beall’s solution is open to the
charge that for any statement that is unknown there will be a corresponding
true contradiction, or else it is not a solution to the paradox at all. For if
the rejection of reductio is going to work as a rejection of Fitch’s argument
then it must do for all true but unknown statements, not just for isolated
cases such as the knower sentence (which, recall, is unknown as well as being
known). Beall is aware of this problem, it seems, as he says:
Grant, as has been argued throughout, that the knower proposition
gives everyone reason to admit a world of inconsistent knowledge, a
world in which Kk ∧ ¬Kk obtains. The verificationist, with everyone
else, admits as much, but the verificationist, unlike everyone else, must
admit more — a lot more. Specifically Fitch’s Proof shows that the
verificationist must admit a world in which Kq ∧ ¬Kq obtains for any
actually unknown truth q. (Anonymous referee) (Beall 2000, 246)
To be clear that the objection above holds it is worth briefly running
through an example to show that an epistemic contradiction follows from
any unknown truth: suppose that you have an arbitrary unknown sentence,
call it q. If q is both true and unknown, then it is a counterexample to
the scheme p → Kp. However, if we insert that particular q in place of
p throughout Fitch’s proof, then we seem to arrive at the conclusion that
q → Kq. Beall, therefore, seems committed to the claim that Kq and ¬Kq
are both true for every true but unknown q.
Beall’s reponse to this is basically that the referee has presented an excel-
lent argument, one which potentially rules out the dialetheist strategy. And
he further says that the knower sentence does not give us reason, even prima
facie, to suppose that every unknown truth leads to a true epistemic contra-
diction. In this Beall grants too much if he wants to present dialetheism as
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a response to the paradox of knowability (or at least a possible response).
Granting that for every unknown truth there is a true epistemic contradiction
is doubly problematic: not only do we then have more true contradictions
than dialetheist are usually happy with, but our defense against the worry
that anti-realism implies that all truths are known is to say “yes, they are
and they are also unknown.”
Let’s raise one more objection, one which has not been discussed in the
literature or in Beall’s article. It begins with a little proof: suppose some
p is true, but unknown. Given the above objection that for any unknown
truth there is a corresponding true epistemic contradiction we can state that,
for the unknown truth p, Kp ∧ ¬Kp. It appears that it is now possible to
construct the following argument:
(1) Kp ∧ ¬Kp (true epistemic contradiction)
(2) Kp (1 ∧ elim.)
(3) p (2 factivity)
(4) p ∨ ¬¬Kp (3 ∨ intro.)
(5) ¬p → ¬¬Kp (classical → from (4))
(6) ¬¬Kp → Kp (DNE)
(7) ¬p → Kp ((5), (6) HS/Transitivity)
The proof ends, then, with the conclusion if p is false, it is known — this is
obviously even more ‘silly’ than the conclusion derived from the Fitch style
argument.
The question now is: why would it be possible to reach this conclusion?
The answer is that Beall makes no commitment to a particular system of
logic. Simply rejecting reductio ad absurdum, then, is not enough. Given
adequate classical machinery we end up with the ridiculous conclusion that
there is a p which, if it is false, it is known. Since we cannot know falsehoods,
this conclusion cannot be maintained under any circumstances — on the
basis of this argument we can now say that dialetheism is entirely wrong,
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rather than just an unlikely candidate for blocking the paradox. Rejecting
reductio ad absurdum is insufficient as a block to the proof since it does not
rule out other permissible rules of inference from classical logic.
It appears, then, not only that the dialetheist should not accept true
epistemic contradictions as a block to the proof, but that they cannot simply
on the grounds of rejecting RAA. A natural question, though, is whether an
alternative solution to the paradox is available to Beall, one with a more
substantial philosophical motivation. The brief answer is that there isn’t.
In order to block the proof by using dialetheism a different rule of in-
ference other than RAA must be rejected. Either ∨-introduction or dis-
junctive syllogism must be given up because, in combination, they lead to
explosion. The choices, then, are either to give up the classical arrow or
∨-introduction. There seems little motivation to reject ∨-introduction. ∨-
introduction merely gets us to line (4) of the proof which says that either p
is true or that p is not not known.
The more easily motivated position is the reinterpretation of the arrow
operator. In the present context, giving up disjunctive syllogism amounts
to not accepting that → is the classical conditional. This makes the move
from (4) to (5) illegitimate. We will have an opportunity to consider the
philosophical virtues of this move later when we consider relevance logic,
which similarly rejects the classical arrow operator — this is a move that
a dialetheist might make, but which Beall does not commit himself to, and
one which has other (e.g., relativist) motives and which is arguably sufficient
to block the proof without rejecting reductio.
To conclude, the rejection RAA is not only unmotivated, but insufficient,
to provide a block the ridiculous consequences. The dialetheist finds himself
on increasingly weak ground.
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5.4 States of Information Semantics
The obvious interpretation of the diamond in the anti-realist principle is to
explicate it in terms of possible worlds. The motivation for using possible
world semantics is that one can say that p is true and that it is possible to
know that p, but that, at this world, p is unknown. The statement that it
is possible to know something, without it being known means that there is
some world x, where p is true and, if an agent were to find himself in this
world, they would know that p. Since p is unknown in the actual world some
story would need to be told about what it means to talk of knowability in
counterfactual worlds. Very briefly, in order to make sense of p → ♦Kp, a
possible world semanticist will say that: for any true p, there is some world
where p is known. We shall see in due course why appealing to possible
world semantics is problematic.
It was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter that the intuitionistic
logician has a way of avoiding p → ♦Kp collapsing into p → Kp. Ignoring
the application of the intuitionistically unacceptable de Morgan’s negation
law,17 the way to block the proof is by the rejection of double negation
elimination. Hence, while p → ¬¬Kp follows in intuitionistic logic from
p → ♦Kp, p → Kp does not.
So now we are in the position where we can make the case that intu-
itionistic logic has the machinery to block the proof. But is this enough?
Not really, since merely employing intuitionistic logic does not mean that
the block fails to be ad hoc.18 Although intuitionistic logic is one natural
17Alternative versions of the proof can be run such that the de Morgan law can be
avoided — hence rejecting the proof on that basis is insufficient.
18In the literature some authors skip this objection. Since Dummett argued that the
correct logical basis for anti-realism is intuitionistic logic, I wonder if that is (at least one
of) the reason that the application of intuitionistic logic is immediately taken to be a non
ad hoc response to Fitch style arguments.
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suggestion for blocking the paradox of knowability, then, it is still necessary
to show how this is philosophically motivated.
While I shall be advocating intuitionistic logic as a solution to the para-
dox, appealing to constructivist semantics is problematic.
While some of the seeming oddities some authors have thought to attend
the appeal to intuitionistic logic can be resolved (e.g., by being sure to
consistently read ¬ as intuitionistic rather than classical negation, so that the
equivalence of ¬p and ¬Kp is not problematic) there are some issues that are
not resolved. That is, an advocacy of intuitionistic logic runs into problems
if it is conflated with constructivism, as I will show that it sometimes is. For
example, it hard to explain on constructivist grounds why p → ¬¬Kp is less
problematic than p → Kp.
Conveniently there is another semantic interpretation of intuitionistic
logic which can provide a philosophically strong motivation for using this
system, namely states of information semantics. In this semantics the con-
nectives are interpreted in terms of states of information. It also gives us
an important handle on ‘extensions’ of information. And, crucially, it allows
us to explain naturally why an anti-realist should welcome the validity of
schemes like p → ¬¬Kp while rejecting p → Kp. It will be convenient to
take up these matters in reverse order
5.5 Explication of S-O-I Semantics
One of the benefits of states of information is that information is useful
in assessing the cognitive states of agents and the community in general.
Suppose that p is true, but agent a does not know it. Call the state of
information where p is true but unknown, s-o-i x. Suppose further that
there is an agent, agent b, who knows that p is true. This agent must
have access to more information than a. In other words, b has accessed the
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information at x, whereas a has not — therefore agent b has access to, what
I call, a ‘richer’ state of information than a.
Further, an important concept for this chapter is that of extensions of
states of information. We will see in due course that the counterexamples
to the paradox rely importantly on extended states of information.
There is an obvious sense in which we can talk about one state of in-
formation extending another: suppose that p is true, but unknown. This
means that in the described case there will never be any warrant to overturn
p (once true, always true). Take a state of information x such that (using
an, I hope, obvious bit of notation) xp, x♦Kp and 2xKp. What would it
mean for ♦Kp to be true at x? A natural reading is that there is further
information that is compatible with x that takes p from being an “open ques-
tion,” to being established. That is, there must be a state of information y
that extends x (we write x 6 y) which is such that yp and yKp. S-o-i y
is said to be an extension of x, it is compatible with x which we idealize by
supposing it includes x, but also (may) contain extra information. How do
we actually make sense of this?
(1) Suppose that xp, then x♦Kp (since the knowability principle is uni-
versal and therefore holds at every point in a model).
(2) Suppose further that agent a does not know p, but agent b does.
If (1) and (2) are the case, then we can say that agent b has access to more
information than a, and thus finds himself at a different state of information
than a.
This is, of course, a highly idealized account of “extensions of infor-
mation,” one that readily invites confusions. The following remarks may
forestall some of them.
(1) Different states of information may be concurrent.
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Consider the case where a wakes up at seven a.m. on Monday March 26th,
2007 and b wakes up at four a.m. If there happened to be a shooting star at
4:30 and b was suitably placed to see the sky then he would know that “a
shooting star was visible from Kitchener-Waterloo at 4:30 on Monday March
26th, 2007” (call this p). Agent a would not know this, however. Agent b,
then, has access to s-o-i y (both at 4:30 a.m. and at 7 a.m.) and therefore
yKp. Since agent a was still asleep at 4 a.m., then at 7 a.m. a does not
know that p (and so does not have access to y). Therefore, there is some
other state of information x, where a does not know p, so 2xKp. So, a has
access to x and b has access to y, where both states of information can be
‘accessed’ at 7 a.m and are therefore distinct in the information that they
carry, but are concurrent.19
(2) A richer state of information may be temporally prior to one that it
extends.
It is easy to become confused about the relationship between the information
ordering and the temporal ordering. Talk of “acquiring new information”
suggests that richer implies later, which we’ve seen isn’t right. One might
still suppose, though, that a richer state of information must either be con-
current (as in example (1)) or that an agent simply missed the information,
even though it would have been available if he had performed some action
(say getting up at 4 a.m., rather than 7 (as in example (3)). In the latter
case the richer state is not temporally prior, i.e., getting up at a time such
that a state of information is ‘missed’ is not the same as a temporally earlier
19Note that in a case such as this we would not say x 6 y unless we were willing to
stipulate that all the information in x is also in y. However, we are using information
as a sort of success term (true information), so even if b doesn’t know everything in x,
there is some state of information extending x that includes what is in y but not in x (i.e.,
x ∨ y). The talk of the information available to particular agents can thus be regarded as
a helpful shorthand for a more precise story.
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state of information, as the example below shows.
Suppose that an agent’s grandfather had in 1950 some number n1 of
pairs of shoes in his closet. Call this state of information x. And suppose
further, that no one bothered to count how many pairs of shoes there were20
Over time, the shoes wore out and were not replaced with an equal number
of pairs.
The information at x that there were n1 pairs of shoes in the closet in
1950 was available (even if they were actually never counted. Now, suppose
that the agent’s grandfather dies. The information now is lost forever. Let
us assume that in 2007 there is some state of information y. Since the infor-
mation in regards to the agent’s grandfather’s number of shoes is lost forever,
the information is not and never will be available to anyone. The assump-
tion that richer states of information are either concurrent or temporally
later has now been rejected.
So, what this shows is that states of information need not be concerned
only with states of information that are temporally concurrent, nor that
an agent may simply have ‘missed’ accessing a state of information due to
happenstance. Rather, what it shows is that the temporal order and the
information order are distinct.
The fact that x is before y and yet x > y implies that there has been
‘degradation’ of information. The grandson will never find himself in a posi-
tion to know what the information x contained. But, knowability in principle
still holds. Had the grandson been alive in 1950, he would have been able to
count the number of shoes. But, the degradation of information means that
he never knows what n1 was, and to reiterate, this means that the richer
state of information is temporally earlier. Elsewhere I have summarized the
point like this:
20I, myself, for example, have no idea how many pairs of shoes I or my daughter possess
at any one time.
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A crucial question that confronts any attempt to show that some ver-
sions of anti-realism fit this states-of-information scheme is how one
makes sense of the accessibility relation. In particular, the “in prin-
ciple” cases. . .make clear that we cannot expect the temporal order
to match nicely with the order of “extension of information”; at least,
we cannot expect it if we hope to avoid the immediate refutation of
the idea that truth is epistemically constrained. . . (Davies and DeVidi
2005, 5)
(3) Another scenario, though, is this: suppose that no one was suitably
placed at the right time to see the shooting star. It does not mean
that the existence of the shooting star (is or) was unknowable.
This example does not show the failure of the universality of the anti-realist
principle, under the interpretation we assume here. Given an appropriate
interpretation of states of information, p is knowable. Anyone could have
been awake at 4:30 and be looking towards the sky. Had they been so they
would have witnessed the shooting star, it just so happened that no one did.
There is still some s-o-i y, then, where yKp. It just so happens that no
one gains access to this state of information. It is still the case that there
is a state of information where p is not known and a state of information
where p is known. Again y (where y could have been accessed, but never
was) extends x: x < y.
(1)–(3) make clear how the states of information idea yields a natural ac-
count of the important notion of knowability in principle. Without building
in knowability in principle into states of information semantics the univer-
sality of the knowability principle is jeopardized. For all p true at x it is
or was knowable that p, so there is some state of information extending x
at which Kp. But, as noted, this does not imply that for all p, p was or
ever will be known — this is the notion of in principle knowability we have
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available.
So, states of information allows one to maintain the universality of p →
♦Kp without thereby being committed to p → Kp. The epistemic anti-
realist principle, based on states of information semantics, allows one to say
that, given the diamond operator, interpreted as possibly ranging over states
of information, if x p, then x ♦Kp, and so there exists a state y such that
x 6 y and y Kp. So, the universality of p → ♦Kp is maintained. But since
y 6= x is possible, 2x p → Kp, so p → Kp, at least sometimes fails to be
true.
Given that states of information semantics is the philosophical motiva-
tion for taking intuitionistic logic as the logical foundation for anti-realism
negation cannot be interpreted classically. The natural interpretation of
x  ¬q in states if information semantics is that x contains information that
rules out q — that is, there is no information compatible with x that would
establish q. Thus, in states of information semantics ¬Kp does not mean
that p is unknown, but that p is unknowable.21
As we shall presently see, the states of information semantics I have used
in this sketch of a counterexample to Fitch’s paradox yields, in a completely
natural way, intuitionistic propositional logic as the correct logic. This has
important consequences in the remainder of the chapter. The remaining
counterexamples in paraconsistent logics rely on states of information se-
mantics — it is in this loose sense that they rely on intuitionistic logic (since
that is the logic for which states of information is developed). But, minimal
logic, Jaśkowski’s system, and relevance logic do not rely on intuitionistic
logic per se. Rather, they rely on the extra machinery I add by using states
of information semantics in order to develop the counterexamples.22 The
21This means, then, that ¬Kp → ¬p should be valid.
22In other words, the counterexamples do not become intuitionistic, but require the
semantics which provides the philosophical motivation for intuitionistic logic.
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order of explanation is this: take, for instance, relevance logic — in order to
develop a counterexample in relevance logic we need more machinery than
relevance logic alone provides — extra machinery that brings states of infor-
mation into the picture. Therefore states of information semantics is used
in all counterexamples, but they happen to be principled for intuitionistic
logic.
The relationship between states of information and intuitionistic logic is
easiest to see by considering Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic.
The relevant definitions of Kripke frames for propositional intuitionistic
logic, then, are:
A Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉 consists of a set W of points and a relation
R between those points. An interpretation I is a map that assigns a set
of I (x) of atomic sentences to each s-o-i/possible world. If xRy, then
I (x) ⊆ I (y). We define a sentence holding as a s-o-i as follows:
- If B is atomic, then B holds at x iff B ∈ I (x) (this reflects the idea
that the interpretation tells us which atoms are true at each s-o-i).
- P ∧Q holds at x iff P holds at x and Q holds at x (this means that a
conjunction holds exactly when each conjunct holds).
- P ∨Q holds at x iff P holds at x or Q holds at x.
- ¬P holds at some s-o-i iff there is no s-o-i extending23 x at which P
holds, i.e. ¬∃y(xRy ∧ p holds at y)
- P → Q holds at some s-o-i x iff for all y extending x if P holds at y
then Q holds at y.(Davies and DeVidi 2005)
- We write x  P or x P for the claim that P holds at x.
23‘Extension of information’ means that if state of information y is an extension of state
of information x then it contains all the information contained in x (with whatever other
information is added if it is a ‘richer’ state of information
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This formal semantics is well known to validate intuitionistic proposi-
tional logic. Comparison of the clauses especially those for atoms, negations
and conditionals, with the discussion above will make it no surprise that
states of information semantics originates as a heuristic for discussion of
these frames.
To conclude, this section has provided philosophic motivations for states
of information semantics and therefore a reason for accepting intuitionistic
logic as the underlying logic, and the machinery to do so.24 Note that there
is an immediate distinction between classical logic and intuitionistic logic
that assists in employing states of information in discussion of knowability.
When I say that ¬Kp means that p is unknowable, it is because of states
of information semantics. To say x  ¬Kp means, not that p is unknown,
but unknowable, given the information in x — that is, there is no state of
information y > x where y  ¬Kp .
Shortly we will be construct counterexamples in different systems of logic
which will be shown to be non ad hoc on the basis of states of information
semantics. However, as mentioned, we will first consider a more straight-
forward use of possible world semantics and constructivism as alternatives,
and show them to be insufficient.
5.5.1 Possible World Semantics
It is not immediately clear why possible world semantics would or should be
taken to be problematic. Indeed there do seem to be several benefits to this
semantics:
(1) in possible world semantics the diamond in p → ♦Kp means that
24Some work that has been done in relation to states of information semantics can be
found in (Davies and DeVidi 2005), (DeVidi and Solomon 2001), and (DeVidi and Kenyon
2003).
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there is some possible world in which it is known (by somebody) that
p. Thus, it appears that p → ♦Kp doesn’t collapse into p → Kp.
(2) one might imagine that one of the virtues of possible world semantics
is that, since it is not generally required that if xRy and if x 6 y, then
all atoms that are true at x are true at y (that is q(x) 6 q(y)), we
need not assume that information is “persistent,” and so it allows us
to take better account of the fact that information can degrade (i.e.,
things may be forgotten, not witnessed and so nobody — in this world
— could know that event x happened). But, suppose that there are
two agents, agent a, who lives in world x, and agent b, who lives in
world y. a might possess different information than b and vice versa.
But, one might say that neither needs to have access to a ‘richer’ state
of information than the other. This is the case with s-o-i semantics.
See note 22). Both a and b could gain access to the information state of
the other. a gaining access to information from world y and b gaining
access to information from world x may increase their knowledge base,
but neither world contains more information than the other — just
different information. The difference is that this new information may
be incompatible with what is in x or y, so this needn’t be an extension
— accepting the new information might require rejecting something
previously accepted.
A metaphysical reason for rejecting possible world semantics in favour of
states of information semantics is the fact that a satisfactory answer con-
cerning their nature has still not been provided: are they real, but nonactual?
Are they real and actual (where actual would need to be given an appropri-
ate reading other than the usual sense)? Are they neither real nor actual,
but just a useful way of conceptualizing and explaining certain problems?
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Possible world semantics might be employed to make sense of the para-
dox of knowability. Someone advocating this type of semantics would need
to make clear how one could have two worlds x and y such that W xp,
W 2xKp, xRy, and W yKp, for some x. How this is to be done is not clear
and thus the required clarity is simply not available. States of information,
on the other hand, can be made sense of without any heavy metaphysical
disputes.
Second, and more importantly, a reason for shifting the discussion from
possible world semantics to states of information semantics is that infor-
mational states concern this world. That is, although sometimes states of
information are called ‘points’, this is merely for convenience. The infor-
mation is in the actual world and the ‘points’ are just a metaphorical way
of describing a collection of information. For instance, call a point x, at x
there is information that there are mice in the house. There is some further
point y, which extends x, where the information is available that there are
mice in the house and there are bats in the yard. We can use information
to capture what is meant by knowability for actual agents in a much more
natural sense. The anti-realist principle would likewise be restricted, and it
seems natural to interpret the knowability of truths as knowable by actual
agents.
But, apart from these considerations there are more important reasons
for rejecting possible world semantics.
Even if the above seemingly beneficial aspects of possible world seman-
tics, noted at the beginning of this section could be fleshed out in detail,
there is very important problem that is insurmountable for the anti-realist.
Why can the anti-realist who opts for possible world semantics not appeal
to intuitionistic logic? Or, why is the semantics not sufficient in and of
itself to block Fitch style arguments? It is, indeed, possible to interpret the
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diamond in such a way that it necessitates a shift in worlds to go from ♦Kp
to Kp. But, underneath an appropriate interpretation of the diamond, the
logic is classical. This means that the paradox still follows — the anti-realist
principle would, in other words, collapse into p → Kp. Take even a weak
modal logic and a reasonably behaved knowledge operator, then anti-realist
principle implies that all truths are known.
So, the paradox of knowability cannot be avoided and hence the anti-
realist principle becomes absurd. An anti-realist simply cannot appeal to
possible world semantics, because it does not have the machinery necessary
to avoid the collapse from every truth being in principle knowable and every
truth being known.
5.5.2 Kvanvig’s and Percival’s Objections
Intuitionistic logic provides an interpretation of negation and the conditional
that diverges from that of classical logic, one under which you cannot move
beyond line (11) in the proof given.25 An argument was already presented in
a previous section which showed that (1) intuitionistic logic provides a block
to the paradox of knowability given the rejection of double negation elimi-
nation; (2) states of information semantics, which is particularly suited to
intuitionistic logic, provides the philosophical motivation. Using intuition-
istic logic is not, however, accepted as a solution by some authors,26 as it
is seen as ad hoc. Considering the problems these authors raise will clarify
why it is not simply advocacy of intuitionistic logic that solves the paradox,
but advocacy of a particular interpretation — an interpretation other than
the usual constructivist one.
Line (11) of the proof is p → ¬¬Kp, so even if intuitionistic rather than
classical logic is correct, p → ¬¬Kp must be accepted by the anti-realist.
25That is, you cannot conclude p → Kp from p → ¬¬Kp.
26See amongst others (Kvanvig 1995) and (Percival 1991).
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Kvanvig, (Kvanvig 1995) however, maintains that p → ¬¬Kp is problematic
in and of itself:
[I]t is hard to see what makes the second claim [P → ¬¬Kp] so much
better than the first [P → Kp]. At the very least, the intuitionist owes
us an explanation about why to affirm the second claim (other than
that the knowability paradox forces us to). (Kvanvig 1995, 481-500)
from (DeVidi and Solomon 2001, 332-332)
However, DeVidi and Solomon (DeVidi and Solomon 2001) respond to
such objections by claiming that not being able to describe p → Kp from
p → ¬¬Kp is entirely in keeping with anti-realism:
P → ¬¬Kp says: given that P is true, then it’s possible to come
to know that P , in the sense that there is some possible consistent
extension of the current state of information which would establish that
KP . And that ought to be perfectly acceptable for an anti-realist, and
indeed, seems to capture nicely what (AR) [the anti-realist principle]
was originally formulated to capture. (DeVidi and Solomon 2001, 324)
This is the view that has thus far been developed in terms of states of
information semantics.
The fact that it follows from the validity of p → ¬¬Kp that, if x  p, then
there is some state of information where Kp is forced should be welcomed
by the anti-realist, since all truths are in principle knowable. The response
may be expressed as follows:
? p → ¬¬Kp holds at some s-o-i x iff for all y extending x if p holds
at y then ¬¬Kp holds at y. In addition, given the interpretation of
¬: ¬¬Kp holds at some s-o-i z iff there is no s-o-i extending z at
which ¬Kp holds. So, for all w ≥ z ∃t such that t ≥ w and t  Kp.
More colloquially put: if p holds at some s-o-i x, then there cannot
be a state which extends it at which ¬Kp holds. But that means that
for any extension of z, there is an extension where Kp holds. But
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an extension of z is an extension of w. Putting things together, the
validity of p → ¬¬Kp amounts to: if x  p, there is an extension
of x at which Kp, i.e., if x  p there is some information compatible
with x which allows us to know p — something an anti-realist should
be happy to endorse. The states of information response shows why
Kvanvig’s worry is not a worry at all.
Turning to the Percival objections: he equates constructivism with intu-
itionism, which in turn is equated with intuitionistic logic. His strategy is
to argue that intuitionistic logic allows derivation of consequences from the
anti-realist principle that are not acceptable on constructivist grounds. For
instance:
Since p → Kp is plainly false — not every truth is known — Fitch’s
proof appears to refute p → ♦Kp. But against this Williamson . . . and
Rasmussen and Ravnkilde . . . object that the propositional connec-
tives involved should be interpreted constructively, that so read Fitch’s
reasoning only proves p → ♦Kp ` p → ¬¬Kp, and that under this
interpretation the consequent of this entailment is true. However, this
defence of the knowability principle doesn’t work. Constructive read-
ings of ‘→’ and ‘¬’ (whatever they are, since p ranges over sentence
expressing empirical contents), presumably warrant the intuitionistic
move from p → ¬¬Kp to ¬Kp → ¬p. And the latter is false under
a constructive reading: grounds for asserting that is it never known
that p are not, and can’t be, transformed into grounds for asserting
¬p. (Percival 1991, 84)
In the background of this complaint is the assumption that an inter-
pretation of intuitionistic logic must give a constructive reading to →; i.e.,
p → q is true when there is a procedure for turning an arbitrary proof of
p, should one ever be found, into a proof of q. Hence both his reference to
the difficulty of extending the interpretation to empirical claims (where the
notion of proof does not apply) and his talk about transforming grounds for
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one claim into grounds for another.
So, Percival contends that the logical revisionist solution using intuition-
istic logic fails because of the unacceptability of:
1 ¬Kp → ¬p.
Consider also this sentence, which follows (1) and factivity (Kp → p implies
¬p → ¬Kp by an intuitionistically valid form of contraposition):
2 ¬Kp ⇔ ¬p.
Percival also views this as highly problematic. An interpretation of the prob-
lem Percival puts forward is: suppose that p is a mathematical statement.
If this is the case, then p being unknown (¬Kp) is contingent, since whether
something is known or not is always a contingent matter. p, on the other
hand, is mathematical, and so either true or false necessarily. But since (2)
is provable, we have a contingent and a necessary claim that are provably
equivalent.
As noted, above, I claim that the principled intuitionistic solution to the
paradox of knowability lies in the application of Kripke frames for proposi-
tional intuitionistic logic. A useful piece of evidence for this is that by using
such frames the ‘problems’ of using intuitionistic logic quickly dissipate.
Turning to the solution for the first of Percival’s objections, then: The
issue with ¬Kp → ¬p is, according to Percival, that grounds for not knowing
that p cannot be transformed into grounds for asserting that p is false. But,
there is are several issues here. Percival’s statement assumes we are using
constructivism (and the corresponding interpretation of ¬), which we are
not forced to do simply because we are using intuitionistic logic.
Consider now the states of information reading: ¬Kp → ¬p means that
at any state of information x such that x¬Kp, x¬p. This means that any
x that rules out knowing p also rules out p. This is, in effect, merely to insist
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on the anti-realist principle in other words.
So ¬Kp → ¬p is not counterintuitive on this reading and should be
accepted by the anti-realist.
¬Kp ⇔ ¬p, holds at some state of information x iff ¬Kp → ¬p and
¬p → ¬Kp holds at x. This means, first, that given the reading of ¬Kp
as “p is unknowable” in states of information semantics, if p is unknowable,
then p is “ruled out — there is no state of information which extends x such
that p could be forced at that state. And, second, if ¬p is the case at x, then
there is no state of information that extends x at which p is forced — so,
there is no state of information which extends x at which p is known. The
worry about necessity and contingency being equivalent dissolves because
both ¬ and ¬Kp work as peculiar sorts of modalities in this setting.
In short, given states of information semantics, this should be common-
sensical and something the anti-realist should endorse.
Constructivism was originally intended to account solely for mathemat-
ical statements, which made the constructivist-theoretic semantics a nat-
ural choice. Giving up the constructivist-theoretic semantics (DeVidi and
Solomon 2001, 325) in favour of Kripke semantics for propositional intuition-
istic logic (based on states of information), allows one, as shown above, to
resolve Percival’s objections.
5.6 Paraconsistent logics
As we have seen, dialetheism is an unsuitable ‘solution’ to the paradox of
knowability for a variety of reasons. However, there are many paraconsis-
tent systems that could seemingly block the paradox. The aim in solving a
paradox is of course not just to show that one can solve it in a particular
way but that it should solved in a particular way, i.e. as previously noted,
we need a principled solution.
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Useful references to more systems of paraconsistent logics are to be found
in (Priest 1987), (Priest 1998), (Brady 2003). Note, though, that the authors
admit that their discussions are not exhaustive of all paraconsistent systems.
It is not entirely clear what distinguishes one system from another, e.g., a
system may have different axioms from another, yet the same principles are
provable, for example. Other systems, by reinterpreting the operators, may
have the same axioms but, given the alternate readings of the operators,
lead to differences in what is provable in the systems. In seeking a principled
solution, three paraconsistent systems in particular appear to be promising:
Johansson’s minimal logic, Jaśkowski’s non-adjunctive system, and relevance
logics. Of course, there are many relevance logics — too many to consider
them individually, so I will focus on Routley-Meyer’s version of relevance
logic.
5.6.1 Minimal — Intuitionistic — Classical Logic
Dag Prawitz, in ‘Ideas and Results in Proof Theory’ (Prawitz 1975) provides
a Gentzen-style system of natural deduction27for Johansson’s Minimal logic.
For present purposes, one important feature of minimal logic is that it makes
clear that a non-explosive system need not reject reductio. The operators are
defined in the familiar way in terms of introduction and elimination rules.
Most salient for this discussion is how negation is introduced and eliminated.
There is a negation introduction rule:28
[A]
⊥
27This just means that there are introduction, and corresponding elimination rules for
each operator.
28Notice that, as in intuitionistic logic, ¬A iff A →⊥ (¬A means that A reduces to
absurdity). Therefore, ⊥ is suitable interpreted as ‘ad falsum’. The difference is that ⊥ in









Here, of course, ⊥ is a logical absurdity. These in combination with the
standard rules governing the other operators ∧,∨,→ result in propositional
minimal logic. Notice that minimal logic is not explosive, but that reductio
ad absurdum is a valid rule of inference — in fact, RAA is important in the
definition of the negation operator — ¬-introduction is, essentially, RAA.




Adding explosion to minimal logic rule results in intuitionistic logic. Notice
that in neither minimal, nor intuitionistic logic, do any of the accepted rules
of inference imply that reductio ad absurdum results in the permissibility of
double negation elimination.29




29It is possible to get confused on this point. It is helpful to distinguish reductio — the
principle that allows one to conclude ¬A if one derives an absurdity from A — from indirect
proof — the principle that allows one to conclude A upon deriving an absurdity from ¬A.
Reductio and DNE clearly make indirect proof valid; if ¬A allows proof of an absurdity,
then ¬¬A follows by reductio and A by DNE. Conversely, indirect proof validates DNE.
Both minimal logic and intuitionistic logic validate reductio, but not indirect proof.
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A
gives us classical logic.
It should be plausible, and it is not hard to prove, that explosion is not
derivable from the other rules of minimal logic.30 Minimal logic is, as a
result, paraconsistent.
By employing minimal logic it is easy to block the knowability paradox.
However, it does not block it by preventing reductio as Beall does. Instead,
the key point is that minimal logic does not validate double-negation elim-
ination. It is the rejection of DNE that blocks the proof. The proof is now
blocked from lines (11) to (12): that is, we cannot move from p → ¬¬Kp to
p → Kp.
As is well known, DNE also fails for intuitionistic logic. Indeed, there is
substantial philosophical literature touting intuitionistic logic as the vehicle
for a solution of the knowability paradox built around exactly this point.
Notice that we are able to conclude that p → ¬¬Kp. This is precisely the
point at which the intuitionist will and should be able to block the proof.31
The lesson to be learned from the discussion concerning minimal logic
is not that a system of paraconsistent logic has been found that can block
the proof, but that it does so in virtue of features it has in common with
intuitionistic logic. Let us see how this squares with states of information
semantics. Here I shall simply quote myself from above (the section concern-
ing Percival’s objections), since he objected to the derivation of p → ¬¬Kp
30Minimal logic simply does not have the logical machinery for it to be explosive.
31Notice that both minimal and intuitionistic logic will actually block the proof from
lines (10)–(11) in my formulation of the proof, since neither accept that the De Morgan
negation rule. But since it is possible to reformulate the proof in such a way as to avoid
using de Morgan negation laws, it is more appropriate to view the proof as blocked from
lines (11)–(12).
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in intuitionistic logic. Remember that the problem of DNE was solved in
virtue of the states of information semantics as follows:
? p → ¬¬Kp holds at some s-o-i x iff for all y extending x if p holds
at y then ¬¬Kp holds at y. In addition, given the interpretation of
¬: ¬¬Kp holds at some s-o-i z iff there is no s-o-i extending z at
which ¬Kp holds. So, for all w ≥ z ∃t such that t ≥ w and t  Kp.
More colloquially put: if p holds at some s-o-i x, then there cannot
be a state which extends it at which ¬Kp holds. But that means that
for any extension of z, there is an extension where Kp holds. But
an extension of z is an extension of w. Putting things together, the
validity of p → ¬¬Kp amounts to: if x  p, there is an extension of x
at which Kp, i.e., if x  p there is some information compatible with
x which allows us to know p.
To sum up: minimal logic can block the proof, because it is not strong enough
yet to permit double negation elimination. But what is the motivation?
Perhaps someone will come up with a minimal-logic based philosophical
motivation. For the time being, at least, it seems that states of information
are the best way to motivate this. So states of information semantics and
machinery shared with intuitionistic logic are what motivate this block.
5.6.2 Jaśkowski’s System
One way to understand Jaśkowski’s non-adjunctive system logical system
(which is somewhat peculiar) is to imagine a discourse with more than one
discussant. The contribution of each discussant is self-consistent, but may be
inconsistent with the input of others. Anything that a discussant contributes
to the discourse is classed as ‘holding’ (or ‘true’) in the discourse. And so,
conjunction fails ‘discursively’.
The reason Jaśkowski’s system is paraconsistent is that A might hold in
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the model and B might hold in the model, but A and B may be contribu-
tions from different discussants. If A and B are contributions from different
discussants, then A and B hold in the model, but A ∧ B does not (since,
‘non-adjunctive’ means that ∧-I is not permitted. In particular, given the
consistency requirement, it would need to be the case that, if B is ¬A, we
can’t have (using an obvious notation) M xA and M x¬A, since it would
mean that an agent asserts a contradiction. The system is classed as para-
consistent, since it is possible within the system for A to hold at some x,
call it x1, and ¬A holds at x2, x1 6=x2, and so both A and ¬A “hold” — but
not for the same agent (or the same point) in the system.
Would such a logic provide a solution to the paradox of knowability?
Perhaps: so far we have not said enough about the system to say with much
confidence whether a counterexample can be developed. So let’s look at a few
crucial features of Jaśkowski’s logic. First, notice that the arrow operator
in Jaśkowski’s system is not equivalent to the material conditional (this will
be made clear when the counterexample is developed).
If there is going to be a philosophical case for the claim that Jaśkowski’s
system provides tools for the anti-realist to block the knowability paradox it
must at least provide a counterexample to Fitch’s proof:
A case in Jaśkowski’s system which shows the invalidity of Fitch style argu-
ments needs to make it the case that the anti-realist principle holds at all
points32 in a Jaśkowski model, but that there is (at least) one case in which
the conclusion fails. That is, the anti-realist principle holds universally, but
p → Kp does not.
A crucial feature of the system is the definition of what it means for a
discussant to assert something.
32I interpret a ‘point’ to be that part of the model at which some agent a makes their
assertions. So, if agent a asserts A, B, and C, then M aA, M aB, and M aC.
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- M d A iff for some w in M , M w A.
We read this as follows: A holds discursively in a model M iff at some world
in the model, w, A is true at w. The worlds of the model are the discussants’
discursive contributions. Further features of Jaśkowski’s system that must
be noted before proceeding to give a counterexample are:
(a) In this system, the arrow operator is defined as ‘discursive implication’.
Discursive implication is defined as follows: A ⊃dB iff MA ⊃ B, where
M is interpreted as a possibility operator (read as something along the
lines of: “if anyone states that A, then B” (Priest 1987) (174)). Note
that I shall use  for the diamond in discursive implication in order to
avoid confusion with the diamond in the anti-realist principle, while
still avoiding the unfamiliar M for possibility. Further we are here
presuming that  is an S5 operator, by assuming that all discussants
have “access” to all others, when “anyone” is used in this gloss. This
is the way Priest (Priest 1987) interprets .
(b) The interpretation of  assumes that everyone has access to the asser-
tions of everyone else.
The counterexample begins with a standard Kripke semantics for modal
logic, involving a two-place accessibility relation R. Since there are two
modalities at work in the system we need another accessibility relation R.
A model now consists of < W, R,R>, where R is the accessibility relation
for  and R is the accessibility relation for ♦. Given that both diamonds
are types of possibility, they are both two-place relations.
What would a counterexample be like? As noted, it would have to be
such that:
(1) p ⊃ ♦Kp holds at every world x, x ∈ W
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(2) p ⊃ Kp fails at (at least) one world x, x ∈ W s
So,
(1) ∀x ∈ M , M xp ⊃ ♦Kp
(2) ∃x ∈ M , M 2xp ⊃ Kp
From (1), we have
(3) ∀x ∈ M , M x¬p ∨ ♦Kp
While (2) gives us
(4) ∃x ∈ M , M 2x¬p ∨Kp
That is,
(5) ∃x(M 2x¬p and M 2xKp)
Let’s refer to such an x as a,
(6) From (5) M 2a¬p and so from (3) M a♦Kp
So
(7) There must be some b such that aRb and M bKp where a 6= b, since
we know that M 2aKp. That is ∃b(aRb and M bKp)
We can now see why it was necessary to include distinct accessibility relations
for ♦ and . For, since M bKp, we have M aKp. But, as noted,
M 2a♦Kp. So the accessibility relation between points for ♦ from the one
for  must differ. In particular the accessibility relation for ♦ cannot be
symmetrical.
So, we must expand the semantics by adding a new accessibility relation
for ♦. And it needs to be a relation that accounts for the fact that where
there is an ‘unknown truth’, i.e. some p such that for some w, M 2wp → Kp,
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there is some other discussant 2 such that wR2 and M 2Kp. In any
conversation, then, if p is ‘true’, but someone does not know it, someone
else suitably related to discussant 1 does know that p. The question now is
how to motivate that assumption.
This is where Jaśkowski’s system ceases to be of help to the anti-realist,
as it does not provide a principled solution to the knowability paradox. In
order to develop a philosophically motivated solution I will appeal again
to states of information. I will argue that the only way to understand the
difference in the cognitive states of the agents is to build in a notion of
extensions of information. That is, it must be the case that discussant 2
has access to more information than discussant 1. So discussant 2 is in the
position to know that p, but discussant 1 is not.
How, then, might a principled restriction be imposed? The question to
start with is how one could motivate ♦Kp being true at one point, with Kp
holding at some other. A natural reading is to take the relation between the
points as one of extended information (new discoveries and the like).33 Such
an interpretation of R seems to require that it be reflexive and transitive,
but not symmetric. Thus it is a pre-ordering rather than an equivalence
relation — otherwise Kp would be accessible to everyone.
If R is interpreted as a pre-ordering, then p → ♦Kp can hold at each
world, but p → Kp fails at at least one world in the model.
The question now is whether we can make the counterexample compati-
ble with the discursive semantics. It is, indeed, quite possible to construct a
counterexample, but as noted earlier not merely by using the machinery of
Jaśkowski’s system. Traditionally Jaśkowski’s system interprets the discur-
33This is why states of information, or points, are here used interchangeably with, what
Jaśkowski calls possible worlds. Extensions of information is a much more natural notion
for this counterexample. For a discussion concerning this, see amongst others (DeVidi and
Solomon 2005)
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sive frames as ‘full-frames’, and so the accessibility relation relevant for the
system must be symmetric, transitive, and reflexive.
But, by appealing to states of information semantics we see that a non-
symmetric accessibility relation is necessary. Although all participants in
the ‘discussion’ may have access to all of the assertions of the each other,
it cannot be the case that they have access to equivalent information. This
cannot be the case because, as made clear earlier, it is quite possible for
M A and M ¬A to hold in the same frame, but then it must be the case
that M xA and M y¬A, where x 6= y. The reason for this, to restate the
point, is that otherwise a contradiction would be derivable at a single point
in the system — something Jaśkowski’s system does not permit.
Privileging states of information means that the interpretation of ‘what
holds’ in Jaśkowski’s system must account for an agent having more or less
information available to them.
As with minimal logic, it seems that this solution is not peculiar to dis-
cursive logic. Once again, given that the notion of states of information
semantics is explicated in terms of Kripke semantics for propositional intu-
itionistic logic, the solution is due to virtues of that semantics, not discursive
logic in particular. p → Kp is intuitionistically true at w1 if and only if for
all wx such that w1Rwx, if  w1p, then  wxKp, where R is a pre-order (i.e.
reflexive and transitive), and so an agent at point w1 does not have access
to the information at wx. Both p and ♦Kp are now true at w1, Kp is true
at some later state of information, call it w2, such that w1 6= w2 and w1Rw2.
So, now we have a counterexample. But we get it only by appending ma-
chinery we have seen to be naturally associated with intuitionistic logic; the
philosophical motivation is similarly also not specifically Jaśkowskian, but
due to states of information. Indeed, without the pre-ordering restriction of
the relation between points, I do not see a way of getting a counterexample
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to the proof at all.
So, in order to build a counterexample in this system, with suitable extra
logical machinery ‘bolted on’ we can get a counterexample to the paradox.
But, the extra machinery does not share motivations with Jaśkowski’s sys-
tem. And it is precisely the machinery of intuitionistic logic which we saw
provides the motivated solution.
5.6.3 Relevance Logic
In order to build a counterexample to Fitch’s proof in relevance logic we
shall consider the standard account of the arrow operator given by Routley
and Meyers (Priest 1987), which is:
A → B is true at a world a ⇐⇒ for all worlds b and c such that Rabc
either A is false at b or B is true at c.
The counterexample in relevance logic, shall be based, for similar reasons
as the Jaśkowski counterexample was, on standard Kripke semantics for
relevance logics. The relevant part of a Kripke frame consists of a set of
worlds and a three-place accessibility relation among the worlds: < W, R >.
However, given that the anti-realist principle involves the modality ♦, the
definition of an appropriate frame expands to < W, R,R>. Here again, W
is the set of worlds, R is the accessibility relation between worlds for the
arrow operator, and R is the binary accessibility relation for ♦.
A counterexample will be an interpretation such that for all worlds x,
x  p → ♦Kp and at the particular world a, a 2 p → Kp. So, it will
effectively show that for all worlds the anti-realist principle holds, but that
at some world a, a 2 p → Kp. Hence:
(1) a  p → ♦Kp
(2) a 2 p → Kp
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So from (1),
(3) ∀b, c ∈ W,Rabc ⇒ (b 2 p or c  ♦Kp)
While from (2),
(4) ∃d, e(Rade and (d  p and e 2 Kp))
Let us look more closely at d and e. Since Rade from (3) we have,
(5) d 2 p or e  ♦Kp
Thus, since d  p by (4),
(6) ∃f(eRf and f  Kp)
But, e 6= f because we already know that e 2 Kp from (4). This shows that
it is possible to construct a counterexample to the knowability paradox, since
the anti-realist principle holds at a (in fact at all worlds), but p → Kp does
not hold at a.
Again, we must appeal to states of information semantics to make sense
of the relevance logic counterexample: R is not an accessibility relation
required by relevance logic. Appending it to the usual relevance logic se-
mantics allows us to force it to be the case that Kp is false at e, but true at
f and eRf .
What kind of relation would R be, if it’s to be such that whenever p
is true, but unknown at e, there is an R-related f at which p is known?
Again, it seems to me, we must appeal to states of information semantics. e
is an earlier (less rich) state of information than f , so e 2 Kp and f  Kp.
So, again, a solution is possible, but the motivations that block the proof
do not come from relevance logic. Instead the motives are the same as the
intuitionistic logic account.
So, p → ♦Kp holds at every s-o-i and Kp hold at some ‘later’ or ‘richer’
state of information. Whether or not an agent actually ever reaches this
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state of information where they gain the information that p is true is not the
issue, only that they could. This is what is essential to the counterexample.34
To conclude, if the anti-realist principle is to make sense at all in terms
of relevance logic, then it must developed in terms of s-o-i semantics. The
counterexample, then, is similar to the one developed for intuitionistic logic,
minimal logic, and Jaśkowski’s non-adjunctive system .
5.7 Conclusion
Returning to the investigation as to whether paraconsistency is a suitable
method to block Fitch style arguments the following main lessons have been
learned. First, according to J.C. Beall (Beall 2000) a dialetheist can use true
epistemic contradictions as a solution to the proof, but remains neutral as
to whether they should. We have seen reasons to question even this limited
optimism. The objections which I raised against dialetheism shows that a
dialetheist, who does not adhere to a particular system of logic, but merely
the rejection of RAA, cannot give a solution to the paradox at all — the
result was shown to be wrong (not just questionable) on the basis of the last
objection.
Second, the three subsequent systems of paraconsistent logics discussed
can provide interesting blocks to the proof — all given in terms of states of
information semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic.
Therefore, as shown above, there is nothing in paraconsistency itself
that offers a motivated, non ad hoc, solution to the paradox of knowability.
34What precisely accessibility in principle is is not fully discussed at this point. Although
I have begun work in states of information semantics, my work is not complete and the
story I have to tell thus far is based on the bare bones of a research project I intend to
undertake in the future. Therefore a full discussion of the in principle notion of states of
information semantics would take us too far afield of the current discussion.
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Rather the motivation comes from the features that must be added to the
system, that are part of the solution using intuitionistic logic. Those familiar
with the literature, will find in this endorsement of intuitionistic logic as
the logic for anti-realism an echo of much work done by anti-realists about
particular domains of discourse.
The overall conclusion, then, is that intuitionistic logic is the system
which should be used to block the proof35 — and from the systems we have
discussed is the only one which provides a non ad hoc solution. And, more-
over, since intuitionistic logic is the logic that validates states of information
semantics, it seems to be the correct system of conventionalism.
The Kripke semantics, laid out above, also shows that we can invoke a
notion of knowability faithful to the externalist picture endorsed throughout
the dissertation. It need not be the case that any one agent is in the position
to know p, just that if p is true it is possible to come to know that p. Relating
this to community-based semantics we see that this is highly desirable. If
any one in the community has access to the state of information in which
that agent knows p, and that agent is able to point out to others that p is
or was the case.
But, it is also possible that no one in the community comes to know
that p. Just because p is true, it need not be the case that p is known,
even if it is knowable. This is consistent with the notion, raised in chapter
one, that knowability for conventionalist semantics needs to be understood
as knowability in principle, not actuality. Thus use-based semantics of con-
ventionalism is a defensible and, indeed desirable, position, and one which is
fundamentally tied to intuitionistic logic and states of information semantics.
35Remember that intuitionistic logic provides the machinery necessary, and states of





I have been calling the theory presented in this dissertation neo-Dummettian.
In some respects I have remained close to the spirit of the original Dummet-
tian stance, for instance by incorporating the overarching maxims. (Dum-
mett 1973), (Dummett 1993). However, in the course of the investigations
in the first five chapters we have seen various ways in which Dummett’s
views need clarification, supplementation, or modification. For instance, in
Chapter Three we saw that de-fanging Williamson’s objection required that
we reject Dummett’s commitment to luminosity, and that we could do so
by giving closer scrutiny to what manifestability involves — a process that
revealed the need to supplement Dummett’s view with a commitment to a
division of linguistic labour.
Division of linguistic labour is an essential feature of the externality of
language. As I showed in Chapter Three one can be, with respect to a bit
of language, a competent linguistic agent (the robin example); an incompe-
tent linguistic agent (the toadflax example); or an agent can with a fairly
colloquial competence, sufficient to know how to use the term appropriately
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in certain circumstances, but with knowledge that is incomplete. But in all
cases I can achieve some useful things using the words in question.
In the first case I can use the term appropriately (unless referring to
Australian robins). In the second example, I cannot use the term at all,
except via appeal to a suitable authority. The third example, regarding
knowledge of the meaning of ‘geophysics’, is that I can apply limited knowl-
edge in certain circumstance, but an appropriate authority can supplement
the knowledge so that I can use the lexical item in more circumstances. The
point is not that ‘geophysics’ has a limited meaning in my mouth and a
fuller one in theirs. Rather, it is that they can teach me more about what
the words means when I use it. Knowledge of meaning is inherently bound
up with correct usages of lexical items, and hence with competence or incom-
petence as a linguistic agent. This is consistent with the Wittgensteinean
maxims — which are basically what it means to be a conventionalist.
In sound bite form, as described in Chapter One, the major features of
conventionalism are that:
(1) meaning is intersubjective.
(2) meaning is public (meaning does not reside in the head).
(3) meaning is use-based (competent speakers must grasp the rules of the
language game to be able to use lexical items appropriately). It is the
patterns of behaviour of the linguistic community which determines
whether the rules of correct use are being followed.
(4) meaning is two-aspect in nature. That is, the meaning of, for in-
stance, a declarative sentence, is determined both by the conditions
under which an agent would be warranted in asserting it, and by the
things an agent is warranted in inferring upon hearing it asserted. In
short, the aspects are the assertion conditions and the (immediate)
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consequences.
(6) meaning is manifestable. There are no aspects of the meaning of a
lexical item that are private, nor are there any that are beyond our
ken — all aspects of meaning can be made “available” to any linguistic
agent.
Before giving a more extensive explanation, note that, any decent or
plausible theory of meaning must, according to Dummett, be closely tied to
the notion of Fregean thoughts. But it’s important not to confuse Fregean
thoughts with other things we might be tempted to call ‘thoughts’.
For Frege, thoughts — the contents of acts of thinking — are not con-
stituents of the stream of consciousness. . . The reason is that thoughts
are objective. . . On Frege’s view, thoughts and their constituent sense
form a ‘third realm’ of timeless and immutable entities which do not
depend for their existence on being grasped or expressed. (Dummett
1993, 22-23)
There is an important distinction between the role of thoughts in the
philosophies of Frege and Dummett. Frege’s view was that thoughts are
explanatorily primary: they are the meaning of sentences and understanding
a sentence is a matter of grasping a thought — and so being in a special
relationship with something in the platonic realm. Dummett reverses the
Fregean view. Sentences have meaning, but there is no abstract third realm
where thoughts reside. Thus sentences and the rules governing their use are
explanatorily primary and meanings that are secondary. Dummett’s reasons
for this inversion are, primarily, because one cannot gain access to the third
realm. Some sort of bridge, as one might call it, is needed. Dummett turns
to intersubjectivity, rather than objectivity.
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6.2 Conventionalism — Motivations
It was mentioned in Chapter Two that Gricean semantics and Dummet-
tian semantic conventionalism share (at least) two motivations. Both the
third realm and behaviourism are rejected. However, whilst Grice opts for
intention-based semantics, Dummett opts for conventionalism.
As noted in the introductory chapter, the main thing I set out to do, that
is my motivation for investigating semantic conventionalism is that it seems
to me a viable theory, even in light of semantic theories which are thought by
some to be obviously stronger and in the face of potentially serious, knock-
down, objections — a point of view not shared by many. Thus I needed to
respond to two issues, namely: (1) the idea that semantic conventionalism
is an obviously weaker theory than others and (2) that various knock-down
arguments can be raised — thus showing conventionalism to be dead in the
water.
Tackling (1), by using Gricean semantics as a case study, I have shown
that semantic conventionalism is not obviously weaker than this very popular
approach to semantics. Indeed, in light of objections raised in the chapter
regarding intention-based semantics, it seems that, at least in typical cases,
the conventions of linguistic meaning must exist prior to the intentions a
linguistic agent has when making an utterance. One is only able to gauge
the intentions of the speaker on the basis of the shared understanding of the
language. Hence conventionalism is in a better position than intention-based
theories, at least if these are supposed to be semantic theories.
Tackling (2) involved showing that the knock-down arguments were not
knock-down after all. In these cases, though, the reasoning not involved in
refuting the arguments has told us more about what conventionalism must
be like if it is to be defensible. The main point of this concluding chapter is
to sum up these lessons we have learned along the way.
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Most of these lessons can be profitably described as clarifications of one
sort or another of the six criteria that I take to be fundamental to Dummet-
tian motivated conventionalism.
6.3 Conventionalist Conditions
6.3.1 Meaning is intersubjective.
Meaning is something that arises from the use of lexical items by the lin-
guistic community. Note, though, that it is conceivable that at some time
there might be no person in the community who has a grasp of the mean-
ing of a term and yet the term has a meaning. That is, suppose that all
theoretical physicists were to disappear, so everyone with a clear grasp of
the use of the term ‘quark’ would be lost to the community. There are two
options for dealing with such scenarios: (1) we could say that in this case
the term ‘quark’ ceases to have meaning and is taken out of the linguistic
repertoire. (2) we could say that the meaning of the term ‘quark’ can be
taken to be in principle knowable . Supposing that those in know about
the meaning of the term disappear completely is fine. One must not ignore
the fact that this could have been otherwise, nor that there may come a
time when, e.g., someone discovered the manuscripts of the physicists and
relearns what ‘quark’ means. Whether (1) or (2) is correct would seem to
depend on what information is left behind that would allow those left behind
to learn the proper use of the term.
In Chapter Five states of information semantics was developed as a philo-
sophical motivation for the application of intuitionistic logic. As that chapter
made clear, the states of information framework is necessary and philosoph-
ically well motivated for anti-realism — which in turn, at least arguably,
follows from conventionalism. We needn’t rehash the whole story here. The
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present point is merely that the meanings of lexical items might be forgotten,
even by the entire linguistic community. What is right to say in such a case
depends on whether they are in a some state of information which contains
only enough information that the word must be incorporated (again) into
the stock of meaningful words (in which case then the community has access
to the lexical item) or the information continues to exist in the community
(e.g., in textbooks), even though not in any existing person’s mind and so
“the community” is in a state of information that determines the meaning
of ‘quark’ nonetheless. Basing meaning on community communicative prac-
tices allows us to make sense of the fact that meanings may be forgotten,
regained, revised, or what not.
6.3.2 Meaning is use-based.
Conceiving of meaning as use-based implies that being a competent speaker
of a language depends on the way in which one uses the language. A speaker
must always follow the rules of the language to be a competent speaker. He
must know how to use the language — and so conform to the conditions
which apply to asserting, inferring, etc. The question that follows, of course,
is how sentences (or words) are actually meaningful in virtue of use. Without
such an account conventionalism can hardly be said to be a semantic theory.
An important aspect of conventionalism is that words have the meaning
that they do in virtue of the role(s) that they play in sentences — accepts
Frege’s ‘context principle’. But notice, that this is a feature shared by holism.
But, arguably, that meaning is determined by use follows from the fact
that sentences have meaning in virtue of how they are employed by the
linguistic community — only a use-based theory allows the community to
determine meaning, and so allows for a theory that avoids the perils of
psychologism and platonism.
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Let us consider an example of a sentence that would not be accepted by
the linguistic community — “Quadruplicity drinks procrastination,” (this is
one of Russell’s examples) — the sentence has a perfectly regular form of
subject, verb, object. But the sentence does not make sense in the English
language because the word ‘quadruplicity’ has nothing to do with ‘procras-
tination’. ‘Quadruplicity’ means “fourfold nature; the condition of being
fourfold, or of forming a set of four.” (Oxford English Dictionary n.d.)
‘Procrastination’ is used to refer to the common practice where important
activities are put off, not, e.g., fourfold nature. There is, in short, no connec-
tion between the two words ‘quadruplicity’ and ‘procrastination’ and they
are never used together when connected by the verb ‘to drink’.
The conventionalist is in a good position to offer a satisfying explanation
for the sentences nonsense status — the sentence is useless in the sense
that there are no conditions under which it is assertable, nor are there any
sensible consequences of it, considered as a claim.
6.3.3 Two-aspect theory.
To call conventionalism a “two-aspect” theory simply means that the mean-
ing of a sentence is determined both by its assertion conditions and from its
consequences.
Concerning the conditions of use consider an assertion and the situation
in which it is warrantedly assertable. If I am in a position to warrantly assert
“There is water in the bottle,” I should have some evidence for making the
utterance (e.g., it is in a water bottle, it is a clear liquid, etc.). If I am
correct then my interlocutor and I are put into position to draw particular
conclusions, and/or act in a particular way, and draw further inferences (for
instance going on to say “If I am thirsty, I shall take a drink from that
bottle,” and then carrying through with the corresponding actions).
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On the other hand, if it turns out that some person has switched the
water for gin, and I find out that the bottle contains gin and not water, then
I should retract my initial assertion. Although in such cases the utterer must
retract his assertion, this need not mean that the circumstances of making
the assertion were insufficient. But finding out that the assertion was wrong
means that the consequences change. Different inferences are now licensed
which previously weren’t. And the previously licensed inferences fall by the
wayside.
So much is common currency for conventionalist views. What we have
learned about this is in the thesis is two-fold: (1) if conventionalism is to
avoid a disastrous collapse into holism, it must involve putting constraints
on which assertion conditions and which consequences contribute to meaning
and which do not.1 (2) One way to try to make this out in terms of direct
but non-logical inferences — what I call in Chapter Four, borrowing and
modifying a useful term from Brandom, the materially correct inferences.
6.3.4 Conventions are arbitrary.
The arbitrariness of conventions in regards to the meanings of lexical items
follows immediately from the fact that conventions are constituted by in-
tersubjective rules, which are determined by the behaviour in place in a
linguistic community. There is nothing about the word ‘cup’ for example
that means that it designates cups. Drinking vessels of that particular type
could easily have been termed ‘schmuck’; or have had no word attaching
particularly to them at all.
This does not mean, however, that conventions are particularly easy to
update. Often the adoption of a new convention is a long and slow process,
1There is an anticipation of just this point in Dummett’s discussion in The Logical Basis
of Metaphysics (Dummett 1991) of canonical verification conditions and consequences,
though he raises the matter when discussing logical vocabulary.
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since the entire linguistic community — or a relevant class of “experts” —
must come to accept the change. Examples to the contrary are, of course,
available, such as the adoption of the word ‘Google’ almost overnight — such
an example shows that in the linguistic community change of conventions is
possible (sometimes at a rapid pace), since once a new lexical item is accepted
by the community a whole new set of assertions becomes possible. But
generally speaking the conventional semantic theory is not open to objections
that the conventions are unfixed/easy to change/changeable on a whim, or
some such thing.
What I am currently interested in is a different form of arbitrariness
of convention, which indicates that the conventions are stronger and more
ingrained in the community then might be thought. Conventionalism, then,
means more than accepting the arbitrary nature of word meaning. The
possibility of change in the meaning of lexical items, or having had the lexical
items be otherwise, is a form of conventionalism that (almost) everyone
would agree to. For instance, no one would argue with the claim that the
certain lexical items of a language is just so by accident. ‘Water’ could have
been ‘shwhater’. It is basically a truism to say that sentences and words
could have been expressed otherwise — we might all have spoken French,
after all. It is worth pausing to consider whether language is conventional
in some richer sense.
Poincaré
As pointed out in Chapter One, there are alternative forms of convention-
alism other than those directly related to a semantic theory. Although they
concern a different field, that is not to say that we cannot use them as a guide
to the more ‘robust’ conventionalism mentioned above. After discussing ge-
ometric conventionalism, I will tie it in with semantic conventionalism.
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One sort of conventionalism that has its (perhaps benighted) defend-
ers is conventionalism about (e.g., scientific) truths, nicely summarized by
Lawrence Sklar:
Let us agree that we can offer a variety of alternative hypotheses about
the material world, all equally compatible with the possible totalities
of sensory data. . . To accept one of these hypotheses is as rational as to
accept another. They are all “equally true.” What we need is a correct
understanding of truth, realizing that it is a matter of a convention; but
since conventional truth in these matters is the best obtainable, there is
no reason to disparage it because of its conventionality. . . (Sklar 1977,
123)
This is not quite the sort of conventionalism we want, for it is not empir-
ical truth we want to have be conventional, but meanings. Let us turn, then,
to a slightly different kind of conventionalism, also familiar to philosophers
of science. Famously Poincaré was a conventionalist concerning geometry,
as Carnap (Pinco n.d.), Murzi (Murzi 2006), Sklar (Sklar 1977), and I am
sure others, have noted. As Sklar states:
Poincaré thought that we would stick to the Euclidean theory, come
what empirical data may. But this wasn’t because of an ineluctable
psychological hold the theory had on us, but because of a self-conscious
choice of the descriptively simpler alternative. . . (Sklar 1977, 128)
Poincaré notes that there are several geometries and argues that each
is compatible with all possible observations — we may need to postulate a
different selection of basic forces, for instance, if we assume space is Euclidean
from those needed to describe the phenomena if we assume a curved space,
but anything that can be done with one assumption about space can be
done with the other. There is, then, no fact of the matter as to which ‘truly’
describes space. Which geometry is assumed is a matter of convention —
the point is that we must choose some geometry to do physics — geometry,
then, becomes a framework. Which framework we use is not a forced choice,
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but rather a pragmatic decision — the point is that geometry is not in
the business of describing reality. It is just a framework. And, as Sklar
notes, if Poincaré thought that our pragmatic grounds would always lead
us to do physics in 3-D Euclidean space, a claim, ironically, made just a
couple of years before Einsteinean physics moved to centre stage we should
be conventionalists about geometry — we can decide which geometry to
accept. Perhaps one might even choose one geometry for one purpose and a
different geometry for another.
Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism is explicitly cited in The Logical
Syntax of Language (Carnap 1934), as a source of his own conventional-
ism about linguistic frameworks, as formulated in his famous Principle of
Tolerance.
The question now is what geometrical conventionalism squares can tell us
about semantic conventionalism. What is “arbitrary” in the case of geometry
is the choice of framework — this does not mean, however that everything is
conventional — the empirical data which must be accounted for is framework
independent.
Linguistic conventionalism assigns rules of language a status in many
ways similar to that assigned to geometry by Poincaré. Poincaré did not
think (notoriously) that there was any real prospect of the scientific commu-
nity opting for non-Euclidean geometry; his point was just that, in principle,
they could. Similarly, to think that our linguistic practices could be radically
different, that the rules are arbitrary, does not mean that it would be easy
or likely that we switch, nor that we were aware of making a choice when
developing the rules in the first place. It means that there are alternative
ways language might work that would let us get done the things we do with
language.
Moreover Poincaré’s view is not simply that any old geometry will do.
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It is that various geometries will all let us do something in particular —
formulate adequate physical theories. The “choice” is constrained by the
goal, and many possible geometries (e.g., one-dimensional geometries, to take
a silly example) simply will not do. Similarly, I think, conventionalism about
language needs to be understood as the claim that our linguistic practices
could be organized in quite different ways and yet we would be able to
accomplish the things we do accomplish with language.
6.3.5 Manifestability
For the conventionalist all meaning must be manifestable and externalized.
Manifestability, however, does not (as was shown in Chapter Three) imply
luminosity. There is little room in the semantic conventionalist account
of meaning for internal psychological states to play a role. Dummett, for
instance, allows the intentions of a speaker to play a role in determining
meaning in a context:
When there is undeniable ambiguity, produced by there being two dis-
tinct conventional uses of the linguistic form, what determines the force
attached to the utterance is how the speaker intends it to be under-
stood: this intention selects between two existing linguistic practices
but creates neither of them. (Dummett 1993, 119)
Note, though, that intentions have a role only after the possible meanings
are fixed in another way.
Again, meaning can only be determined by looking at what happens
‘outside the head’ — in other words, the behaviour of the community. Dum-
mettian, or neo-Dummettian, conventionalism, after all, requires thoughts
to be extruded from the intentionality of agents — intentions, in short, cease
to matter, except, as noted above, if disambiguation is needed.
It is the nature of the manifestability criterion about which we have
learned the most in this thesis — but I have already described this once in
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this concluding chapter, and so will not repeat the lessons here
6.4 Conclusion
To conclude, the six criteria of semantic conventionalism are that meaning
is (1) intersubjective; (2) public; (3) use-based; (4) two-aspect in nature; (5)
manifestable; (6) and the conventions are arbitrary.
These are all features that were drawn out in Chapters Two to Five, and
some of them considerably clarified. It is interesting to consider these criteria
together in the conclusion for a couple of reasons. The first is that it shows
that conventionalism has not simply been protected from several potentially
devastating objections and the charge that it is an obviously lesser theory
— rather, in the process we have seen the emergence of a positive and viable
theory.
Second, it has now become explicit that there is quite a bit of overlap
between the criteria — this is only to be expected, however, since at the
base lie the two maxims of meaning being determined by use and that to be
a competent user of language one must master the rules of the game.
So, although the six criteria sometimes considered in isolation in Chap-
ters Two through Five, they are inextricably bound up together. The inter-
action of the six criteria show that none of them have simply been ‘tagged’.
They all need each other to be suitable for the list of a use-based theory
of meaning. And hence, each criterion drawn out as suitable for semantic
conventionalism cannot stand alone — giving us a stronger basis for conven-
tionalism than others give it credit.
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